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Abstract 
 
The last decade has witnessed an unprecedentedly hyperactive Turkish foreign policy 
under the Justice and Development Party’s administration, which has brought Turkey to 
the spotlight of world attention.  The question “What is happening to Turkey?” has 
been raised many times by scholars of Turkish foreign policy in the West, some of 
whom have found a shift of axis in Turkish foreign policy. They claimed that Turkish 
foreign policy is turning away from the Western world towards the Middle East and 
Asia.  Yet, given the history of Turkish foreign policy one may claim that it is not a 
recent development since Turkish foreign policy has been going through a 
transformation process for quite a long time. This study argues this transformation may 
be traced back to as early as 1980, when Turkey started the liberalization of the Turkish 
economy, which opened Turkish society and the Turkish economy to the outside world. 
Since then, Turkish state identity and interests have been going through a massive 
transformation process in order to adapt to the profound changes that have taken place 
in Turkey and in the international arena. 
Along with liberalization some internal and external factors, such as globalization, the 
end of the Cold War, the rise of the JDP, the EU membership process and the “strategic 
depth” doctrine have been also influential in the transformation of the Turkish state’s 
identity and interests. Consequently, Turkey’s foreign policy making culture has 
experienced a transformation from a Lockean culture based on rivalry and suspicion to a 
Kantian culture based on friendship and cooperation. This transition will be analyzed in 
the wider context of the transformation and liberalization of the Turkish state and 
society in the last three decades. Furthermore, the process of Europeanization in Turkey 
and its effects on Turkish foreign policy making will be also examined. Additionally 
special attention will be paid to the role of Davutoglu’s new foreign policy doctrine, 
“strategic depth”, in the transformation of Turkish foreign policy. Finally, this study 
will apply holistic constructivism as a theoretical framework with special emphasis on 
Alexander Wendt’s culture of anarchies theory in order to provide a fuller picture of the 
JDP’s foreign policy and the transformation of the Turkish state’s identity and its 
foreign policy in the last three decades. 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Im letzen Jahrzehnt haben die Partei für Gerechtigkeit und Aufschwung Regierungen 
(JDP) eine beispiellose hyperaktiv türkische Außenpolitik betrieben, welche die Türkei 
zum Fokus der Aufmerksamkeit der Welt gebracht hat. Im Westen wurde die Frage 
"Was ist mit der Türkei passiert”  mehrfach von Wissenschaftlern der türkischen 
Außenpolitik erhoben, von denen einige eine Verschiebung der Achse in der türkischen 
Außenpolitik gefunden haben. Diese Wissenschaftler behaupteten, dass die türkische 
Außenpolitik eine Abkehr von der westlichen Welt zum Nahen Osten und Asien erlebt. 
Doch die Geschichte der türkischen Außenpolitik zeigt, dass es sich nicht um eine neue 
Entwicklung sondern um  eine schon in den 80er Jahren begonnene Transformation der 
türkischen Außenpolitik handelt. Diese Studie argumentiert, dass der 
Transformationsprozess relativ früh so um 1980 begann, als die Türkei die 
Liberalisierung der eigenen Wirtschaft startete, welche die türkische Gesellschaft und 
die türkische Wirtschaft nach außen geöffnet hat.  Seither haben die Identität und 
Interessen des türkischen Staates  einen massiven Transformationsprozess durchlaufen, 
um sich den tiefgreifenden Veränderungen, die in der Türkei und in der internationalen 
Arena stattgefunden haben, anzupassen. 
 
Zusammen mit der Liberalisierung einiger interner und externer Faktoren, wie der 
Globalisierung, das Ende des Kalten Krieges, der Aufstieg der JDP, der EU-
Beitrittsprozess und die strategische tiefe Doktrin  haben  eine wichtige Rolle in der 
Umgestaltung der Identität und Interessen des türkischen Staates. Infolgedessen, hat die 
türkische Außenpolitik  eine Transformation von der „Lockean Culture“, die auf 
Rivalität und Misstrauen basiert ist, zu „Kantian Culture“, die auf Freundschaft und 
Zusammenarbeit basiert ist, erlebt. Dieser Übergang wird in den breiteren Kontext der 
Transformation und Liberalisierung des türkischen Staates und der Gesellschaft in den 
letzten drei Jahrzehnten analysiert werden. Darüber hinaus wird der Prozess der 
Europäisierung in der Türkei und deren Auswirkungen auf die türkische 
Außenpolitikgestaltung ebenfalls untersucht werden. Zusätzlich wird bei der 
Transformation der türkischen Außenpolitik die Rolle  von Ahmet Davutoglu und seinen 
neuen Außenpolitik Doktrin "strategische Tiefe"  ebenfalls analysiert. Letztendlich wird 
in dieser  Studie  der holistische Konstruktivismus mit besonderem Schwerpunkt auf die 
Kultur der Anarchien Theorie der Alexander Wendt´s als theoretischer Rahmen 
anzuwenden sein, um ein vollständigeres Bild der Außenpolitik der JDP und die 
Transformation der türkischen Staats- Identität und seiner Außenpolitik in den letzten 
drei Jahrzehnten zu bieten. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Purpose of Thesis 
 
In the past decade, the question “What is happening to Turkey?” seems to have become 
a commonly raised question by the scholars in the Western world. Some analysts even 
observe a shift of axis in Turkish foreign policy and claim that Turkish foreign policy is 
turning away from the Western world towards the Middle East and Asia. Nevertheless, 
considering Turkey’s history, one may argue that the transformation of Turkish foreign 
policy is merely a new phenomenon. This study will argue that this transformation can 
be dated back to as early as the 1980s when Turkey started the liberalization of the 
Turkish economy, which opened Turkish society and the Turkish economy to the 
outside world. Since then, in order to adapt to the profound changes that have taken 
place in Turkey and in the international arena, Turkey’s identity and interests have been 
going through a massive transformation process, which has in return reshaped its 
foreign policy making culture fundamentally.  
The scholars of Turkish foreign policy almost unanimously agree that the fundamental 
feature of Turkish foreign policy is its orientation towards the West. Consequently, after 
the establishment of the Republic in 1923 Turkey adopted a one dimensional foreign 
policy strategy which was based on the Kemalist identity’s main goals of 
Westernization and Europeanization of Turkey. As a result of this deliberate policy 
Turkey neglected its political, cultural and economic ties with its surrounding regions 
such as the Middle East, Caucasia, the Balkans and Central Asia, which in the eyes of 
the Kemalist establishment represented “backwardness and corruption”. It is no 
exaggeration to say that the Kemalist identity and its one dimensional pro-Western 
orientation had been the main driving force behind Turkish foreign policy during the 
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much of the Republic’s history.  The unchallenged role of the Kemalist identity and its 
foreign policy begun to change with the end of the Cold War, since the new era created 
profound challenges to the Kemalist identity and its isolation policy in Turkey’s 
surrounding regions. First, under the late Turgut Özal’s administration (prime minister 
1983–1989; president 1989– 1993) Turkey began to be involved in the greater Middle 
East, Central Asia, the Balkans and Caucasia actively. Yet it is clear that this 
transformation process has been accelerated and become much more visible since the 
JDP (Justice and Development Party) came to power in late 2002. Consequently, a 
significant shift in Turkish foreign policy has gone largely unnoticed over the last 10 
years under the Justice and Development Party rule (2002-2012). 
It is a well known fact that the JDP’s foreign policy has been mainly shaped by Ahmet 
Davutoglu’s “strategic depth” doctrine. Davutoglu served until 2009 as chief foreign 
policy advisor to Prime Minister Erdogan and was described as the mastermind behind 
the scenes of new proactive Turkish foreign policy.  In 2009 he has been appointed as 
foreign minister, a position which he holds up until today.  In his sentimental book, 
Strategic Depth, Davutoglu criticises the one dimensional and unbalanced foreign 
policy practices of Kemalist elites who mainly focused on the ties with Western Europe 
and USA neglecting Turkey’s relations with neighboring countries and regions such as 
the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus.1 Davutoglu suggests that Turkey has to 
improve its relations with its neighbors under the guidance of his zero problem- 
maximum cooperation with neighbors policy and also adopt a multidimensional foreign 
policy strategy, which does not rely on one actor or region but has multiple ties with 
various actors and regions at the same time.2  
Davutoglu argues that Turkey’s foreign policy needs a reorientation in the face of the 
new regional and global developments in the post Cold War era. With his concept of 
“strategic depth” Davutoglu offers a new interpretation of the geopolitical position of 
Turkey, which laid down the foundations of new grand strategy for Turkish foreign 
policy after the end of the Cold War. Davutoglu argues that geography is not altered; 
                                                            
1 Davutoglu, Ahmet (2001); Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiyenin uluslararasi Konumu (Strategic 
Depth: Turkey´s Place in the World), Küre, Istanbul, pp. 45-63. 
2 Davutoğlu, Ahmet (2008); Turkeys Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007, Insight 
Turkey, Vol.10, No.1, 2008, p.77. 
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however its interpretations are subject to change in the course of history.3 In this regard 
the following quote, in which Davutoglu reinterprets Turkey’s geopolitical position, is 
noteworthy: “As a major country in the midst of the Afro-Eurasia landmass, Turkey is a 
central country with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one, unified 
category. In terms of its sphere of influence, Turkey is a Middle Eastern, Balkan, 
Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf, and Black Sea country all at 
the same time.“ 4  It is clear that this new approach poses a major break with the 
Kemalist establishment’s notion that Turkey is and must be a European country.  
Davutoglu concludes that Turkey should obtain a new position in its region by 
promoting security and stability for itself as well as for its neighbors and the region.  
Furthermore, under the guidance of Davutoglu Turkey declared a zero problem policy 
with its neighbors, which also poses a major break with the Kemalist establishment’s 
notion that Turkey is surrounded by enemy and rival states. Subsequently, in the last 
decade Davutoglu achieved a paradigm change in Turkey’s foreign policy by changing 
Turkey’s attitude to its neighbors and other countries from enmity and rivalry to 
friendship.  As a result Turkey has improved its relations with most of its neighbors and 
neighboring regions significantly, which has helped Turkey to emerge as a pivotal actor 
that promotes stability and security in its immediate neighborhood.  
The foreign policy initiatives that Turkey undertook under the JDP rule are hard to 
count. In the last decade during the JDP government Turkey has mediated between 
various groups and countries such as Israel and Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Shia 
and Sunni groups in Iraq, Bosnia and Serbia. Furthermore, Turkey started the accession 
negotiations with the EU (European Union) in 2005; was elected for a permanent seat at 
the UN (United Nations) Security Council for two years in 2009-2010; contributed to 
the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) mission in Afghanistan; improved its 
relations with most of its neighbors dramatically, sent troops for UN peace keeping 
forces in Lebanon; obtained a leading status in the OIC (Organization of the Islamic 
Conference); improved its relations with the Arab League obtaining an observer status; 
established closer ties with Iran, Iraq, and Syria, and improved its economic, political, 
and diplomatic relations with most Arab and Muslim states; obtained an observer status 
                                                            
3 Davutoğlu, Ahmet (2001); Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiyenin uluslararasi Konumu,  pp. 115-118. 
4 Davutoğlu, Ahmet (2008); Turkeys Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007, p.77. 
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in the AU (African Union) in 2005, in the Gulf Cooperation Council, in the Association 
of Caribbean States and the Organization of American States. Counting these initiatives, 
which cover an immense area, demonstrates clearly the new multidimensionalism of 
Turkish Foreign policy. According to Davutoglu, Turkey’s engagements from Africa to 
Central Asia and from EU to OIC are parts of his new foreign policy vision. In the 
following quote he envisages a global role for the Turkish state in the next decade: 
“Domestically, Turkey needs to deepen and enrich its democracy, accommodate the 
differences within its society, and strengthen the coordination and balance among its 
institutions in 2008 and the years that follow. These initiatives will make Turkey a 
global actor as we approach 2023, the one hundredth anniversary of the establishment 
of the Turkish Republic.”5 
This study aims to analyze the drastic changes that have taken place in the Turkish 
state’s identity and interests in the last three decades, which in return have reshaped its 
foreign policy under the rule of the JDP governments. This transition will be put into 
the wider context of the transformation and liberalization of the Turkish state and 
society in the last three decades. Furthermore, the process of Europeanization in Turkey 
and its effects on Turkish foreign policy making will be also examined. Additionally 
special attention will be paid to the role of the Davutoglu’s new foreign policy doctrine, 
i.e. strategic depth, in the transformation of Turkish foreign policy. Finally this study 
will apply holistic constructivism as a theoretical framework with special emphasis on 
Alexander Wendt’s culture of anarchies theory in order to provide a fuller picture of the 
JDP’s foreign policy and the transformation of the Turkish state’s identity and its 
foreign policy in the last three decades. 
 
1.2   Literature Review and the Argumentation of the Thesis 
 
Considering the analysis of Turkish foreign policy, one can claim that there are two 
significant approaches regarding the main orientation of Turkish foreign policy. While 
some scholars argue that Turkish foreign policy has been mainly shaped by Kemalist 
ideology/identity and has followed its principles throughout the Republic’s history, 
                                                            
5 Ibid. 
 5 
 
others claim that it has always had a pragmatic approach towards the external world and 
has not always implemented the Kemalist ideology in foreign affairs. 
According to the first approach, Turkish foreign policy has been used to realize 
Kemalist aspirations to transform Turkish society into a Western one. Turkey`s 
engagement with Western organizations, such as NATO and the EU, has been 
considered by the state elite as a part of Turkey’s Westernization process.  Calis argues 
that behind the continuity of Turkish foreign policy one can see the state’s identification 
with the norms of Western civilization. Additionally, he argues that the internal and 
external conditions do not significantly alter the traditional course of foreign policy 
because of the powerful state structure. He notes that “as long as the state structure 
does not change its identification with Kemalism, Turkey´s western oriented foreign 
policy would hardly be changed by events occurring outside the country” 6 However he 
also acknowledges that some external and internal developments may have affected the 
style and implementation of Turkish foreign policy. Despite this, he claims that its 
substance, namely its Western orientation, has been preserved for more than seven 
decades. He concludes that there has been a strong correlation between the Westernist 
and Kemalist state’s identity and the making of Turkish foreign policy.  
The latter approach argues that Turkey’s foreign policy course has been influenced by 
history and geopolitics. These scholars consider the Turkish foreign policy decision 
makers as realists, who sought to implement a policy to protect Turkish national 
interests in accordance with Turkey’s national power. This school of thought 
acknowledges the continuity in Turkey’s foreign policy, however they claim that in 
essence Kemalist foreign policy has not been ideological but pragmatist. These analysts 
consider Turkey’s pro-Western policies and its membership to NATO as realist moves, 
and mainly driven by the maximization of its security interest.7 For instance, Danforth 
argues that “Turkish leaders have seldom been influenced by the ideologies that 
determine their domestic politics. Understood in context, Atatürk’s disengagement from 
                                                            
6Çalış, Şaban (1996); The role of identity in the making of modern Turkish foreign policy, PhD 
Thesis, University of Nottingham, p.8 and 19. 
7 Ibid.; p. 9. 
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the Middle East and the AKP’s re-engagement with the region were both practical 
responses to strategic realities.”8 
However, the two approaches presented above do not provide a sufficient explanation of 
Turkish foreign policy in the post Cold War era. Although the cornerstone of traditional 
Turkish foreign policy, namely its orientation towards the West, has remained in place 
and provided continuity, there are some new elements in Turkish foreign policy, which 
cannot be explained only by short term pragmatic reasons or Kemalist principles. These 
new elements indicate a transformation in the Turkish state’s identity and interests, 
which is reshaping its foreign policy foundations. It should be noted that it is unlikely 
that this transformation will change Turkey’s orientation towards the West, however, 
what it is also clear that it is changing Turkey’s attitude towards other regions and 
Turkish foreign policy is obtaining a more multidimensional approach.     
Considering the events after the end of the Cold War, one may claim that Turkey was 
caught unprepared to the major systemic changes in the international system and their 
consequence in Turkey’s surrounding regions. To begin with, the 90s in Turkey were 
marked with political instability and weak coalition governments, which were unable to 
cope with these massive challenges. Additionally, due to its ideological handicaps the 
Kemalist elite was reluctant to improve relations with those other than Western 
countries. The Kemalist elite’s pragmatic approach as put forward by some scholars in 
foreign policy was mainly to turn to non-Western regions whenever they faced 
problems with the West9 such as in 1964 (the Cyprus crisis), in 1974 (the Turkish 
intervention in Cyprus) or in 1980 (military coup). These short breaks in Turkish 
foreign policy orientation did not lead the country to develop alternative policies and 
were meant to last for a short term until the relations with the West improved again.  As 
a result of this, after the Cold War Turkey was unable to develop a realistic grand 
strategy in order to achieve its ambitious plans, as declared by former President 
                                                            
8Danforth, Nicholas (2008); Ideology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy: From 
Atatürk to the AKP, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 3, Fall 2008, p.83. 
9 Sönmezoğlu, Faruk; Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin dış politikasında süreklilik ve değişim 
(Continuity and Change in Turkish Foreign Policy ) in:  Sönmezoğlu, Faruk (Ed.) (2001); 
Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi (The Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy), Der Yayınları, 
İstanbul, p.1047. 
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Suleyman Demirel, to spread its influence from “the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of 
China”10.   
The main argumentation of this study is that the Turkish state’s identity and interests 
have been going through a fundamental transformation process since the end of the 
Cold War, which began with the transition to a liberal economic system in 1980. 
Together with the transition to a liberal system there are also other factors which have 
been influential in this transformation process. Firstly, the end of the Cold War ended 
the strict bipolar world system, which enabled Turkey to improve its relations with 
various regions at the same time.  Secondly, the Helsinki Summit decision in 1999 to 
grant Turkey candidacy status for EU membership opened a vast political reform 
process in Turkey, which has been accelerated under the JDP government since 2002. 
Thirdly, the JDP’s foreign policy advisor, Ahmet Davutoglu, provided the much needed 
grand strategy for Turkish foreign policy, namely the “strategic depth” doctrine. Finally, 
another factor for the transformation of Turkish foreign policy was provided by the 
ideological preparedness of the JDP, namely its Islamic background and its willingness 
to improve deep rooted relations and cooperation with Turkey’s surrounding regions, 
most of whom were Muslim countries.   
All of these factors together contributed to the transformation of the Turkish state’s 
identity and interests, which in return reshaped its foreign policy making culture 
fundamentally. As a result of this, Turkey obtained a self confident, multi dimensional 
and balanced foreign policy strategy towards various regions and countries.  Thus it can 
be claimed that the notion that the JDP’s foreign policy practice is just driven by its 
Islamic orientation is not accurate. In sharp contrast, it may be claimed that the JDP’s 
foreign policy poses a reflection of the normalization and structural transformation of 
Turkish foreign policy, which started with economic liberalization in the 80s and 
reached its peak time in the post Helsinki era with the emergence of a Kantian culture in 
Turkish foreign policy and with the implementation of new foreign policy doctrine. 
                                                            
10 Aydin Mustafa, Kafkasya ve Orta Asya`yla ilişkiler (Relations with Caucasus and Central 
Asia), in; Oran, Baskın (Ed.) (2006); Türk Dış Politikası II, 1980-2001: Kurtuluş Savaşından 
Bugüne Olgular Belgeler Yorumlar (Turkish Foreign Policy II 1980-2001), İletişim , İstanbul, 
pp 388. 
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Considering the history of Turkish foreign policy one can clearly argue that the Turkish 
foreign and security policy-making culture has mainly been influenced by a Realpolitik 
view of international relations. The key Turkish decision makers perceived the 
international environment as anarchical, which required being militarily strong and 
ready to deploy hard power military force for win-lose outcomes.11  Alexander Wendt’s 
theory of “culture of anarchies” may be of particular interest in the Turkish context. 
Wendt suggests three main distinct forms of cultures of anarchy, namely Hobbesian, 
Lockean and Kantian, whose prevailing logic are enmity, rivalry and friendship 
respectively. Wendt also suggests that the cultures of anarchy can be internalized in 
three degrees.  Within this context, in this study it will argued that Turkey’s foreign 
policy making culture until the Helsinki Summit in 1999 can be considered to be within 
the Lockean culture.  The history of Turkish foreign policy clearly demonstrates that 
Turkey has not followed a revisionist or irredentist foreign policy and has accepted the 
right of existence of other states, which mainly places Turkey into a Lockean culture. In 
the course of history Turkey has internalized the Lockean culture to the third degree and 
recognized other states’ sovereignty and their right to exist.  The dominance of a 
Lockean culture based on rivalry started to change after the Helsinki Summit, leading to 
an Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy, which in return promoted the emergence 
of a Kantian culture based on friendship and cooperation in the Turkish foreign policy 
making culture. The determinants and consequences of this transformation process will 
be discussed in the fourth chapter in more detail. 
 
1.3. The Structure and Methodology of the Thesis  
 
This study will be mainly based on secondary literature and the discourse analysis of 
official documents, debates, policy papers on Turkish foreign policy, as well as 
speeches/ interviews and articles of state personalities, who play a role in Turkish 
foreign policy. 
                                                            
11 Kirişçi, Kemal (2006): Turkey's foreign policy in turbulent times, Chaillot Paper No 92 
September 2006, Inst. for Security Studies European Union, Paris, pp. 100-101, available at 
http://aei.pitt.edu/7409/01/chai92.pdf (accessed 19.05.08, 13:30) 
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In order to understand the profound changes that take place in Turkish foreign policy 
this study will apply constructivism, since it has broadened our analysis of world 
politics with its valuable contributions. It considers international relations to be socially 
constructed and focuses on the awareness and consciousness of the human being and its 
place in international relations.12 Constructivism claims that identity plays a substantial 
role in the definition of states’ interests, which in return shape their policies. Finally, it 
emphasizes the importance and role of norms, material structures and identity in the 
formation of political decisions. It also points out the mutual construction of agents and 
structures at the same time.13 
In foreign policy studies there has been always a discussion about the level of analysis, 
which centered around the question of whether to focus on national or international 
factors in the analysis of the foreign policy of a certain country. Some scholars 
considered the mixing of both national and international levels as unthinkable.  
However, over the past two decades the cross level analysis approach, which 
incorporates both national and international factors, has started to become popular 
amongst scholars of IR (International Relations). Checkel points out the fact that 
“today, an IR-FPA consensus seems to be emerging that we need synthetic, cross level 
approaches.”14 
 
Constructivism has also been affected by this new trend in FPA (Foreign Policy 
Analysis). Holistic constructivists questioned the approach of unit level and systemic 
level constructivists, who have only taken into consideration domestic or international 
factors respectively. Holistic constructivism advocates a cross level analysis approach, 
which takes into consideration the two dimensions of international politics, namely 
domestic and international. Reus Smith notes that in order to “accommodate the entire 
range of factors conditioning the identities, interests of states, they bring the corporate 
                                                            
12 Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2010); Introduction to International Relations: Theories 
and Approaches, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p.160. 
13 Reus-Smit, Christian; Constructivism; in: Burchill, Scott et. al. (2009); Theories of 
International Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p. 212. 
14 Checkel, Jeffrey T.; Constructivism and Foreign Policy, in: Smith, Steve/ Hadfield, 
Amelia/ Dunne, Tim (2008); Foreign Policy: Theories Actors Cases, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, p. 78. 
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and the social together into a unified analytical perspective that treats the domestic and 
international as two faces of a single social and political order.”15 
 
As mentioned above, holistic constructivism makes it possible to combine the two 
facets of international politics, which might lead to a better understanding of the 
complex issue of the formation of the states’ identities and interests, which shape their 
policies. Thus this study will apply a holistic constructivist approach in order to achieve 
a comprehensive analysis of the domestic and international factors that led to the 
transformation of Turkish foreign policy in the past three decades.  
 
This study will be mainly divided into three chapters. The second chapter of the study 
will focus on the evolution and roots of constructivist theory in social sciences in 
general, and IR theories in particular. It will analyze the main ideas of constructivist 
theory focusing on the assumptions of conventional constructivism rather than on 
critical constructivism since conventional constructivism offers various practical 
theories for IR. In this regard, unit level, systemic level and holistic level 
constructivism’s contributions to IR theory will be examined thoroughly. In doing so 
extra attention will be paid to the Alexander Wendt’s culture of anarchies theory, which 
will be used as the general theoretical framework to explain the transformation of 
Turkish of foreign policy. Furthermore, in the section of unit level constructivism the 
influence of the norms of international society and international organizations -with 
special emphasis on Europeanization -on the states’ identities will be also examined, 
since it may shed light on the transformation of the Turkish state’s identity and interests.  
 
As discussed in the previous section, the main argumentation of this thesis is that 
Turkish foreign policy is going through a radical transformation process which started 
with the transition to a liberal economy in Turkey in 1980.  Therefore the analysis of 
Turkish foreign policy will be divided into two periods. The first period will cover the 
period between 1919 and 1980, which is the period from the last days of the Ottoman 
Empire to the military coup in 1980.  The evolution of the Turkish state’s identity, i.e. 
the Kemalist identity, will be the main focus in the third chapter, which will be based on 
                                                            
15 Reus-Smit, Christian; Constructivism; in: Burchill, Scott et. al. (2009); Theories of 
International Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p. 225. 
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a holistic constructivist approach. Therefore both domestic and external determinants of 
the formation of the Turkish state’s identity will be examined in the third chapter. 
Consequently the first part of the third chapter will analyze the domestic structural 
factors in the making of the Turkish state’s identity, which have exerted a long term 
influence over the determination of Turkish foreign policy.  In this regard the role of 
following factors in the evolution of the Turkish state’s identity and interests will be 
examined in detail: the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, Sevres syndrome, state ideology, 
radical Westernization, clash of identities, the extraordinary role of the Turkish Army, 
geographical determinants, the lack of strategic thinking and the dominance of elites in 
the decision making process. The second part of this chapter will describe conjunctural 
factors under two categories, namely domestic and external factors, which have exerted 
temporary effects on Turkey’s foreign policy and its daily implementation. Finally in 
the third part, the results of the third chapter will be discussed.  
 
The fourth chapter will cover the period between 1980 and 2012.  It will analyze the 
factors and the processes that facilitated the transformation of the Turkish state’s 
identity and interests which in return led to the emergence of a Kantian culture in 
Turkish foreign policy making.  Following the holistic constructivist approach, the 
determinants of this transition will be analyzed under two categories, namely external 
and internal. In the first section of this chapter the following external factors, which 
paved the way for the emergence of a Kantian culture in Turkish foreign policy, will be 
examined:  globalization, the end of the Cold War, the transformation of the geo-
political and geostrategic position and Europeanization. The second section will focus 
on internal factors such as the transition to a liberal economic system, the rise of counter 
elites and identities, the rise of the JDP, the “strategic depth” doctrine and the rising role 
of civil society. Finally, the last part will summarize the results of the fourth chapter, in 
which a thorough discussion of the transition of Turkish foreign policy from a Lockean 
culture to a Kantian culture will take place. 
The fifth chapter will constitute the conclusion of this research. In this chapter the 
overall results of this study with a brief summary as well as the predictions about the 
future of Turkish foreign policy will be presented. 
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2. Theoretical Framework: Constructivism  
 
This section analyzes constructivism in international relations theory, as it may provide 
us with a better understanding of the transformation of the Turkish state’s identity and 
its foreign policy in the last three decades.  Furthermore, because Turkey is a candidate 
for EU membership, this section will also discuss the concept of Europeanization in 
candidate countries, which will provide a theoretical framework to analyze the impact 
of the EU on the transformation of the Turkish state’s identity and it’s foreign policy. 
 
2.1. Definition 
 
Constructivism is first presented to international relations theory by Nicholas Onuf in 
1989.16  Its main assumption about international relations theory was summarized in 
Wendt´s oft cited phrase: “Anarchy is what states make of it”.17 Throughout the 1990s 
it has become a trendy and popular approach among the scholars of international 
relations, as it has broadened the analysis of world politics with its valuable 
contributions. Constructivists consider international relations to be socially constructed, 
and they focus on the awareness and consciousness of the human being and its place in 
                                                            
16 Fierke, K.M.; Constructivism, in: Dunne, Tim/ Kurki, Milja/ Smith, Steve (2010); 
International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
p.186. 
17  Wendt, Alexander (1992); Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of 
power politics, International Organization, 46, 2, Spring 1999, pp. 391-425.  
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international relations.18 The phrase “socially constructed” indicates that they give 
greater importance to the “social” and consider the world “as coming into being through 
a process of interaction” between agents and structure.19 Shortly, constructivism 
highlights the significance and role of norms, material structures and identity in the 
formation of political decisions. It also points out the mutual construction of agents and 
structures at the same time.20 
 
Constructivism does not consider the international system as something which exists 
independent of human consciousness, like the natural world around us. It is produced 
through intersubjective awareness or a common understanding among people. This 
means that it is constructed by ideas, not by material forces. “It is a human invention or 
creation not of a physical or material kind but of a purely intellectual and ideational 
kind. It is a set of ideas, a body of thought, a system of norms, which has been arranged 
by certain people at a particular time and place.”21 According to constructivist logic, 
any change in the thoughts and ideas entering into the international system will affect 
and alter the system as well, since the system is constituted by ideas and thoughts. This 
explains the logic behind Alexander Wendt`s oft-cited phrase: ‘anarchy is what states 
make of it’. As put forward by Jackson and Sorensen this phrase seems to be harmless, 
however “the potential consequences are far- reaching: suddenly the world of IR 
becomes less fixated in an age- old structure of anarchy; change becomes possible in a 
big way because people and states can start thinking about each other in new ways and 
thus create new norms that may be radically different from old ones.”22 
As mentioned above, constructivists suggest that the social world does not exist 
independent of human consciousness and is affected by the ideas and beliefs of the 
                                                            
18 Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2010); Introduction to International Relations: Theories 
and Approaches, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p.160. 
19 Checkel, Jeffrey T.; Constructivism and Foreign Policy, in: Smith, Steve/ Hadfield, 
Amelia/ Dunne, Tim (2008); Foreign Policy: Theories Actors Cases, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, p. 73. 
20 Reus-Smit, Christian; Constructivism; in: Burchill, Scott et. al. (2009); Theories of 
International Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p. 212. 
21 Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2010); Introduction to International Relations,p.160 
22 Ibid.; p.160 
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people engaged in it.  Therefore constructivists reject the positivist and behavioralist 
stance that considers the social world as an external entity in which rules may be 
analyzed and explained by scientific research. Constructivists make a distinction 
between the socio-political and natural world. While scientific laws exist for the natural 
world, there are no such laws in social sciences. Similarly, constructivists do not 
consider history as evolving external phenomena separate from human thought and 
ideas. Therefore they claim that “sociology or economics or political science or the 
study of history cannot be objective ‘sciences’ in the strict positivist sense of the 
word.”23 
 
Furthermore, constructivists reject the mechanical causality of positivism because of its 
failure to consider the intersubjectivity of social events. For instance, constructivists 
question the well-known billiard balls analogy in the explanation of international 
relations because it does not take ideas and beliefs of the actors into consideration. 
Constructivists argue that the aim of their approach is to illuminate the inside of the 
billiard balls in order to achieve a comprehensive understanding of international 
relations.24 
 
There is a consensus among constructivists about the employment of Marx Weber’s 
interpretive understanding (verstehen) idea in the analysis of social action. However, 
they are not united about “the extent to which it is possible to emulate the scientific 
ideas of the natural sciences and produce scientific explanations based on hypotheses, 
data collection and generalization.” According to constructivists there is no absolute 
objective truth across time and place in social sciences.  However, constructivists still 
do make truth claims in their analysis of international relations, but acknowledge that 
“their claims are always contingent and partial interpretations of a complex world”25 
 
The scholars of IR distinguish between European and North American forms of 
constructivism. This division is a reflection of the debates within critical international 
theory. The North American variant is labeled as conventional or modernist 
                                                            
23 Ibid.; p.162 
24 Ibid.;p.164 
25 Ibid.; p.165 
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constructivism.  The European form of constructivism is often referred to as critical, 
post-modernist, interpretive or post-positivist26. In spite of this division, these two 
schools of thoughts share some main assumptions about social life and world politics.  
 
Firstly, constructivists consider the role of normative or ideational structures to be as 
significant as the material structures in shaping the behavior of the actors. Contradicting 
the neo-realist and Marxist emphasis on the influence of material structures, 
constructivism points out the structural characteristics of the system of shared ideas, 
beliefs and values, which affects the outcome of the social and political actors’ 
decisions.27 According to Wendt, constructivists do not argue that “ideas are more 
important than power and interest, or that they are autonomous from power and 
interest. The claim is rather that power and interest have the effects they do in virtue of 
the ideas that make them up. Power and interest explanations presuppose ideas, and to 
that extent are not rivals to ideational explanations at all.” As a result of this new 
approach, Wendt suggests “a rule of thumb for idealists: when confronted by ostensibly 
‘material’ explanations, always inquire into the discursive conditions which make them 
work.”  For instance, he states: “when Neorealists offer multipolarity as an explanation 
for war, inquire into the discursive conditions that constitute the poles as enemies 
rather than friends.” 28 
 
Two factors are important in constructivism’s focus on the role of normative or 
ideational structures.29 Firstly, constructivists point out the fact that “material resources 
only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in 
which they are embedded.” Wendt puts forward this constructivist view with the 
following example: “500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United 
States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons, because the British are friends of the 
United States and the North Koreans are not, and amity or enmity is a function of 
                                                            
26 Checkel, Jeffrey T.; Constructivism and Foreign Policy, pp. 72-73. 
27  Ibid.; p. 220. 
28 Wendt, Alexander (2009); Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, p.135. 
29 Reus-Smit, Christian; Constructivism, p. 220. 
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shared understandings.”30 Secondly, they highlight the significance of normative or 
ideational structures because of their influence on the actors’ identities. Accordingly, 
the social identity of a state is determined by the norms of the international system. 
Reus-Smit illustrates this constructivist notion with the following example, “in the age 
of Absolutism (1554-1848) the norms of European international society held that 
Christian monarchies were the only legitimate form of sovereign state, and these norms, 
backed by the coercive practices of the community of states, conspired to undermine 
Muslim, liberal or nationalist polities.”31  
 
The second common assumption by constructivists is that the effects of non-material 
structures on identities are important since interests are shaped by identities, and they in 
turn determine the actions.  Unlike the rationalist view, which holds interests as 
predefined and exogenous to interstate interaction, constructivists suggest that interests 
are not given and are subject to change. Furthermore they argue that in order to achieve 
a comprehensive understanding of world politics it is vital to comprehend the process of 
actors’ interest formation.32 In order to analyze the formation of interests, 
constructivists concentrate on the actors’ social identities as “identities are the basis of 
interests.”33 Finally, they do not reject the notion that actors are self-interested, 
however they suggest that this does not provide sufficient explanation until “we 
understand how actors define their selves and how this informs their interests.”34 
 
Thirdly, constructivists suggest that agents and structures are mutually constructed. On 
the one hand, the actors’ identities and interests are determined by the normative and 
ideational structures; on the other hand these structures owe their existence to the 
knowledgeable practices of the actors. In other words, constructivists emphasize the 
influence of the non-material structures on identities and interests as well as the role of 
practices in preserving and altering those structures. As put forward by Wendt “it is 
through reciprocal interaction that we create and instantiate the relatively enduring 
                                                            
30 Wendt, Alexander (1995); Constructing International Politics, International Security, 
Vol.20,  No. 1, Summer, 1995, p 73. 
31 Reus-Smit, Christian; Constructivism, pp. 220-221. 
32 Ibid.; p. 221. 
33 Wendt, Alexander (1992); Anarchy is what states make of it, p. 398. 
34 Reus-Smit, Christian; Constructivism, p. 221. 
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social structures in terms of which we define our identities and interests.”35 In other 
words “social structures exist, not in actors' heads nor in material capabilities, but in 
practices. Social structure exists only in process. The Cold War was a structure of 
shared knowledge that governed great power relations for forty years, but once they 
stopped acting on this basis, it was "over."”36 
 
According to Reus-Smit there are three main differences between the rationalist theories 
of IR (such as neo-realism and neo-liberalism) and constructivism. Firstly, unlike the 
rationalist stance, constructivists do not consider actors as atomistic egoists but as social 
beings. Accordingly, actors’ identities are constructed by the “institutionalised norms, 
values and ideas of the social environment in which they act.”  Secondly, whereas 
rationalists claim that interests of the actors are defined before they enter into social 
relations, constructivists consider the interests as endogenous to social relations, “as a 
consequence of identity acquisition, as learned through process of communication, 
reflection on experience and role enactment.” Thirdly, instead of considering society as 
a strategic realm, in which actors attempt to maximize their interest, constructivists 
consider society as a constitutive realm, in which actors are generated as 
“knowledgeable social and political agents.”  Reus-Smit points out the fact that 
constructivists are labeled as “constructivists” because of this different ontological 
stance, which highlights the “social determinants of social and political agency and 
action”37 
  
Apart from these common assumptions, there are significant differences between 
conventional and critical constructivism. Conventional constructivism analyzes the 
impact of social norms and identity on foreign policy decisions and world politics. This 
school of thought is mainly dominated by positivist North American scholars, who are 
“interested in uncovering top-down/deductive mechanisms and casual relationships 
between actors, norms, interests and identity”. They are labeled conventional because 
of their positivist view of the analysis of IR. For instance, in the analysis of the impact 
of international organizations on the promotion of certain values or norms in the 
                                                            
35 Wendt, Alexander (1992); Anarchy is what states make of it, p. 406. 
36  Wendt, Alexander (1995); Constructing International Politics, p 74. 
37 Reus-Smit, Christian; Constructivism, p. 223. 
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international system, conventional constructivists discuss the influence of these values 
on the formation of the individual’s or the state’s interests.38 Prominent representatives 
of conventional constructivism include Alexander Wendt, Peter Katzenstein, Martha 
Finnemore, Christian Reus-Smit, John Ruggie, Emanuel Adler, Michael Barnett, and 
Ted Hopf.39  
 
Unlike the conventional approach, the focus of critical constructivism is the analysis of 
language’s role in mediating and constructing social reality. Contrary to conventional 
constructivism, which analyzes factors that influence the change in a state’s identity, 
critical constructivism examines the “background conditions and linguistic 
constructions (social discourses)” that contribute to any such change. In other words, 
critical constructivists rely on a “deeply inductive (bottom up) research strategy that 
seeks to reconstruct state identity, with the methods encompassing a variety of linguistic 
techniques.”40  
 
Critical constructivists are also unconvinced about conventional constructivists’ stance 
about truth claims.  Because of the absence of a neutral ground, where truth claims can 
be evaluated objectively, critical constructivists claim that “truth claims” are not 
achievable. Accordingly, “truth is always connected to different, more or less dominant, 
ways of thinking about the world”.  Therefore, there is always a connection between 
power and truth and these two cannot be separated. Critical constructivists consider the 
uncovering of the connection between truth and power, and the critique of the dominant 
ways of thinking to be the main task of their approach.  Ann Tickner, David Campbell, 
James Der Derian, Jim George, Andrew Linklater and R. B. J. Walker are the prominent 
representatives of critical constructivism.41 
 
The fact that critical constructivism concentrates on the critical assessment of present 
theories is criticized by some scholars. According to Jackson &Sorensen, in terms of 
new contribution to IR theory conventional constructivism can be regarded much more 
                                                            
38 Checkel, Jeffrey T.; Constructivism and Foreign Policy, p. 72. 
39 Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2010); Introduction to International Relations, p. 165. 
40 Checkel, Jeffrey T.; Constructivism and Foreign Policy, p. 73. 
41 Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2010); Introduction to International Relations, p.165. 
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productive than critical constructivism.42 Therefore this study will be based on the 
assumptions of the conventional constructivism as it offers various theories for IR.  
2.2 Historical Context of the Rise of Constructivism in IR 
 
The historical context in which constructivism rose should be understood before going 
into detail about the constructivist theories of IR. Like other debates which have shaped 
IR theory in the past (such as the debate between realism and idealism after the First 
World War), the constructivist approach emerged in historically and culturally specific 
circumstances. 43 
  
Throughout the Cold War international relations theory was dominated by materialist, 
rationalist and positivist theories such as realism and liberalism, which mainly focused 
on power distribution and balance of power.44  Realism had overcome idealism after the 
Second World War and became the dominant theory in IR due to its powerful 
theoretical explanations of war, alliances, imperialism and the obstacles for international 
cooperation at that time. Realism considered international relations as a power contest 
among self-interested states and had a pessimistic view regarding peace and cooperation 
among rival states.  
  
However, the dominance of classic realism was challenged by liberals in the 1970s. 
Unlike the realists’ image of international relations as a system of colliding billiard 
balls, liberals such as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye considered the international 
system “as a cobweb of political, economic and social relations binding sub-national, 
national, transnational, international and supranational actors”.45 They highlighted the 
significance of non state actors, transnational relations and the interdependence between 
states. Subsequently, Keohane and Nye revised their views acknowledging and 
explaining the significance and power of sovereign states in the concept of complex 
interdependence. Accordingly “states were acknowledged to be the principal actors in 
                                                            
42 Ibid.; pp.165-166. 
43 Fierke, K.M.; Constructivism, p. 178. 
44 Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2010); Introduction to International Relations, pp. 160-
161. 
45 Reus-Smit, Christian; Constructivism, p. 213. 
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world politics, but pervasive interdependence was thought to alter the nature and 
effectiveness of state power, with the balance of military power, so long emphasized by 
realists, no longer determining political outcomes, as sensitivity and vulnerability to 
interdependence produced new relations of power between states.” 46     
 
As a response to this liberal challenge, Kenneth Waltz published Theory of 
International Relations47 in 1979 modifying realist theory radically, and thereby 
founding neo-realism or structural realism. Neo-realism is based on two main 
assumptions. Firstly, it considers the international system to be anarchical because of 
the absence of an order imposing central authority. Secondly, as a result of this 
anarchical system the main aim of the states is to protect their own existence, which 
requires a maximization of military power.  According to Waltz, the power struggle and 
conflict are the main endemic features of international relations. As a result of this view, 
he claims that international cooperation is at best risky and at worst nonexistent. Reus-
Smit points out the fact that Waltz’s book gave a new identity and confidence to the 
neo-realists. 48  
 
However, this did not prevent neo-realism to be challenged by a new approach of neo-
liberalist insitutionalists. Realism had claimed that international cooperation would only 
be possible under the hegemony of a powerful state, which would establish and impose 
the necessary institutional rules for a sustainable cooperation between states. However, 
the end of 1970s witnessed a decline in American hegemony, which did not affect the 
international economic cooperation promoted by America in the Cold War era.  As a 
response to this phenomenon, Keohane developed a theory to explain the cooperation 
between states under anarchy or in the absence of a hegemonic power.   In After 
Hegemony49, published in 1984, Keohane developed a neo-liberal theory of 
international cooperation embracing three main assumptions of neo-realism: the 
influence of international anarchy on a state’s behavior, the importance of the state as 
                                                            
46 Ibid.; p. 213. 
47 Waltz,  K. N. (1979); Theory of International Politics, McGrav-Hill, Boston. 
48 Reus-Smit, Christian; Constructivism, p. 214. 
49 Keohane, Robert (1984); After hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy, Princeton University Press, Princeton 
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the most significant actor in IR and the notion that states are basically self-interested. 
However, aside from these common assumptions neo-liberalism advocated different 
explanations regarding international cooperation. According to neo-liberals, in the 
absence of a central authority states are reluctant to cooperate due to their fear about a 
potential renege on agreements by other states. This makes cooperation too risky and 
costly. Neo-liberals argue that this phenomenon does not only clarify the failure of 
cooperation between states, but also makes clear in which conditions they would 
cooperate. According to neo-liberals, the establishment of international institutions or 
regimes can be seen as an attempt by states to overcome these difficulties. They argue 
that the results of international regimes, which make international cooperation under 
anarchy possible, are as follows: increased cost of breaking agreements, reduced 
transaction costs, and increased information about the intent of other states. 50 
 
The core disagreement between neo-realists and neo-liberals is regarding the question of 
whether states are interested in relative or absolute gains. The neo-realist argument is 
that states are preoccupied with relative gains and therefore the prospect of absolute 
gains does not necessarily encourage cooperation between states. For instance, “even if 
a trading agreement promises to net state A $100 million in profit, if that same 
agreement will net state B $200 million, State A may refuse to cooperate”. However, 
according to neo-liberals, the calculation of relative gains does not prevent international 
cooperation as “states tend to evaluate the intentions of other states as well as their 
relative capabilities; and when states have multiple relationships with multiple states 
the constant calculation of relative gains is simply impractical.” Therefore, unlike neo-
realists, who define states as defensive positionalists, neo-liberals consider them to be 
utility-maximizers.51 
 
Apart from these distinctions, these two mainstream theories share a common ground 
because of their rationalism, which is based on the three assumptions of micro 
economic theory. Firstly, actors are considered atomistic, self interested and rational. 
Secondly, the actors enter into social relations with predefined interests and which are 
not influenced by social interaction. Thirdly, society is considered as “a strategic realm, 
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a realm in which individuals or states come together to pursue their predefined 
interests”. Neither neo-realism nor neo-liberalism is interested in the formation of state 
interests as they consider state interests as exogenous to interstate interaction. 
Furthermore, neo-realism denies the reality of an international society describing it as 
an international system, whereas neo-liberals accept the existence of an international 
society emphasizing its strategic significance. Accordingly, the main reason for 
cooperation between states is the establishment and protection of functional institutions.  
However, social interaction does not play any role in the formation of states’ identities 
and interests.52   
 
In the midst of these discussions between two rationalist theories, the main assumptions 
of rationalism were challenged by critical theorists leading to the emergence of a new 
critical approach in IR. Contrary to rationalist theories, they claimed that “actors are 
inherently social, that their identities and interests are socially constructed, the 
products of inter subjective social structures.” Furthermore, they criticized the 
epistemology and methodology of Lakatosian neo-positivism pointing out “the 
unquantifiable nature of many social phenomena and the inherent subjectivity of all 
observation”. They also questioned the objective truth claims of rationalist theories 
indicating the relationship between knowledge and interests. Thus, they argue that the 
main task of their theories is to uncover and dismantle the structures of hegemony and 
oppression.53  
 
Critical theorists were also divided into two main camps between post-modernists and 
modernists. Post-modernist critical theory is inspired by French social theorists such as 
Jacques Derrida and Michael Foucault. They advocated a radical interpretivist approach 
contradicting “all attempts to assess empirical and ethical claims by any single criterion 
of validity, claiming that such moves always marginalize alternative viewpoints and 
moral positions, creating hierarchies of power and domination.”  The assumptions of 
modernist critical theory were mainly based on the ideas of the Frankfurt School 
theorists like Jürgen Habermas. They adopted a stance of critical interpretivism 
acknowledging knowledge-power relations and the subjectivity of all truth claims. 
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However they maintained that “some criteria were needed to distinguish plausible from 
implausible knowledge claims, and that without minimal, consensually grounded ethical 
principles, emancipator political action would be impossible.”54  
 
Apart from these discussions, it is suggested that the first wave of critical theory was 
mainly focused on the critique and dismantling of rationalist theories in IR.  Therefore, 
it is primarily an abstract theory, which criticizes the dominance of rationalist theories 
with regards to their position on legitimate knowledge, nature of the social world and 
their aim. Accordingly, they pointed out the symbiotic connection between theory and 
practice considering the critique of IR discourse as the core of their analysis.55 
 
It is a historical fact that the end of the Cold War dramatically transformed the 
international system, which had some inevitable consequences for international 
relations theory as well.  It is suggested that the end of the Cold War demonstrated neo-
realism’s failure to predict the end of the Cold War and to explain the balance of power 
in the post Cold War era, as the neo-realist logic assumed that US (United States) power 
would be balanced by other states leading to a multipolar world. However, it is clear 
that this assumption did not come true. Waltz speculated that it would occur tomorrow 
and Christopher Layne claimed that Japan and Germany could balance US power in 
fifty years. As a solution to this uncertainty, constructivists claim that the role of 
thoughts and ideas must be analyzed as well, in order to achieve a better understanding 
of the balance of power and anarchy.56  
 
It was this historical context and the theoretical debate among mainstream IR theories 
which led to the emergence of the constructivist approach in IR. It is suggested that 
because of the domination of mainstream theories in North America, constructivism 
became particularly popular and trendy among American scholars, whereas in Europe 
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this was not the case as the role of ideas and the social interaction between states had 
already been added into the international society approach analysis.57 
 
According to Richard Price and Reus-Smit, constructivism can be considered as a 
natural consequence of critical theory due to their adaption of critical theory’s insights 
to explain some features of international relations. However, unlike the first wave of 
critical theory, constructivism highlighted the significance of the empirical analysis.  
Constructivism has used the critical theorists’ ontology, which emphasized an 
“alternative image of humans as socially embedded, communicatively constituted and 
culturally empowered” to illuminate international relations.  Furthermore, 
constructivists also used critical theory’s methodologies, such as interpretive discursive 
and historical modes of analysis, for their empirical studies.58  
 
According to Reus-Smit there were four influential factors in the rise of constructivism 
in IR. Firstly, the critical theorists were challenged by the rationalists because of their 
focus on the theoretical critique without a substantive analysis of world politics. While 
leading critical theorists questioned the drives behind this challenge, constructivists took 
up the challenge to prove the power of their non-rationalist heuristic approach.   
Secondly, as mentioned before, the end of the Cold War had demonstrated the 
theoretical weaknesses of mainstream theories and also “undermined the critical 
theorists` assumption that theory drove practice in any narrow or direct fashion, as 
global politics increasingly demonstrated dynamics that contradicted realist 
expectations and prescriptions.”  This change made it clear that other than a narrowly 
defined meta-theoretical critique, new alternative approaches were required in order to 
explain the new challenges in world politics.  Thirdly, the emergence of a new 
generation of scholars in the 90s, who not only adopted many aspects of critical theory 
but also “saw potential for innovation in conceptual elaboration and empirically 
informed theoretical development”, contributed to the rise of constructivism in IR. 
Lastly, the frustration about the analytical handicaps of rationalist theories has also 
                                                            
57 Ibid.; p. 161. 
58 Reus-Smit, Christian; Constructivism, pp. 218-219 
 26 
 
contributed to the embrace of a new approach by the mainstream scholars, which has 
carried constructivism “from the margins to the mainstream of theoretical debate”.59 
 
To sum up, one can say that two debates had shaped IR theories before the end of the 
Cold War.  The first debate was between neo-realism and neo-liberalism and about the 
possibility of international cooperation. The second was the debate between rationalists 
and critical theorists.  However, as discussed above, the end of the Cold War has thrown 
up new questions and challenges for IR theory, shifting the axes to two new debates, 
namely the debate between rationalists and constructivists, and between constructivists 
and critical theorists. Constructivism has criticized the rationalist and positivist 
approaches of neo-realism and neo-liberalism, and also condemned the critical theorists’ 
focus only on meta-theoretical critique without an empirical analysis of IR. As put 
forward by Reus-Smit “The veracity of the epistemological, methodological and 
normative challenges that critical theorists levelled at rationalism has not diminished, 
but the rise of constructivism has focused debate on ontological and empirical issues, 
pushing the metatheoretical debate of the 1980s off centre stage”. 60  As a result of this 
turn in IR, constructivism has been carried into the mainstream of IR theories and 
become a very popular and trendy approach among IR scholars throughout the 1990s.  
 
2.3 The Roots of Constructivism 
 
It should be mentioned that constructivism has been regarded both as a social theory 
and a theory of IR. Therefore, the developments in sociology and philosophy have also 
had their imprints on constructivism. For instance, Anthony Giddens analyzed the link 
between structures and actors in his concept of “structuration”. Accordingly, unlike the 
neo-realist assumption about the limitation of state actors by the structure of anarchy, 
there is no mechanical determination of the actors by the structures. “The relationship 
between structures and actors involves intersubjective understanding and meaning. 
Structures do constrain actors, but actors can also transform structures by thinking 
about them and acting on them in new ways. The notion of structuration therefore leads 
to a less rigid and more dynamic view of the relationship between structure and 
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actors.”61 This new understanding is used by constructivists to propose a less rigid 
understanding of anarchy in IR theory. 
 
Some analysts also suggested that constructivism is not a totally new approach. Jackson 
et al. suggest that the roots of constructivism can be found as late as in the 18th century.  
For instance, Giambattista Vico, an Italian philosopher in the 18th century, suggested 
that the natural world is created by God whereas the historical one is created by human 
beings. According to Vico “history is not some kind of unfolding or evolving process 
that is external to human affairs. Men and women make their own history. They also 
make states which are historical constructs. States are artificial creations and the state 
system is artificial too; it is made by men and women and if they want to, they can 
change it and develop it in new ways.”62 Furthermore, Immanuel Kant has been 
considered as another pioneer of social constructivism as he suggested that we could 
only obtain subjective knowledge about the world due to the filtration of knowledge 
through human consciousness.63  
 
Additionally constructivists have also referred to the Weberian concept of “verstehen”, 
which indicates that “action always must be understood from within and thus that social 
meaning is a function of what is in people’s heads. “64 Max Weber highlighted the 
difference between the social world and the natural world of physical phenomena. 
“Human beings rely on ‘understanding’ of each other’s actions and assigning 
‘meaning’ to them. In order to comprehend human interaction, we cannot merely 
describe it in the way we describe physical phenomena, such as a boulder falling off a 
cliff; we need a different kind of interpretive understanding, or verstehen... Weber 
concluded that subjective understanding is the specific characteristic of sociological 
knowledge”65 The concepts outlined above were used by constructivist theory to 
highlight the significance of meaning and understanding in IR. 
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2.4. Constructivist Theories of International Relations: The Formation of Identity, 
Norm, Interest and Culture 
 
As mentioned above, constructivism has two aspects. To begin with, it is a general 
social theory, which analyzes social actions, the social world and the linkage between 
structures and actors. Therefore, constructivism as a social theory is applicable to all 
social sciences.  Consequently, it has also contributed to the theory of IR with a number 
of substantive theories.66 Reus-Smit distinguishes between three distinct variants of 
constructivist IR theories, which have been developed throughout the 90s, according to 
their level of analyses: systemic, unit level and holistic constructivism.67  The next 
section will include an elaborate analysis of these three different approaches. 
 
2.4.1 Systemic Level Constructivism: The Emphasis on Systemic/External Factors;  
The systemic level constructivism focuses only on the relations between states in the 
international system ignoring the role of domestic factors. This approach does not take 
the domestic political developments into consideration.  According to Reus-Smit the 
best example of systemic level constructivism is developed by Alexander Wendt with 
his theory of cultures of anarchy.68 However, it should be mentioned that Wendt is not 
the only representative of this approach. There are other theorists, who contributed to 
this approach with their analysis of the effect of international organizations and 
international society’s norms on the formation of the states’ identities and interests, such 
as Martha Finnmore and Michael Barnett.69   
Wendt distinguishes between social and corporate identities of the state. He defines the 
social identity of the state as “the status, role or personality that international system 
ascribes to a state”. The corporate identity is defined by Wendt as “the internal human, 
material ideological or cultural factors that make a state what it is”. Consequently, 
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although Wendt acknowledges that the identities and interests of the states are “in 
important part determined by domestic rather than the international system”, he argues 
that “if we are interested in the question of how the state system works, rather than in 
how its elements are constructed, we will have to take the existence of states as 
given...”70  
This stance of systemic level constructivism is criticized by some scholars because it 
disregards the role of domestic factors in the formation of identities and interests. For 
instance, Reus-Smit criticizes Wendt’s focus on systemic theorizing with the following 
statement: “Wendt brackets corporate sources of state identity, concentrating on how 
structural contexts, systemic process and strategic practices produce and reproduce 
different sorts of state identity.”  According to Reus-Smit the major trouble of this 
approach is the fact that it analyzes the influential factors in the international system 
from an unproductive narrow perspective as it focuses only on the systemic level.  
Therefore this approach does not provide sufficient explanation of the drastic changes in 
the international society and state identities. Reus-Smit concludes that by excluding 
domestic factors, Wendt disregards “most of the normative and ideational forces that 
might prompt” a change in the identities and interests.71 
Aside from the critiques and limitations of this approach, it should be mentioned that 
systemic level constructivism shed important light on the systemic sources in the 
formation of state identity and interests. As a result, this approach might be effective in 
understanding one element of world politics, namely the external international 
environment and its effects on the identities and domestic structures of states.  Therefore 
this section will first analyze all the contributions of systemic level constructivism in 
order to achieve a better theoretical framework in the analysis of the systemic sources of 
the transformation of the Turkish state’s identity and its foreign policy.  
2.4.1.1 Cultures of Anarchy  
The core assumption of Wendt´s theory is that anarchy in the international system does 
not always lead to self-help, which contradicts the neo-realist stance. Wendt argues that 
whether the anarchy leads to self-help cannot be decided a priori as the process of 
interaction between states creates and may change the identity and interest of the 
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actors.72 In Alexander Wendt’s words “There is no logic of Anarchy apart from the 
practices that create and instantiate one structure of identities and interest rather than 
another; structure has no existence or causal power apart from process. Self help and 
power politics are institutions, not essential features of anarchy. Anarchy is what states 
make of it”73  
Wendt agrees with the neo-realists about the main objectives of the states, namely 
survival and the security. However, as mentioned above, Wendt argues that this does 
not always result in a self-help system. In order to achieve a comprehensive 
understanding of various security policies resulting from this desire for survival and 
security, Wendt suggests that the formation of the identities and interests in the 
interaction between states should be analyzed.74 In this regard Wendt refers to a basic 
assumption of constructivist social theory, namely that “People act towards object, 
including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them.”  
For instance the relations between enemy states and friendly states are radically 
different, and the neo-realist logic of anarchy does not explain these different attitudes.  
Wendt illustrates this constructivist view with the following example; “If society forgets 
what a university is, the powers and practices of professor and student cease to exist; if 
the United States and Soviet Union decide that they are no longer enemies, the cold war 
is over.” The structures are constructed accordingly by collective meanings, which in 
return form the actions. Wendt concludes that “actors acquire identities- relatively 
stable, role specific understandings and expectations about self, by participating in such 
collective meanings”.75 
Wendt agrees with the neo-realist assumption that the main characteristic of the 
international system is anarchy. However, as mentioned above, Wendt suggests that 
anarchy does not always lead to self-help systems and different sorts of anarchy cultures 
might develop as a result of the interaction between states throughout history. 
Consequently Wendt distinguishes between three main types of anarchy cultures at the 
macro level: “based on what kind of roles- enemy, rival and friend- dominate the 
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system”. He defines these cultures as Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian respectively. 
According to Wendt the self-help system can only be observed in a Hobbesian culture 
and he rejects the neo-realist notion of one single “logic of anarchy” as he argues that 
“anarchic structures vary at the macro level and can therefore have multiple logics.” 
Furthermore, against the rationalist claim that only the behavior of states is determined 
by system structure, Wendt argues that “the structure of the international politics also 
has construction effects on states.”   He criticizes the neo-realist stance with the 
following statement: “Anarchy as such is an empty vessel and has no intrinsic logic; 
anarchies only acquire logics as a function of the structure of what we put inside 
them”.76 
Wendt emphasizes the fact that he considers structure not in material but in social terms. 
Considering structure in social terms means that “the actors take each other into 
account in choosing their actions. This process is based on actors ideas about the 
nature and roles of Self and Other, and such social structures are distribution of ideas 
or stocks of knowledge.”  Wendt draws a distinction between shared and private ideas 
and claims “shared ideas make up the subset of social structure known as culture”. He 
acknowledges that private ideas might construct structures, however he maintains that 
its shared ideas that generally construct structures.  As a result of this, Wendt argues 
that it is culture which constitutes the structure of the international system, which he 
defines as its political culture. 77 
To demonstrate how these cultures constitute states, Wendt mentions three influential 
factors in the adaptation of cultural norms by actors: force, price and legitimacy. Wendt 
considers these factors as a reflection of the “three different degrees to which a norm 
can be internalized and thus as generating three different pathways by which the same 
structure can be produced.”  Thus Wendt claims that the three types of anarchy cultures 
can be internalized in three different degrees (see Figure 1). Furthermore, Wendt 
suggests that the absolute construction of the actors only takes place in the third degree 
of the internalization of cultures. In the first and second degrees “the culture is affecting 
just their behaviour or beliefs about the environment, not who they are or what they 
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want” The next section will provide an elaborate analysis of the three cultures of 
anarchy developed by Wendt.78 
 
Figure 1: Cultures of Anarchy and Degrees of Internalization 79 
 
a. Hobbesian  
Wendt acknowledges that the logic of a Hobbesian culture is war of all against all. 
However, unlike the conventional view, he claims that the causes of the state of war are 
the shared ideas, not anarchy or human nature. Therefore the concept of enmity and how 
states perceive each other is vital in a Hobbesian Culture.  Wendt suggests that “enemies 
are constituted by representations of the Other as an actor who (1) does not recognise 
the right of the self to exist as an autonomous being, and therefore (2) will not willingly 
limit its violence toward the Self.”  Wendt notes that enmity and rivalry have a common 
ground as “both does not fully recognise the self and therefore may act in a revisionist 
fashion toward it”. However he makes a distinction between deep revisionism of 
enmity, which aims to eliminate the “Other”, and shallow revisionism of rivalry, which 
aims to revise only the Other’s behavior or property. Consequently the intentions of 
enemies are unlimited and the intentions of rivals are limited in nature. Furthermore 
Wendt suggests that whether the enemy is real or imagined does not affect the 
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perceptions of the states because when they consider enemies as real then they will act 
accordingly.80    
According to Wendt, defining each other as an enemy might have four different 
consequences for a state’s foreign policy conduct, which in turn produce “a particular 
logic of interaction”. Firstly, the principle of “kill or be killed” forces the states to 
follow deep revisionist policies towards their enemies, even if they prefer a status quo 
policy.  Secondly, the actors will base their decisions on the worst case scenario, that is 
to say “negative possibilities rather than probabilities will dominate, which reduces 
likelihood of reciprocating any cooperative moves made by the enemy.”  Thirdly, “if 
you want peace prepare for war” will be the main principle of the states, which will 
lead states to increase their military capabilities because the enemy might wage a war 
“as soon as he can win.” Lastly, in case of a war the states will not limit their violence 
because the enemy might take advantage from the other state’s self-restraint. Wendt 
notes that he considers power politics as “fundamentally social in the Weberian sense.” 
Therefore, he defines power politics as Realpolitik rather than realist.  He considers 
Realpolitik as “a self-fulfilling prophecy”, whose beliefs produce behaviors “that 
confirm those beliefs”. In short, enemy images have “homeostatic quality that sustains 
the logic of Hobbesian anarchies.” 81  
The above outlined concept is based on the micro level interaction between actors and 
how they perceive each other.  In the macro level, the logic of enmity will prevail in the 
system after reaching a “tipping point”, namely when the majority of the states consider 
each other as enemies. It is at this stage that actors begin to consider enmity as a feature 
of the system, which forces them to “represent all Others as enemies simply because 
they are parts of the system.” As a result of this, a logic of interaction emerges, which is 
“based more on what actors know about their roles than on what they know about each 
other, enabling them to predict each other´s behaviour without knowing each other`s  
minds.”  Wendt suggests that the logic of Hobbesian anarchy produces four macro level 
patterns in the international system. Firstly, war becomes endemic and unlimited, which 
does not necessarily mean a constant state of war because of material limitations. 
However, as a result of collective perceptions of the Other as an enemy “war may quite 
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literally at any moment occur”.  Secondly, the weak and unfit actors will be eliminated 
by strong actors.  This will reduce the number of actors involved in the system, which 
will lead to power concentrations such as empires. Thirdly, the strong states will attempt 
to balance each other’s power, which however will not be sustainable because in a 
Hobbesian anarchy “the tendency toward consolidation” will prevail in the long run. 
Lastly, in a Hobbesian anarchy non-alignment and neutrality will be very difficult since 
all the actors have to follow the logic of the system: “kill or be killed”. 82     
As mentioned before, there are three degrees of internalization of Hobbesian anarchy.  
In the first degree the actors are aware of the norms; however the actors act according to 
the norms because they are forced to do so, not because it is their intention. Therefore 
an actor’s “behaviour is purely externally rather than internally driven”. Wendt notes 
both status quo and revisionist powers comply with Hobbesian norms because shared 
ideas about the system force them to do so. According to Wendt the first degree of 
Hobbesian culture does not match much of recent Western history. However, he 
mentions that the post Westphalian system based on Lockean culture witnessed 
“temporary regressions to a Hobbesian condition when a powerful state had an internal 
revolution and rejected Lockean norms altogether”, such as the French revolution, the 
following Napoleonic wars and the rise of national socialism. 83 
In the second degree of internalization the actors comply with the norms because they 
believe it is in their self-interest. Therefore their behavior towards to norms can be 
considered as instrumental.  At this point actors start to justify their decisions with 
shared expectations, such as necessity and raison d’état. Wendt suggests that after a 
short time any Hobbesian culture will be internalized at least to the second degree, 
because the states have to comply with the logic of the system in order to secure their 
existence. 84 
In the third degree actors comply with the norms because they consider them as 
legitimate. Norms constitute actors absolutely only in this stage and before this stage 
their identities and interests are not shaped by the culture. It is in this degree that 
“actors identify with other expectations, relating to them as a part of themselves. The 
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other now inside the cognitive boundary of the Self, constituting who it see itself as in 
relation to the Other, its “Me”.” As a result of this approach Wendt rejects the neo-
realist stance on anarchy, according to which the source of the anarchy is human nature. 
Wendt argues that “having defined their identities and interests in terms of a shared 
systemic culture, enemies become a group- albeit a dysfunctional one that has 
suppressed any sense of itself”. Furthermore he points out that the more actors resist 
change the more their identities and interests are constructed by the shared beliefs and 
norms. 85 
 
 b. Lockean  
According to Wendt the post Westphalian world is not a Hobbesian but Lockean 
system. However, it should be mentioned at this point that Wendt`s theory is 
Eurocentric and he does not consider the other parts of the world in his analysis.  Apart 
from this limitation he suggests that after the Westphalian agreement the “live and let 
live” logic of Lockean anarchy prevailed over the Hobbesian logic of “kill or be killed”. 
86 
Lockean anarchy is based on rivalry rather than enmity of Hobbesian anarchy. In a 
Lockean anarchy rivals recognize the other states’ sovereignty and their right to exist. 
Therefore conquest and domination of the other states are not among the characteristics 
of this system. However, this self-constraint does not mean that states settle their 
disputes peacefully and the use of force in the disputes is still an essential part of this 
system. Wendt suggests that rivalry might lead to territorial revisionism as well, 
because “the right to property- enough to live- is acknowledged, but which property 
may be disputed, sometimes by force”.”87 
Wendt considers sovereignty as an institution, which is shared by many states.  The 
recognition of others’ right to exist is the essence of this institution. Wendt points out 
the fact that in the Westphalian system this right is recognized in international law as 
well, which makes it more than an abstract right. Today the majority of states recognize 
this law in spite of the nonexistence of a central authority. Yet this does not make the 
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Lockean system “a complete rule of law system” because the rivals can use force to 
resolve disputes.  
This type of culture of anarchy based on rivalry might have four consequences for 
states’ foreign policy behavior.  Firstly, states follow a status quo policy towards other 
states’ sovereignty. Secondly, because the right of sovereignty is a commonly accepted 
right, the security threats decrease, which might cause absolute gains to prevail over 
relative losses. The states will still be concerned about their security, however in a far 
less intense way since “certain pathways on the game tree- those involving their own 
death- has been removed.” Third, the states do not rely on just military power as in the 
Hobbesian system because the states can easily find trusty allies in case of a threat. 
Lastly, in case of war the use of violence is limited as manifested in “just war theory 
and standards of civilisation.”88   
The concept explained in the above analysis is the micro level interaction between 
actors and how they perceive each other.  In the macro level the logic of rivalry will 
prevail in the system after reaching a “tipping point”, namely when the majority of the 
states consider each other as rivals rather than enemies. It is at this stage “states will 
make attributions about each other´s minds based more on what they know about the 
structure than what they know about each other, and the system will acquire a logic of 
its own”.  According to Wendt this structure produces four types of behavior at macro 
level. First is the limitation and acceptance of warfare at the same time.  War is 
considered legitimate in terms of protecting interests, however it is also limited, “not in 
the sense of killing a lot of people, but of not killing states.” Moreover, wars of conquest 
are a rare phenomenon, and are opposed by the majority of the states for the sake of the 
status quo.  Secondly, the death rate is lower than in Hobbesian culture and the Lockean 
anarchy has more stability in terms of membership. Wendt emphasizes that membership 
is the core of the logic of Lockean anarchy; since the states considered to be non 
members do not enjoy the right to sovereignty. Wendt illustrates his view with the 
survival of micro states such as Monaco and Singapore, who survived just because 
“potential predators let them live.”  This means that weak states are protected because 
of the restraint of the strong, not because their power. Thirdly, the balance of power 
turns into “a basis for order” since it is not needed for the survival. Finally, the 
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neutrality or non-alignment of a state is recognized by other states.  According to Wendt 
his concept places Waltz’s anarchy in a Lockean system. 89 
 
As mentioned above, the norms of each culture can be internalized in three distinct 
degrees.  The institution of sovereignty is the basis of the Lockean system. In the first 
degree states comply with the Lockean norms just because of the coercive power of 
other states or material limitations. Wendt points out the fact that if the majority of the 
states do not comply and recognize the norms of Lockean culture then there is always a 
danger that Hobbesian culture can take over the system. However, the relative stability 
of the Westphalian system demonstrates that Lockean culture has been more deeply 
internalized.90 
In the second degree, the actors adopt the norms because they believe it is in their self-
interest, which makes their behavior towards the norms instrumental. The institution of 
sovereignty reduces security risks and enables cooperation between states for mutual 
benefits. Wendt notes that it is “in this way the institution of sovereignty exert causal or 
regulative effect on states.” Furthermore, it also has constitutive effects on states’ 
behavior since “the shared beliefs about what counts as violation of sovereignty” 
facilitates the institution to work. Wendt suggests that in the second degree culture plays 
a much more important role than in the first degree, “but still as an intervening variable 
between power and interest and outcomes.”91 
In the third degree case, the states adopt the norms of Lockean culture just because they 
consider them legitimate and identify themselves with the norms. Wendt makes a 
distinction between interest and self-interest, and explains interest as follows: “our 
behaviour is still interested in the sense that we are motivated to obey the law, but we 
do not treat the law as merely an object to be used for our own benefit.” Therefore, in 
the third degree states follow status quo policies both at the level of behavior and 
interests. As an example for this Wendt mentions that the USA let the Bahamas live 
although no power would have prevented a USA invasion of the Bahamas. Wendt’s 
argument is that the USA has internalized the norms of sovereignty so deeply its 
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interests and behavior are determined according to these norms, which has prevented a 
USA invasion of Bahamas.92 
 
 c. Kantian             
According to Wendt, the Westphalian system is mainly dominated by Lockean culture. 
There were some returns to Hobbesian culture in the past three centuries, however, each 
time the revisionist states were confronted and prevented by the status quo powers. 
Despite this domination of Lockean culture in the modern times, Wendt observes the 
emergence of Kantian culture - derived from Immanuel Kant’s “perpetual peace” - in 
the post Cold War era, since the behavior of consolidated liberal democracies “seems to 
go well beyond a Lockean culture.” For instance, contrary to Lockean culture the north 
Atlantic states and many others have settled their disputes peacefully, and they have 
acted as a team in terms of their security. 93  
According to Wendt the basis of Kantian culture is friendship as a role structure. There 
are two distinct features of this culture: first the non-violent method of dispute 
settlement; second the mutual assistance in case of a security threat towards any 
members of the security team.  Wendt calls these characteristics the two rules of the 
Kantian culture, namely “the rule of non-violence” and “mutual aid”. He notes three 
points about these rules.  Firstly, “the rules are independent and equally necessary” 
Secondly, “the friendship concerns national security only, and need not spill over into 
other issue areas”. Lastly, in contrast to alliances found in Lockean culture, “the 
friendship is temporally open-ended”.94  
 
Pluralistic security communities and collective security are the outcomes of these two 
rules of friendship in Kantian culture. In a pluralistic security community the members 
of the community do not consider war as a legitimate way of resolving disputes and 
therefore do not wage war each other, and settle their disputes peacefully through 
negotiation, arbitration or courts. There is a distinction between a pluralistic security 
community and collective security system. A pluralistic security community is 
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established to settle the disputes among its member states, whereas a collective security 
system is mainly established to resolve the disputes between the community and non-
member states. That is to say, the basis of collective security is mutual aid or “all for 
one, one for all” in case of security threats from outside. In other words, in a collective 
security system the self-help system is replaced by the Other-help system.  Wendt notes 
that self-help systems may produce alliances between states; however there is a 
fundamental distinction between collective security and alliances. While in an alliance 
cooperation is self-interested and will be dependent on the continuum of the security 
risk: “the collective security is neither threat nor time specific.” The members of a 
collective security system consider themselves as “a single unit for security purposes a 
priori”. Furthermore, the military capabilities of member states require a different 
meaning in a collective security system. In alliances, the military capabilities of 
members may pose a threat to each other when the cooperation is over, whereas in a 
collective security system the military capabilities of members are “an asset to all, 
since each knows they will only be used on behalf of the collective.” 95 
 
Wendt notes that universal collective security is compulsory for a Kantian culture at the 
macro level. However, he rejects the notion that a collective security system must be a 
universal system indicating two alternative options. Firstly, the states may establish 
collective security systems “within relatively autonomous regional subsystems or 
security complexes”.  Secondly, in a balance of power system at macro level, the reason 
for cooperation between states within a bloc might be their commitment to “all one for, 
one for all” principle rather than their fears about the other blocs’ intentions. Wendt 
illustrates his view with the following statement: “The fact that the members of a bloc 
can be either rivals or friends also helps us explain change over time, as in the case of 
NATO, which may have formed initially as an alliance with the expectation that it would 
be temporary, but seems to have become a collective security system with an 
expectation of performance”96  
 
As the other cultures, the Kantian one can be internalized in three degrees.  In the first 
degree the states comply with the Kantian culture norms because they are forced to do 
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so. Wendt rejects the notion that material coercion can only be explained by realist 
assumptions and suggests that it is also applicable to idealist theories. As mentioned 
before, one element of Kantian culture is the pluralistic security community, which 
according to Wendt can easily be rationalized by material coercion. In this security 
system the revisionist states are stopped from attacking other states by the sanctions of 
the status quo powers and the high costs of war.  In the other part of Kantian culture, 
viz. collective security, there are two factors explaining cooperation in coercive terms, 
which pose a non-temporary security threat to all members. Environmental issues and 
the threat of a nuclear war can be seen as an example of this kind of threat, which might 
force the states to collaborate against their will.97      
 
In the second degree case states comply with the Kantian norms because of self-interest 
based on instrumental calculation about the advantage of Kantian norms. In the case of 
a pluralistic security community “the costs of violating the norms still figure in states 
calculations, but rather thwarting an interest in aggression they are now viewed 
indifferently as simply part of the incentive structure for different behaviours.” In the 
case of collective security the states perceive friendship as a strategy used to acquire 
advantages for themselves. According to Wendt, at this stage of internalization although 
states have a weak commitment to friendship, they act “as if they were friends”, helping 
each other in case of a security threat, which will continue permanently because of 
shared beliefs. Wendt acknowledges that it is a low possibility that a Kantian culture in 
the second degree might prevail at macro level because of the “demanding obligations 
of friendship”.  However, he maintains that the states might achieve the second degree, 
since “there is a lot more collective action in domestic life than the pure self interest 
model leads us to expect”98   
  
Finally, in the third degree case states adopt the norms of Kantian culture because they 
consider them as legitimate. “This means that states identify with each other, seeing 
each other`s security not just as instrumentally related to their own, but as literally 
being their own. “  Wendt concludes that in this degree the states must really consider 
each other as friends rather than behaving as if they were. Therefore the states must 
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“make sacrifices for the Other for his own sake, because he has legitimate claims on the 
Self.” 99 
 
Wendt suggest that the Kantian culture would establish a “decentralized authority” or 
an “internationalization of political authority”, which looks neither like an anarchy nor 
a state. Wendt concludes that a “Kantian Culture based on the rule of law” would 
imply that “two dimensions are relevant to the constitution of anarchy/non-anarchy  
rather than the traditional one, namely the degree of centralisation of power and the 
degree of authority enjoyed by the system´s norms.”100  
 
To sum up, Wendt concludes that his model does not suggest that a change in structures 
is easy, however it may occur. Wendt questions “whether the international politics 
evolve in a linear direction or progress over time” and indicates that it has two 
dimensions, viz. vertical and horizontal.  The first dimension raises the question of 
whether there is a linear progress in the internalization of cultures from the first to the 
third degree.  Wendt notes that his answer to this question is a “qualified yes” because 
“the longer a practice has been in existence the deeper it will be embedded in the 
individual and collective consciousness.” The horizontal dimension arises another 
question of whether there is a linear progress in history from a Hobbesian culture to a 
Kantian one. Wendt answers this with the following statement: “even there is no 
guarantee that the future of the international system will be better than its past, at least 
there is reason to think it will not be worse.”101  
   
d. The Process of Cultural/Structural Change  
 
As mentioned previously Wendt suggests that cultural/structural change in the 
international system is possible but not easy because the existing culture of anarchy 
reproduces itself through practices and resists such a change. However, Wendt points 
out that “agents and structures are themselves processes, in other words, on-going 
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accomplishments of practice”.102 It is these practices and the interaction between agents 
that produce, reproduce and transform agents and cultures. Furthermore “the process of 
interaction adds an irreducible and potentially transformative element”,103 which might 
change the structure of the international system.  Therefore Wendt rejects realism’s 
single logic of anarchy and suggests that different cultures of anarchies such as 
Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian emerged in the international system throughout 
history. Consequently he suggests that a change in the culture of anarchy is quite 
difficult but possible.  
 
In order to explain the process of change in the culture of anarchy, Wendt points out 
that there are two models of “what is going on” in the social process. On the one hand 
the rationalist model claims that the states’ interests and identities are given and are not 
influenced by the interaction between states. The only change occurs in the behaviors of 
the states, which they modify according to their interests and incentives. On the other 
hand the constructivist model suggests that identities and interests of the states are 
constructed in the process of interaction. This model accepts the realist notion that the 
agents determine their behaviors according to incentives, however “the assumption is 
made that more is actually going on in those choices than just the squaring of means to 
ends: actors are also instantiating and reproducing identities, narratives of who they 
are, which in turn constitute the interests on the basis of which they make behavioral 
choices”104     
 
From the analytical point of view, Wendt says, there is no disagreement between these 
two models since they focus on different dimension of process. He suggests that “it 
would be useful know the scope conditions for when each models assumptions hold.” 
The rationalist model may offer a good explanation when we expect that the identities 
and interests of states will not alter in an interaction, whereas the constructivist model 
may provide a better analytical tool when we expect that they will vary. Finally he 
argues that “rationalism for today and tomorrow, constructivism for the longue duree”, 
since change is more likely to occur in the long term. However, from the ontological 
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point of view, there is a stark disagreement between these models on the question of 
whether the agents are indigenous or exogenous to the interaction. 105 
 
Wendt rejects the realist stance that self-interest is an “external dues ex machine driving 
the international system” and argues that it is a constant product of the system, whose 
existence depends on the practices. If the practice does not reproduce self-interest it will 
perish in the system. “The possibility of structural change is born out of that fact.”106 
 
d.1 The Two  Mechanisms of Identity Formation  
 
Based on what Wendt calls “interactionist social theory” he first proposes a general 
model of identity formation analyzing the production and reproduction of identities in 
social interaction. Wendt notes that there are two approaches to the mechanisms of 
identity formation, namely the natural and cultural selection approaches. Natural 
selection is dominant in nature and both natural and cultural selections are winnowing 
mechanisms in society. It should be noted that these approaches represent the materialist 
and idealist stances respectively, and not the rationalist and constructivist.107 
 
 The first mechanism (natural selection) “occurs when organisms that are relatively 
poorly adapted to the competition for scarce resources in an environment fail to 
reproduce and are replaced by the better adapted… Natural selection is not about a 
war of all against all, but about different reproductive success. This can be used to 
explain the evolution of species (states vs. city-states) or of traits (identities and 
interests) within a species, but mechanisms is the same, reproductive success of 
organisms.” 108 Wendt notes that this approach is successful in explaining the 
emergence and dominance of the Hobbesian culture in the most part of human history, 
however it fails to explain the states’ identities after the Westphalian agreement since 
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the small states have been able to survive despite the inequalities of power and constant 
warfare.109 
 
Cultural selection (second mechanism) “is an evolutionary mechanism involving the 
transmission of the determinants of behaviors from individual to individual, and thus 
from generation to generation, by social learning, imitation or some other similar 
process.”110 The first mechanism of cultural selection is imitation. It shapes the 
identities and interests of states, “when actors adopt the self-understandings of those 
whom they perceive as successful.” both in material and status means.  Wendt notes that 
imitation may change a population’s characteristics within a single generation, whereas 
natural selection requires many generations for such a change. 111 The second 
mechanism of cultural selection is social learning. “The basic idea is that identities and 
their corresponding interests are learned and then reinforced in response to how actors 
are treated by significant Others... actors come to see themselves as a reflection of how 
they think Others see or appraise them, in mirror of Others` representations of the 
Self”112     
 
Wendt notes that despite the materialists’ focus on natural selection as the main 
determinant of identity formation, he prefers cultural selection.  Natural selection may 
be more dominant at some stage, however “cultural selection may still explain most of 
the variance in the cultural forms, and create the parameters within which natural 
selection operates.” Thus both cultural and natural selection mechanisms might have 
been influential in the evolution of the egoistic states’ identities and interests.113 
 
d.2 Collective Identity and Cultural Change 
 
As mentioned previously, on the one hand rationalism argues that the states’ identities 
and interests are exogenous to the interaction between states and the structural change 
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only emerges “when the relative expected utility of normative vs. deviant behavior 
changes.” On the other hand constructivism suggests that the state’s identities and 
interests are endogenous to the interaction between states and the structural change 
emerges “when actors redefine who they are and what they want.” Wendt notes that 
structural change at the level of international politics requires collective identity 
formation. He explains collective identity with the following statement: 
 “The mark of a fully internalized culture is that actors identify with it, have made it, the 
generalized Other, part of their understanding of Self. This identification, this sense of 
being part of a group or “we”, is a social or collective identity that gives actors an 
interest in the preservation of their culture. Collective interests mean that actors make 
the welfare of the group an end in itself, which will in turn help them to overcome the 
collective action problems that beset egoists.” 114 
 
There are some limits to the formation of collective identity. 
• It is relationship specific: Franco-German collective security does not include 
Brazil 
• It is issue and threat specific: In a Lockean culture states are committed to 
others’ survival rather than their general security, since self-help still dominates 
the culture. 
• It will be in constant conflict with egoistic identities: a sacrifice for Others is 
exceptional  
Wendt summarizes his main point with following statement: “because the structure of 
any internalized culture is associated with a collective identity, a change in that 
structure will involve a change in collective identity, involving the breakdown of an old 
identity and the emergence of a new one.“ Wendt distinguishes between identity change 
and structural change, because identity formation occurs at the micro stage and 
structural change occurs at the macro stage. In his analyses Wendt take the Lockean 
culture as his starting point because it is more relevant in today´s international system 
and attempts to demonstrate the process of the transformation of this culture into a 
Kantian one.  According to Wendt, natural selection does not play an important role in a 
Lockean culture because the culture is not based on the principle of “kill or be killed”. 
As mentioned before, structural change is not easy because internal and external sources 
show resistance towards such a change. Thus even redefinition of some states’ identity 
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and interests is not enough for a structural change. Structural change only occurs after 
“enough important actors change their behaviour that a tipping point is crossed.” 115   
Wendt notes that imitation plays a significant role in “the tendency of many Third 
worlds and former communist states to adopt the institutional and ideological attributes 
of Western states”. However this tendency requires “the prior existence of a collective 
identity to which states are trying to gain membership, in this case West or 
Modernity”.116 Therefore Wendt focuses on the role of social learning in the formation 
of collective identity, which was explained in the previous section. Wendt proposes 
“four master variables “that could explain why states in a Lockean world would engage 
in prosocial security policies and thereby spur collective identity formation.” 117  
 
d.3 Master Variables of Cultural/Structural Change              
 
Wendt`s four master variables include interdependence, common fate, homogeneity and 
self-restraint. Unlike the mainstream IR theories that consider the egoism of states as 
given and focus on the how these variables produce cooperation among egoist states, 
Wendt suggests that the main importance of these variables is to weaken egoistic 
identities contributing to the formation of collective identities. Furthermore, the 
variables are divided into two groups, namely the active (the first three variables) and 
permissive (self-restraint) causes. At least one efficient cause combined with self-
restraint is necessary for the collective identity formation. Therefore self-restraint has a 
key role in this process, which has “deeper effects, enabling states to solve the 
fundamental problem of collective identity formation: overcoming the fear of being 
engulfed by the Other.”118 
 
The first master variable is interdependence. “Actors are interdependent when the 
outcome of an interaction for each depends on the choices of other.” Interdependence 
does not only include cooperative but also enmity relations. Wendt notes that in order to 
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create collective identity, interdependence should be objective rather than subjective 
because in case of a collective identity actors consider each other’s interests as their 
own and are interdependent by nature. There is a constitutive rather than casual 
correlation between subjective interdependence and collective identity. The main point 
here is the transformation of objective interdependence into a subjective one. Wendt 
analyzes the reasons and process of this transformation and suggests that 
interdependence will not just alter the behaviors of the states but also their very 
identities.119 
 
The second master variable is common fate, which indicates a situation where actors’ 
life or well-being depends on the fate of the group as a whole. Like the case in 
interdependence, common fate may only produce collective identity “if it is an objective 
condition, since subjective awareness of being in the same boat is constitutive of 
collective identity, not a cause.”  There is a clear distinction between interdependence 
and common fate. The first one results from the interaction of two actors, the latter one 
produced by an outsider who considers and treats the first two as a group. Wendt notes 
that in the early stages of common fate actors may persuade their egoist interests, 
however in later stages their identities will be influenced by the cooperation and a 
collective identity will be formed.120 
 
The third and final efficient master variable is homogeneity or alikeness. Alikeness has 
two aspects in terms of organizational actors’ corporate and type identities. “The first 
refers to the extent to which they are isomorphic with respect to basic institutional form, 
function and casual powers.” For instance states and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) are alike units in today’s international politics.  The second refers to the type 
variation within a given corporate identity, such as regime type. For collective identity 
formation both forms of homogeneity are relevant. Wendt summarizes his hypothesis 
with the following statement: “increases in objective homogeneity cause actors to 
recategorize others as being like themselves. Categorizing others as being similar to 
oneself is not the same thing as identifying with them, but it fosters the latter in two 
ways.” The first indirect influence is a decrease in the quantity and quality of conflicts, 
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which might stem from the dissimilarities of both identities. The second direct influence 
contributes to the phenomenon that actors consider each other “as like themselves along 
the dimensions that constitute them as a group.” This notion produces a pro-social 
behavior which is based on the following logic:  “if they are just like us then we should 
treat them accordingly” However Wendt notes that homogeneity merely produces a 
collective identity and its contribution should be understood in context of other master 
variables.121 
 
The fourth permissive master variable is self-restraint, which is vital in the creation of a 
collective identity promoted by the other three efficient variables. The increasing effects 
of the three efficient variables produce more incentive for actors to adopt a pro-social 
behavior, which weakens the egoism of the actors and persuades them to treat others as 
themselves. This whole process depends on whether the actors overcome “their fear 
being engulfed, physically or psychically, by those with whom they would identify.”122 
Wendt concludes that “self-restraint is not an active cause of collective identity because 
it says nothing about the willingness to help others… However, by helping to constitute 
a security community self restraint also reduces states anxieties about being engulfed if 
they give the Other some responsibility for the care of the Self, enabling the positive 
incentives provided by the other master variables to work... Self-restraint generates 
collective identity only in conjunction with the other factors in the model, but its role in 
that combination is essential.”123  
 
2.4.1.2 Norms of International Society and the Influence of International 
Organizations 
Another variant of systemic constructivism was developed by Martha Finnemore and 
Michael Barnett. Like the other constructivists Finnemore’s focus is on the formation of 
states’ interests and identities. However, unlike the Wendt’s approach, which analyzes 
the effect of the interaction between states on the identities and interests of the states, 
Finnemore draws attention to the norms of the international society and their influence 
on the identities and interests of states.  Finnemore argues that identities and interests of 
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the states are influenced by international forces, namely by the dominant norms of 
conduct in the international society. 124 In Finnemore`s words: 
“States are socialised to accept certain preferences and expectations by the 
international society in which they and the people who compose them live... The fact 
that we live in an international society means that what we want and, in some ways, 
who we are, are shaped by the social norms, rules, understandings, and relationships 
we have with others. These social realities are as influential as material realities in 
determining behaviour. Indeed, they are what endow material realities with meaning 
and purpose. In political terms, it is these social realities that provide us with ends to 
which power and wealth can be used.”125 
Finnemore illuminates the impact of international society norms on national policies 
with three case studies: the role of United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation (UNESCO) on the states’ adaptation of bureaucracy of science policy after 
1955; the role of the International Red Cross on the acceptance of the norms of 
limitations in warfare by the states; and the role of the World Bank on the states’ 
recognition of the limitation of economic sovereignty “by allowing redistribution to 
take priority over production values.” 126  In the first case study she suggests that the 
states learned how to establish science bureaucracies through UNESCO because this did 
not exist in the majority of the states until UNESCO promoted the establishment of 
these bureaucracies after 1955.  As a result of this promotion the number of states where 
these bureaucracies exist increased from fourteen in 1955 to ninety in 1975. Therefore, 
Finnemore claims that UNESCO’s propaganda, namely that a civilized and modern 
state should have a science bureaucracy, was influential in the spread of this 
bureaucratic form over the globe.127  
The states adopt the international society’s norms mainly through international 
organizations, which exert influence on policies of states by setting the norms and 
constructing their interests and identities. Finnemore and Barnett consider international 
organizations as autonomous bureaucracies and as key actors at the international level.  
They argue that “they are not simply passive collections of rules or structure through 
which others act. Rather, they are active agents of global change. They develop new 
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policy ideas and programs, manage crisis and set priorities for shared activities that 
would not exist otherwise.”128 International organizations have authority and power 
“both because of their form as rational legal bureaucracies and because of their liberal 
goals.” This enables them to influence states’ behavior in direct and indirect ways.129   
According to Barnett and Duvall, international organizations might have four distinct 
forms of power in world politics, namely compulsory, institutional, structural and 
productive. Compulsory power is in effect when one actor can unilaterally force another 
actor to accept certain policies. The control of material resources by IOs (International 
Organizations), such as the World Bank, enables them to influence the national policies 
of states.130 The IOs might also have compulsory power because of their normative 
values. For instance the EU forces its members and candidate countries to adopt certain 
policies and to reform their domestic institutions so that they will reach European 
standards.131 The other three forms of power are defined by Barnett and Duvall as 
follows:  
“Institutional power is in effect when actors exercise indirect control over others, such 
as when states design international institutions in ways that work to their long- term 
advantage and to the disadvantage of others. Structural power concerns the constitution 
of social capacities and interests of actors in direct relation to one another. One 
expression of this form of power is the workings of the capitalist world- economy in 
producing social positions of capital and labour with their respective differential 
abilities to alter their circumstances and fortunes. Productive power is the socially 
diffuse production of subjectivity in systems of meaning and signification. A particular 
meaning of development, for instance, orients social activity in particular directions, 
defines what constitutes legitimate knowledge, and shapes whose knowledge matters”132     
All in all, the IOs are powerful actors, rather than just instruments of states, because 
they are bureaucracies that persuade and promote liberal policies at the international 
level. However this does not necessarily mean that they just act for the sake of 
humanity, since like other bureaucracies they protect their own interests and may clash 
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with the interests of the states and citizens, whom they are meant to represent. 133  Thus 
Finnemore argues that the term international society does not indicate “that we live in a 
Wilsion or Ideal World. To say that social norms are at work internationally is not to 
pass judgment on the ethics or morality of those norms” because “sociability and 
community can operate for good or ill”. For instance “social norms can promote 
slavery, racism, and ethnic cleansing as well as acts of charity and kindness”.134    
 
a. Constructivist Analysis of European Integration 
 
The theories of European integration have been dominated by two rival approaches, 
namely, intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism, which share a common ground in 
considering integration as a process. Other theories like federalism are focused on the 
result of the integration process. All these theories are a reflection of the developments 
in European integration and IR theories.135 Diez and Wiener observe three distinct 
periods in European integration history and theory. In the first phase between 1960 and 
1980 the main focus of the theories was to analyze and explain the reasons for the 
integration and its possible results. In the second period between 1980 and 1990 
integration theories were concerned with the analysis of governance. The classification 
of the emerging EU as a political system and the explanation of the political process in 
European integration were among the main areas of research interest in those years. In 
the final phase after the Cold War the EU transformed into an institutionalized body.  
Social and political outcomes of integration theory and conceptualization of European 
integration and governance were among the main research questions of integration 
theories.136 It was in this phase that the rationalist and positivist approaches of the 
mainstream theories were challenged by critical theories. Subsequently, constructivism 
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offered “nuances and insights to the analysis of European cooperation that are played 
down or overlooked in conventional analyses of that complex process”.137 
 
Constructivists contributed to European integration studies by analyzing the different 
aspects of the integration process. As mentioned before, constructivism highlighted the 
importance of the norms, material structures and identities in the formation of political 
decisions. In the case of European integration they drew attention to the 
intersubjectivity and social context of the ongoing integration process.  Christiansen et. 
al. argue that “finding the tools to analyse the impact of intersubjectivity and social 
context enhances our capacity to answer why and how European arrived its current 
stage”.138  Constructivists reject the mainstream integration theories’ assumption that 
the process of integration is a strategic interaction between states with given interests.  
They draw attention to the impact of social learning, socialization and norms on the 
formation of the identities and interests of the actors in European integration.  
According to Checkel, social learning is “a process whereby actors, through interaction 
with broader institutional context, acquire new interests and preferences.” 139 
Constructivism also rejects the realist claim that due to different national interests CFSP 
(common foreign and security policy) in the EU is not achievable, “and the occasional 
progress in the field is merely tactical manoeuvring.”140 In this regard Glarbo considers 
cooperation in the CFSP a result of social interaction rather than as a consequence of 
national interests. He argues that “the results of national diplomacies intentionally and 
unintentionally communicating to themselves and to each other their intents and 
perceptions of political co-operation” therefore social interactions constitute 
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intersubjective structures facilitating further cooperation.141 As put forward by Jackson 
and Sorensen the states in the EU might have different foreign policy interests and 
preferences, yet “day- to- day practices of political cooperation significantly promotes a 
shaping of common perspectives and mutual coordination.”142 
 
Constructivists also criticize the mainstream approaches on federalism and the EU, 
which represent the traditional dichotomy between “the transformation of the EU into a 
federal state, or anticipated a roll- back towards more conventional intergovernmental 
cooperation.”143 Koslowski argues that constructivism offers a better understanding of 
European integration, rejecting the dichotomy between federalism and 
intergovernmentalism. He argues that “Constructivism helps to retool federal theories 
for more persuasive analysis of the EU by refocusing attention on political practices, 
intersubjective meanings and informal norms. … The challenge of analysis, of course, is 
to resist teleological explanations, accept the ‘in betweenness’ of the European polity 
and settle for understanding the European policy for what it currently is, rather than try 
to explain European integration toward some hypothetical ‘end state’ that it may never 
reach.” 144 
 
b. Europeanization in Member and Candidate States 
 
The impact of the European Union on its member and candidate states’ domestic 
political structures is referred to as Europeanization. It is argued that EU membership or 
even prospects of it leads to significant domestic changes in the subject states. The 
foreign policies of the member and candidate states are no exception in this process. In 
                                                            
141 Glarbo, Kenneth (1999); Wide-awake Diplomacy: Reconstructing the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy of the European Union, Journal of European Public Policy, 6:4, Special 
Issue, p. 635., cited in Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2010); Introduction to International 
Relations: p.172. 
142 Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2010); Introduction to International Relations, p.172. 
143 Ibid.; p.173 
144 Koslowski, Rey (1999); A constructivist approach to understanding the European Union as a 
federal polity, Journal of European Public Policy, 6(4), pp. 576-7 cited in Jackson, 
Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2010); Introduction to International Relations: p.173. 
 54 
 
the broader sense Europeanization is defined as the “process of construction, diffusion 
and institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, 
styles, ways of doing things, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and 
consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic 
(national and sub national) discourse, identities, political structures and public 
policies.” 145  Despite this broad definition, Europeanization often refers to the 
internalization of EU norms due to direct or indirect pressures from the EU both in 
member and candidate countries. 
Apart from this conventional approach, constructivists draw attention to society rather 
than nation states and emphasize “the multiple ways social reality is continuously 
created in processes that cannot be reduced to either agency or structures.” 
Constructivism argues that in order to understand Europeanization, globalization and 
the history of modernity in which it occurs must be included in the analysis. 
Consequently constructivism considers Europeanization as a process of social 
construction, in which cultural dynamics play a significant role. 146  Furthermore, 
constructivism suggests that it is the normative arguments rather than rational 
arguments, which play a substantial role in the critical decisions regarding the future of 
the EU such as eastern enlargement. Finally, this approach also highlights the role of 
identity in the decision making process within the EU, indicating the different responses 
of Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) to the adoption of a single European 
currency.147 In brief, this approach highlights the influence of globalization in which 
Europeanization takes place, draws attention to the different logics of the construction 
of Europe and highlights the significance of norms and identities in the decision 
making.  
In general the scholars of IR make a distinction between the effects of Europeanization 
and globalization. However the interaction between these two phenomena makes it 
difficult to identify their influence on the domestic political structures. It is argued that 
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on the one hand Europeanization may reinforce the effects of the globalization and on 
the other hand it may provide a protection against the unwelcomed effects of 
globalization for the EU states. Grigoriadis argues that “careful process tracing and 
attention to the time sequences between EU policies and domestic changes allow us to 
distinguish between Europeanization and Globalisation effects.”148 
According to Featherstone and Kazamias149 the concept of Europeanization can be 
understood in three distinct dimensions: 
• The increasing and expanding institutionalization at the EU level 
• The incorporation of norms, rules identities and interests of actors at the level of 
member states 
• The adoption of EU norms by non-member states. It should be mentioned that 
the third dimension might include the candidate states, such as Turkey, Croatia 
etc. 
This section will first focus on the effects of Europeanization on the member states and 
then attempt to apply this framework on candidate countries, as Turkey is still a 
candidate country for the EU.  
To begin with, the logic of interaction between the EU and the member states should be 
analyzed.  This interaction is often referred to as a two level process consisting of 
bottom-up and top-down dimensions. While the bottom-up dimension focuses on the 
emergence of European institutions as a result of common norms, rules and practices, 
the top-down dimension emphasizes the effects of these institutions on the domestic 
political structures of the member states.  Thus it is clear that the member states are both 
object and subject to Europeanization. It is argued that the member states may adopt 
three distinct strategies in order to protect their own interests towards the effects of 
Europeanization, which varies based on the economic power of the member states: 
• Pace setting, i.e., Trying to impose certain policies at EU level, which represent 
the interests of the member state 
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• Foot dragging, i.e., Opposing or delaying of policies, which are against the 
interest of the member state 
• Fence sitting, i.e., adopting a passive policy  
In the adaptation to the EU norms the member states demonstrate different 
behaviors, in which the traditions and interests of the countries are influential 
variables. This process is referred to as the domestic adaptation with national colors. 
In the adaptation process “EU member states change under the exertion 
adaptational pressures, whose strength is inversely proportional to the compatibility 
of pre-existing domestic conditions “goodness of fit” The transformation in the 
member states occurs smoothly if the domestic structures are compatible, whereas in 
case of an incompatible and enduring domestic structure, Europeanization leads to a 
radical domestic transformation, which faces a serious resistance and therefore its 
success remains uncertain. Furthermore “the process of adaptation is further 
affected by the presence or absence and activity of mediating factors. Multiple veto 
points in the domestic structure, facilitating formal institutions, the organizational 
and policymaking cultures of a country, the differential empowerment of domestic 
actors, and learning are cited as examples of mediating factors.”  150   
The foreign policies of the member states are less affected by Europeanization in 
contrast to other areas because the integration into the CSFP in the EU is still 
relatively weak and has not replaced the national foreign policies. Manners and 
Whitman151 developed a new framework in order to analyze the effect of 
Europeanization on member states’ foreign policies. In this framework there are 
three parts, each of which poses two questions, namely: 
• Foreign policy change: the first question analyzes adaptations through 
membership, which attempts to assess the way in which the member states 
modify their policies towards the EU and other member states as a result of 
EU membership. The second question draws attention to the socialization of 
foreign policy makers, which “analyses the role of social interaction in 
shaping the practices, perceptions and interests of policy makers and tries to 
                                                            
150 Grigoriadis, Ionnnis, N. (2009); Trials of Europeanization, pp.5-6. 
151 Manners, Ian/ Whitman, Richard (Ed.) (2000); The foreign policies of European Union 
Member States, Manchester University Press, Manchester, pp.6-11. 
 57 
 
answer whether the sharing of information and common practices among 
decision makers leads to socialisation and the transformation of the common 
perceptions of policy makers.”152 
• Foreign policy process: this section analyzes the domestic and bureaucratic 
aspects of the foreign policy process in the member states. The first question 
in this section tries to understand the interaction between internal and 
external political forces and the influence of the domestic structures. The 
second part analyzes the legal status of the foreign policy bureaucracies in 
the decision making process and the interaction between bureaucrats and 
ministries.   
• Foreign policy actions: the third section focuses on the foreign policies of 
the member states towards the EU members and non-member states. The 
first question analyzes the positive and negative impacts of the CSFP on the 
member states’ foreign policies. The second question deals with the EU 
member states’ special relations with other countries. 153 
Grigoriadis154 and Özcan155 suggest that the concept of Europeanization may be 
implemented on the candidate countries as well, because the candidate countries are 
more vulnerable to the dictates of the EU and have limited force to influence the EU 
institutions.  However there are some differences in Europeanization in candidate 
countries, namely power asymmetry and conditionality. Firstly, as mentioned before the 
IOs may exert compulsory power on the states to adopt certain policies and norms. The 
asymmetric relationship between the EU and candidate countries allows the EU to exert 
compulsory or coercive power on the candidate countries to adapt their domestic 
structures to EU norms.  Secondly, the candidate countries are forced to comply with 
the conditions of the EU as a result of the uncertain outcome of the accession process.156 
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Consequently it can be argued that this asymmetrical relationship allows the EU to 
determine the rules of the game in the accession negotiations and therefore there is no 
bottom-up process of Europeanization in candidate countries.  
There are several mechanisms used by the EU to foster and force the required 
transformation in the candidate countries. Grabbe defines five mechanisms of 
Europeanization i.e., models: provision of legislative and institutional templates; 
money: aid and technical assistance; benchmarking and monitoring; advice and 
twinning; gate-keeping: access to negotiations and further stages in the accession 
process.157  
In case of the CSFP there are limited required legal changes for candidate countries. 
The candidate countries are expected to adopt the acquis politique, “which means they 
will ensure that their national foreign policies comply with the positions of the member 
states within the framework of the CFSP. Contrary to the adaptation to the European 
standards by acquis communitaire during the accession process, there are limited 
things that the candidate countries should do, like promising not to do unexpected 
things like attacking their neighbours”, the peaceful settlement of border problems and 
to have good relations with the neighboring countries. As a result of the 
intergovernmental nature of the CFSP, Europeanization in this area in candidate 
countries is much more voluntary and non hierarchical.158 
To sum up, the concept of Europeanization can be applied to candidate countries such 
as Turkey since the candidate countries are subject to immense pressure from the EU to 
fulfill the Copenhagen criteria. As witnessed in the last decade, “Turkey´s desire to join 
to European Union have resulted in increasing adaptational pressures on Turkey´s 
domestic political structures, depending in their goodness of fit.”159 However, in the 
transformation of domestic political structures one must distinguish between the effects 
of Europeanization, globalization and domestic factors.  This study will take these 
different factors into consideration and aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
factors contributing to the transformation of the Turkish state’s identity and its foreign 
policy in the last three decade.  
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2.4.2 Unit-level Constructivism: The Emphasis on Domestic Factors 
 
Unit-level constructivism is the opposite of systemic constructivism. Contrary to 
systemic constructivism’s focus on the role of the international environment and norms 
in constructing state identities and interests, unit level constructivists highlight the 
significance of domestic factors in this process.160   
In order to demonstrate the influence of domestic factors on states’ identities and 
interests, some constructivists focused on the different influences of international norms 
in various states indicating the role of domestic factors in this differentiation. For 
instance, Thomas Risse et. al. focus on the different levels of internalization of 
international human right norms in various countries. According to their study, the type 
of regime, the civil war experience and the existence of internal human rights 
organizations all influence a country’s internalization of international human right 
norms.161  
In a book edited by Peter Katzenstein, other constructivists focus on the area of national 
security suggesting that it is constructed mainly by domestic factors, namely the culture 
and identity of states.162 For instance Johnston finds “a specific hard Realpolitik 
strategic culture in the Chinese tradition that informs and shapes Chinese security 
policies. The argument is that Chinese decision makers have internalized this strategic 
culture and that it has persisted across vastly different interstate systems, regime types, 
level of technology and types of threat.” Therefore the neo-realist explanation of 
Chinese policies is inadequate since it does not take this Chinese strategic culture into 
consideration. 163 
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Another scholar, Peter Katzenstein, has studied Japanese national security in order to 
develop a constructivist approach on the role of domestic factors in this area. 
Katzenstein drew attention to the point that the systemic theorizing fails to include the 
role of domestic structures on states’ policies.164 In order to explain his argument 
Katzenstein compares Japanese and German national security policies in the post World 
War II era. Katzenstein highlights the fact that both countries have developed very 
different domestic and external security policies despite their similar history of military 
defeat, foreign military occupation, economic development, their transformation from 
authoritarianism to democracy and nascent great power status.165 
  
As an answer to this phenomenon Katzenstein points out the role of different norms in 
both countries.  Katzenstein suggests that “in Germany the strengthening of state power 
through changes in legal norms betrays a deep-seated fear that terrorism challenges the 
core of the state. In effect, eradicating terrorism and minimizing violent protest 
overcome the specter of a Hobbesian state of nature.” He points out the turmoil of 
German politics in times of national crisis in the 1950s and 1960s resulting from the 
issue of the emergency powers debate, which lasted until a grand coalition of the two 
major parties took over power. Conversely, in Japan “the close interaction of social and 
legal norms reveals a state living symbiotically within its society and not easily shaken 
to its foundation. Eliminating terrorism and containing violent protest were the tasks of 
a Grotian community.” At this point he notes that in Japan “the pressure was much 
lower than in Germany to address the issue of national emergency in legal terms. 
Conversely, Germany´s active involvement in the evolution of international legal norms 
conveys a conception of belonging to international Grotian community. Japans lack of 
concern for the consequences of pushing terrorists abroad and its generally passive 
international stance is based on a Hobbesian view of the society of the states.”166  
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Another contribution to unit level constructivism came from Ted Hopf who has studied 
the domestic formation of identity and interest in Soviet and Russian foreign policy in 
1955 and 1999. Hopf notes that his study attempts to give “an account of how states 
own domestic identities constitute a social cognitive structure that makes threats and 
opportunities, enemies and allies, intelligible, thinkable and possible.”167  
 
To sum up, it can be suggested that on the one hand, unit–level constructivism makes it 
possible to explain the differentiation of identity, interests and action in various states, 
and on the other hand it fails to explain the similarities between states. 168 Therefore an 
approach considering both domestic and external factors is needed to achieve a 
comprehensive analysis of the formation of states’ identities and policies, which will be 
discussed in the coming chapter.  
2.4.3. Holistic Constructivism: Cross Level Analysis of Influential Factors 
 
The level of analysis has been always an issue in foreign policy studies. In the past 
decades the combination of both national and international levels of analysis – i.e. the 
mixing of levels - was perceived as unthinkable.  Yet over the past two decades a 
considerable amount of IR scholars have rejected this limitation and adopted a cross 
level analysis approach. Checkel notes that “today, an IR-FPA consensus seems to be 
emerging that we need synthetic, cross level approaches.”169 
 
Constructivism is no exception to this new trend in FPA. Unlike systemic and unit level 
constructivists, who represent the conventional dichotomy between the national and 
international levels of analysis, holistic constructivists have adopted a cross level 
analysis approach, which aims to incorporate the two dimensions of international 
politics, namely domestic and international. “To accommodate the entire range of 
factors conditioning the identities, interests of states, they bring the corporate and the 
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social together into a unified analytical perspective that treats the domestic and 
international as two faces of a single social and political order.”170 
 
Ted Hopf also prefers a holistic approach and points out the need for cross level 
analysis in foreign policy studies. On the issue of the significance of domestic and 
systemic factors in the shaping of states’ identities, interests and policies Hopf 
summarizes his views in the following statement:   
 
“Although any understanding of world politics requires a theorization of the domestic 
and the systemic, there would be no systemic theory of world politics because world 
politics has no predominant system; it has subcultures, each of which can be 
understood only by examining how states constitute themselves in their societies. The 
answer to the question of who are enemies and friends begins at home. Finding out 
precisely how a state’s identity affects the construction of its interests vis-à-vis another 
state demands that the social context in which that state’s collection of identities is 
being discursively constructed be investigated as deeply and broadly as possible. This 
means exploring not only how that state’s identities are produced in interactions with 
other states, but also how its identities are being produced in interaction with its own 
society and the many identities and discourses that constitute that society.”171  
 
Like any other approach holistic constructivism has both contributions to and 
limitations in FPA. The predominant focus of holistic constructivists is the forces 
behind the global change such as the rise and decline of the states’ sovereignty. In order 
to achieve a better understanding of this process they focus on the mutual constructive 
relationship between the global order and the state. In this regard Reus-Smit notes that 
“holistic scholarship has the merit of being able to explain the development of the 
normative and ideational structures of the present international system, as well as the 
social identities they have engendered.” Yet the focus on the global changes might 
result in a more structuralist approach which neglects the role of human agencies in this 
process.172 
 
Apart from the limitation resulting from this predominant approach within holistic 
constructivism, in general it enables us to combine the two facets of international 
politics, which might lead to a better understanding of the formation of the states’ 
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identities and interests, which in turn shape their policies. Therefore this study will 
adopt a holistic approach in order to achieve a comprehensive analysis of the domestic 
and external factors that led to the transformation of the Turkish state’s identity and 
interests in the past three decades.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 64 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. A Holistic Constructivist Analysis of the Formation of the 
Turkish State’s Identity, Interests and Foreign Policy (1919-
1980) 
 
Although foreign policy of a country is affected by the international system to some 
extent, it is obvious that it is also influenced by its specific system of government, 
political culture and its special circumstances.  Therefore, instead of looking at general 
forms of behavior in international relations to explain all the interactions between states, 
each case has to be analyzed in its specific conditionality within the international 
system. “In this context, Turkey is one of the unique players in the international system, 
encountering a complex set of interrelations with other players. Although one part or 
another of her interrelations could be fitted into, or explained by, one of the various 
different international relations and foreign policy analysis approaches, almost all of 
them, however, fail after a certain point to explain Turkish foreign policy as a coherent 
whole.”173 
Specifying a certain number of variables which affect the identity, interests and foreign 
policy in all countries in same way is hardly possible. Furthermore, analysis of a 
specific case may need highlighting of different factors. Therefore in order to analyze 
the foreign policy of a specific country in a specific time period, some thought should 
be given beforehand to the variables that affect foreign policy. 
There are several factors which affect a country’s identity and interests, which in return 
informs its foreign policy making. Aydin notes that in the Turkish case these factors 
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may be analyzed in two main categories. One category, which may be defined as 
domestic structural factors, is continuous, static and subject to change in the long run. 
The other, which may be defined as conjunctural factors, is dynamic and subject to 
change under the influence of internal and external developments in the short run.174 
The domestic structural factors are not affected directly by international politics and the 
daily happenings of foreign politics. “They can exert a long term influence over the 
determination of foreign policy goals. Geographical position, historical experiences 
and cultural background, together with national stereotypes and images of other 
nations, and long term economic necessities would fall into the category of structural 
variables.”175 
The second category of factors is conjunctural variables, which are affected by 
developments in domestic politics and international relations. Contrary to domestic 
structural factors, these dynamic factors do exert temporary influence on a country’s 
state identity and especially on its foreign policy’s daily implementation. Systemic 
changes in the international system, shifts in the balance of power, domestic political 
changes, economic factors and characters of decision makers can be considered within 
this category. 
As mentioned in the second chapter, this study will adopt a holistic constructivist 
approach, which enables us to combine the two faces of international politics, namely 
internal and external. Combining both internal and external factors might be useful in 
order to achieve a better understanding of the formation of the Turkish state’s identity 
and interests, which have shaped its foreign policy. Therefore this chapter will first 
analyze the factors which shaped the Turkish state’s identity and its foreign policy until 
1980, when Turkey underwent a fundamental economic transformation, namely the 
transition to the liberal economic model, which resulted in a substantial transformation 
of the Turkish state’s identity and society. The era after 1980 and the external and 
internal determinants of this transformation will be analyzed in the next chapter in order 
to achieve a comprehensive analysis of the transformation of the Turkish state’s 
identity, which in return reshaped its foreign policy in the past three decades.  
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Bearing in mind this theoretical framework, the first part of this chapter will analyze the 
domestic structural factors in the evolution of Turkish states identity and interests, 
which have exerted a long term influence over the determination of Turkish foreign 
policy. The second part of this chapter aims to describe conjunctural factors under two 
categories, namely domestic and external factors, which have exerted temporary effects 
on Turkey’s state identity, interests and foreign policy. Finally in the third part the 
results of this chapter will be summarized. 
 
3.1 Domestic Structural Determinants in the Making of Turkish Foreign Policy: 
Identity, Ideology, History and Political Culture 
 
3.1.1 Legacy of the Ottoman Empire  
 
The experiences and traumas of a society during the course of history are likely to exert 
an influence on a country’s identity and its foreign policy in the long run. In this 
context, to some extent the Ottoman legacy has exerted a certain influence on the 
Turkish state’s identity and its foreign policy culture. This chapter aims to describe the 
particular features in Turkish foreign policy which were inherited from the Ottoman 
Empire. 
Although the founders of modern Turkey radically refused their Ottoman past and 
sought to break with its legacy, which symbolized to them “ignorance, Corruption, 
backwardness and dogmas176”, the country has inherited some of its fundamental 
features from the Ottoman Empire. In order to understand the genesis of Turkish foreign 
policy these inherited features should be analyzed in more detail. In this regard Aydin 
argues that:  
“Today, the Turkish nation carries the deep impressions of the historical experiences of 
being reduced from a vast empire to extinction, and then having to struggle back to save 
the national homeland and its independence. The struggle for survival and the play of 
realpolitik in the international arena, together with an imperial past and a huge 
cultural heritage left strong imprints on the national philosophy of Turkey and the 
character of her people. Furthermore, historical experiences cannot be separated from 
the present day life of a nation. Like individuals, nations react to both internal and 
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external forces within the international political arena, based on their historical 
impressions, prejudices and national image of themselves and other nations. Good or 
bad, right or wrong, historical experiences colour a nation’s reaction to events and 
forces in the political system. They limit the foreign policy options of the political 
leadership and are filters for viewing international reality”177 
First of all, it is important to realize that one of the concrete legacies of the Ottoman 
Empire in Turkey is its bureaucratic elite, which established the modern Turkish state. 
In its last two decades the bureaucratic elite of the Ottoman Empire was mostly 
dominated by Turks. These well-experienced elites played a crucial role in establishing 
the new Turkish state and nation.178  Ironically it was these elites, which attempted to 
establish a new republic, a totally new nation and sought to break with the Ottoman 
legacy, who were the very source of the material connection between the Ottoman 
Empire and the modern Turkish state. As a result these elites transferred their 
experiences and policy making culture to the coming generations in modern Turkey. 
Not only the elites but also the majority of the Ottoman institutions and political culture 
were inherited by the modern Turkish state as well.  
Secondly, the main foreign policy strategy of the Ottoman Empire during the 19th 
century, which was playing one great power against another for survival and the 
preservation of the status quo, was also inherited by the new Turkish state.179 The 
Ottoman Empire’s foreign policy during its early centuries was mostly motivated by its 
military offensive character. However, after losing its military superiority to European 
powers, which became obvious after the unsuccessful Vienna siege in 1683, the main 
foreign policy goal was the protection of the status quo by military and diplomatic 
means. After the siege of Vienna in 1683 the Ottoman Empire was steadily forced to 
withdraw from its Balkan regions. The attempts to modernize the army were never fully 
successful and sufficient. Thus the Ottoman Empire was forced to pursue its foreign 
policy by playing one great power against another for survival. This policy became one 
of the main features of Ottoman diplomacy in the 19th century, and due to the 
international system of the balance of powers it was successful to an extent in protecting 
the integrity of Ottoman Empire. The modern Turkish state inherited this policy and 
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implemented it after the First World War using the differences between Britain, France 
and Italy to obtain independence.180 “One can also see that after the Second World War, 
Turkey’s well played role as a continuously threatened nation, gained resulting 
American aid which, at its highest point amounted to $738.9 million for the year 1986, 
only third after Israel and Egypt.”181 
Thirdly, preservation of the status quo is one of the main fundamentals of the Turkish 
foreign policy making culture, which was also inherited from the Ottoman experience. 
Considering the history of Turkish foreign policy one can claim that its main objective 
has always been to preserve the existing status quo. The main features of a status quo 
policy are being conservative and defensive. There are just few examples of revisionism 
in modern Turkish history, such as the issues of Hatay, Mosul and Straits.  In all these 
cases Turkey avoided taking unilateral measures and attempted to resolve these issues 
according to international law.182 According to Davutoglu, during the period of decline 
Ottoman elites were much too concerned with preserving the status quo under the heavy 
pressure of colonial powers, and their foreign policy towards its lost territories was 
mainly based on the notion of “either absolute hegemony or absolute retreat”. He 
argues that this notion prevented the Ottoman Empire and its successor, the modern 
Turkish state, from developing strategies in order to create spheres of influence in lost 
territories (except during the reign of the Abdulhamid II and the post Cold War era). 
Davutoglu notes that Turkey inherited this notion from the Ottomans, and its policies 
towards the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East are mainly shaped by this notion 
of “either absolute hegemony or absolute retreat”.183  
Fourthly, the nature of hostilities against the Ottoman Empire in its last two decades 
made it impossible for it to trust any state. One should also consider the impact of 
European financial control on the Ottoman Empire, exercised through the Public Debt 
Service after the Empire declared bankruptcy in 1881. In addition to this, since the 
Christian minorities had been used as a means of interfering in Ottoman authority 
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throughout the last decade of empire and the nature of playing great powers each other 
required extreme cautiousness and skepticism, these features became one of the 
fundamental features of Ottoman diplomacy.184 This notion manifested itself in the 
modern common Turkish saying that Turkey is a country which is surrounded by enemy 
states, which are extremely efficient and can act in unison against Turkish interests. 
This brings us to another main feature of Turkish political culture, which is constant 
skepticism and cautiousness towards other states and the conviction that the external 
world is conspiring to weaken and divide Turkey. This phenomenon is often called 
Sevres Phobia or Syndrome185, which will be analyzed in the coming section (s.2.1.2) in 
more detail.  As a result of this legacy, Turkish policy makers and the public have 
always been skeptical about the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) financial aid 
programs and the intentions of the EU regarding the rights of Kurds in Turkey. 
Fifthly, the Ottoman domination in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East has 
also had an effect on Turkey’s relations with its neighbors. In particular, the inefficient 
and unpopular Ottoman domination in these countries in the 19th century left bitter 
memories of Ottoman rule. Therefore, Turkish foreign policy makers had to take these 
concerns into consideration when they dealt with former Ottoman regions. The negative 
effect of Ottoman domination in neighboring countries manifested itself obviously in 
Turkey’s everlasting conflict with Greece and Armenia.186 Another issue regarding the 
former Ottoman domination in Turkey’s neighboring regions and countries is the 
religious and ethnic minority groups in those countries, which have close cultural 
connections with Turkey, as the majority of Muslims and Turks in Caucasus and 
Balkans fled to Ottoman Empire and Turkey in the 19th and 20th centuries whenever 
they had political problems in their countries. According to McCarthy, between 1827 
and 1922 around 5 million Muslims were killed in the Caucasus and the Balkans as a 
result of Russian and Balkan Chauvinism. Therefore, within that time 5.4 million 
Muslims (Bosnians, Albanians, Georgians, Chechens, Abkhazs, Circassians and Turks) 
fled to Anatolia, as they considered the Ottoman Empire as a Muslim kin state. 187 In 
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1920 around 1/3 of Turkey’s population consisted of these refugees.188 With the 
increasing role of public opinion in Turkish foreign policy after the Cold War, the 
coming generations of these refugees played the role of a quasi-Diaspora and affected 
Turkish public opinion regarding the conditions and problems of these minorities. 
Therefore these concerns have been reflected increasingly in Turkish foreign policy 
towards these regions after the Cold War189, which can be clearly observed in Turkey’s 
policies toward Bosnia and Chechnya during the 1990s.  
 
Sixthly, the notion that Russia represents a major threat to Turkey’s security is another 
main feature of Turkish foreign policy. The roots of this notion can also be found in the 
long-standing conflict between Russia and the Ottoman Empire which has caused 
thirteen Russo-Turkish wars. This history of distrust, hostility and continuous conflict 
made the Turkish policy makers extraordinarily cautious about Russia and its intentions. 
When the Soviet Union demanded territorial cessions and special privileges on the 
straits after the Second World War the old memories about Russian expansionism 
became alive and this forced Turkey to become a part of NATO.190 
 
Finally, belonging to a nation which had found empires and been master of a world 
empire caused a sense of greatness and self-confidence in the common Turkish mind. 
The fact that majority of Turks do not consider the Ottoman Empire as a classical 
colonial power is also important to understand the modern Turkish state’s policies. “It is 
frustrating for them to be in the position of, and regarded as, a second-rate power. This 
frustration, perhaps in large part, explains Turkish sensitivity to insult and criticism, 
related to her dependence upon the great powers, and to exclusion from important 
international conferences”191 
3.1.2 Sevres Syndrome/ Phobia/ Complex 
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As mentioned above, one of the aspects of Turkish political culture is Sevres Syndrome. 
It is “an expression used in international relations to describe the paranoia of the 
Turkish secular bureaucracy and its politicians. This takes the form of an irrational fear 
that Western powers are bent on dismantling Turkey visà- vis the abortive Treaty of 
Sèvres in 1920.”192 This phenomenon has been investigated increasingly in recent 
studies and referred to as the “Sevres- Phobia, Syndrome or complex”.   
 
The treaty of Sevres was signed between the Ottoman Empire and the allied forces at 
the end of World War I. It was drawn up by the allied forces and imposed the division 
of Anatolia into small states and occupation zones (See Figure 2). However this treaty 
was never ratified by the Ottoman Parliament. Moreover, following the Turkish War of 
Independence the treaty was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.  
 
 
Figure 2: Partitioning of Anatolia and Thrace According to the Treaty of Sèvres 193 
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The fact that the Treaty of Sevres is a matter of history does not necessarily mean that it 
has no influence on the Turkish state’s identity and its political culture today. In order to 
achieve a full comprehension of Turkish politics, this paranoia should be analyzed in 
more detail. Guida claims that this experience affected Turkish opinion of the West for 
years to come. According to a Survey conducted in 2006, 72 percent of Turks were 
convinced that some countries would like to divide Turkey. Guida suggests that this 
opinion is shared by the majority of Turkish intellectuals as well. 194 
This phenomenon is driven by several factors. To begin with, the long tradition within 
Turkish policy making of viewing the world from a Realpolitik perspective can be 
associated with the Sevres Phobia.  Furthermore, it is also a reflection of the long lasting 
territorial loses of the Ottoman Empire to the European powers.195 The other factors are 
described by Guida as follows: “this “insecurity complex” has been reinforced by other 
threats and dangers to Turkey’s national security in the intervening years, ranging from 
Stalin’s expansionist statements in the mid-1940s, to Armenian and Syrian irredentism, 
to the bilateral military cooperation of Greece and Syria, to the invasion of Iraq, and 
finally, to Turkey’s ostracism from the European Union.”196 
The Sevres Phobia promoted the notion that foreign and security policy must be 
exempted from daily politics in order to preserve Turkey’s territorial integrity.  This 
type of understanding of foreign policy making facilitated the idea that in order to not to 
jeopardize national security, democracy should be limited. In return this notion leads 
Turkish politicians like former “social democrat” Prime Minister Ecevit to articulate 
such statements as: “The vulnerability of Turkey demands a special type of 
democracy”.197 On the other hand, “the military plays a critical role in perpetuating the 
Sevres Phobia” as well, because Turkish security culture is mainly shaped by the 
Turkish military.  This culture is “characterised by a deep sense of suspicion and a 
tendency to shy away from cooperation.”198 
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The Sevres Syndrome is crucial to understanding Turkish politics. It casts light on 
Turkish foreign relations, policies, and various Turkish positions towards international 
issues. Guida points out that this syndrome has been also the source of irrational 
overreactions and behaviors from Turkish politicians and the public,199 as has been 
witnessed with the Cyprus issue and in relations with the EU. In such cases it is mostly 
manipulated by elites and politicians to influence the public opinion towards the 
external world.  
 
It has been suggested that in recent years the definition of national security is changing 
and the influence of Sevres phobia is weakening.  The excessively securitized 
traditional foreign and security policy making culture is dissolving. It is an ongoing 
process, in which Turkey’s relations with the EU will be critical. 200 At the same time 
the architect of JDP’s foreign policy, Ahmet Davutoglu, also criticises Sevres Phobia 
harshly and suggests that Turkey has to free itself from this paranoia and follow a more 
active foreign policy in order to improve its international status.201 
 
 
 
3.1.3 State Ideology: Radical Westernization, Kemalism 
 
In the wake of European military superiority the Ottoman Empire started to modernize 
its army in the 18th century. The main question at that time was “how to save the state”.  
In the beginning the reforms included just the military. The Ottomans were convinced 
that the modernization of the army would be sufficient to preserve the state’s integrity. 
However the quasi-successful modernization of the army could not prevent the Ottoman 
territorial losses. Moreover, European imperialism and nationalism undermined the 
foundation of the “Ottoman millet system”. The response of the Ottoman bureaucratic 
elite was to extend the reforms (Tanzimat) to all areas.202  These reforms resulted in 
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identity crises among the Ottoman intelligentsia.  The last quarter of the 19th century 
witnessed a long debate among the Ottoman intellectuals to find a new identity.  These 
intellectuals gathered around four political movements, namely Ottomanism, Islamism, 
Turkism and Westernism.203  
Ottomanists suggested creating a new sense of Ottoman citizenship among all the 
millets. Their main suggestion was that equal rights for all citizens and creation of more 
liberal institutions would preserve the country’s integrity. At the same time Islamists 
sought to unite all Muslims under one authority, by offering them a sense of Islamic 
political identity. On the other hand the Turkists dreamed of creating a Turkish empire 
consisting of all Turkish people in the world. However, the increase of nationalism 
among different Muslim subjects such as Arabs, Albanians and the Christian population 
made the Ottomanist and Islamist ideas irrelevant. Given the geopolitical and historical 
realities, the majority of Turkish intelligentsia realized the utopian character of Turkism 
as well. Although all these political movements were in favor of modernization of the 
country, none of them pledged a total break with the values of Islamic civilization. 
Therefore these movements cannot be regarded as the foundation of the modern Turkish 
state. 204 
Contrary to the above mentioned three movements, Westernism suggested adopting all 
Western values and an absolute integration to Western civilization.  The founder of the 
modern Turkish State, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, was a convinced Westernist and 
strongly believed that the future of Turkey was within the Western culture and 
civilization.  Thus Westernism can be considered as the basis of the new Turkish 
Republic.  Cooper highlights the fact that Ataturk himself is the most important 
institution in modern Turkey.205 Thus the most important factor, which affects Turkish 
foreign policy making culture, is Ataturk’s practice of foreign policy and his 
commitment to the Westernization of Turkey. Ataturk’s principles of foreign policy 
include: 
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• Orientation towards the West 
• International peace, derived from the “peace at home, peace abroad” axiom 
• Preservation of the status quo, rejection of revisionism and irredentism  
• Realism: realization of the country’s power limits and rejection of so called 
“Ottoman Adventurism”  
• Legality, solving international issues by legal means, such as issues of the Straits 
and Mosul 
• Foreign policy as a natural corollary of Turkey’s Westernization and 
modernization206 
• Refusal of participation in any alliances or conferences on the basis of religion 
(Islam), which is considered against the secular identity of the Turkish state.207 
 
Ataturk’s “foreign policy objectives reflected a departure from the expansionist 
ideology of the Ottoman Empire. He was mainly concerned with independence and 
sovereignty, thus with his motto of peace at home, peace in the world, he, while aiming 
to preserve the status quo, sought a deliberate break with the Ottoman past in every 
aspect of life.”208 After the independence war, Ataturk carried out the following radical 
reforms in order to establish a new secular-modern nation and state: 
• Abolition of the sultanate (1 November 1922) and the Caliphate (3 March 1924) 
• Proclaiming of the Turkish Republic (29 October 1923) 
• Replacement of the traditional religious education system with a secular system 
• Prohibition of the use of “fez” and “turban” and legal enforcement of the 
wearing of the European hat (25 November 1925) 
• Abolition of Islamic courts and Islamic law (8 April 1924) and their replacement 
with a new legal system based on a Swiss civil code ( 17 February 1926) 
• Prohibition of the dervish order activities and visits to tombs of sultans (30 
November 1925) 
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• Replacement of the traditional calendar with the Gregorian calendar 
• Language reform; creation of a new modern Turkish language 
• Disestablishment of Islam as state religion (10 April 1928) 
• Replacement of Arabic letters with the Roman alphabet (1 November 1928) 
• Placement of secularism in the Constitution (5 January 1937) 209 
 
The rejection of the Ottoman Empire and old social system manifested itself in the six 
principles of Kemalism: Nationalism, Populism, Secularism, Republicanism, Statism 
and Reformism.  Aydin mentions that many of these principles have foreign policy 
implications. “Though the original Kemalist goals of national foreign policy underwent 
various mutations, practically all Turkish governments, regardless of their standpoints, 
put his "indisputable dogma" into their programmes and have not, and could not 
implement policies that ran counter to Kemalist principles.”210 In an interview, a 
veteran Turkish diplomat and politician Ümit Haluk Bayülken stated that “We were 
raised in the spirit of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and were implementing his guiding 
principles with firm adherence.... His ideas have been whole heartedly accepted and 
implemented by generations of Turkish diplomats and politicians. These ideas became 
the guidelines of Turkish foreign policy...”211 
There is almost a unanimous consensus among the scholars that the fundamental feature 
of Turkish foreign policy is its orientation towards West.212 However, there are two 
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main approaches regarding the nature of Turkish foreign policy. While some scholars 
argue that Turkish foreign policy is mainly shaped by Kemalist ideology and has 
followed its principles, others claim that it has had always a pragmatic approach 
towards external world.  It is clear that these two approaches do not provide sufficient 
explanation of today’s Turkish foreign policy. Although the traditional Turkish foreign 
policy cornerstones remain in place and provide continuity, there are some new 
elements in Turkish foreign policy after the post Cold War era, which cannot be 
explained only by pragmatic or ideological reasons. These new elements indicate a 
transformation in Turkish foreign policy’s foundations, which will be discussed in the 
coming sections in more detail. It is unlikely that this transformation will change 
Turkey’s orientation towards West; however it is changing Turkey’s attitude towards 
other regions and Turkish foreign policy is obtaining a more multidimensional 
approach.     
     
3.1.4 Clash of Identities: “Torn Country” and “Divided Self” 
 
The founding fathers of Turkey attempted to establish a nation according to the 
standards of Western civilization. Their nation was an “imagined community” as 
described by Benedict Anderson. The modern Turkish state was not an outcome of an 
already developed national identity.  Instead it was the Turkish nation which was 
established by the power of the Turkish state and a revolution from above. There were 
different races among the population and the majority of the people were Muslim-
conservative, who did not share the ideas of the Kemalist elite at that time.213 Therefore 
Calis argues that it is possible to distinguish between national identity and state identity 
in Turkey. By the phrase Turkish state identity he means “a particular body of 
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principles and ideas which the Turkish state identifies itself”.214 He emphasizes that 
there are different definitions of the Turkish national identity besides the Kemalists’ 
definition, which vary according to assumptions of different groups such as Turkists, 
Ottomanists and Islamists. Considering Turkish history one could argue that that none 
of these different identities were reflected in Turkey’s foreign policy 215 until the end of 
the Cold War.  
 
After the establishment of the Republic in Turkey, the Kemalist elite implemented a 
very radical Westernization/modernization, secularization, and Turkification process in 
order to create a Western society and a Turkish nation state. These elites were able to 
create a minority among the Turkish population, which were mainly living in the cities 
and supported the ideas of Kemalism and Westernization.216 However until the late 40s 
the majority of the population (in 1940 81%) were living in the rural areas217 and had 
not been affected by the ideas of the Kemalist elite.  The 50s and 60s witnessed a rapid 
urbanization and industrialization, which brought these conservative masses into the 
cities.218 Thanks to the transition to a multi party system in 1945 they became more 
involved in political life. Although these conservative masses were in favor of 
modernization, they did not support the Kemalist radical secularization and 
Westernization. As a result of these factors Turkish society was divided into two main 
camps, namely the Westernized secular culture of the tiny but influential bureaucratic 
elite and the Islamic culture of the indigenous population. 219As put forward by Baran, 
this division still affects Turkish politics today. In the context of the 2007 presidential 
election discussions, Baran clearly demonstrates that Turkish society is divided into two 
main camps between secular republicans and Islamists (supported by liberal 
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democrats).220  Thus it can be argued that this division has been influential in Turkish 
political life until today. 
 
According to Calis, Turkish foreign policy is determined by the Turkish state’s identity, 
not the Turkish nation’s identity.221  Yet the struggle between these two identities has 
caused many problems in Turkish political life.  The movements against Kemalist 
principles and radical secularization/Westernization have been marked by the state elite 
as an “internal threat”. Davutoglu argues that the concept of an internal enemy resulted 
in a focus on internal problems, which in return undermined the strategic thinking of 
Turkish foreign policy and prevented it from developing strategies to increase its 
influence in surrounding regions.222 Davutoglu argues that the imposition of radical 
Westernization and secularization by the Kemalist elite on Turkish society is 
responsible for the social phenomenon of the “divided self”. 
 
According to Davutoglu, Laing’s study of “the divided self”223 could present a 
theoretical framework in order to understand the division of Turkish society. According 
to Laing’s study, the conflict between the “Inner self” and “embodied self” produces a 
crisis between “self” and its surroundings.  The “self”, which is alienated from its 
“body”, identify itself with a “false self”.  Davutoglu emphasizes that one can 
implement this theoretical framework into societies as well and identifies the 
consequences of such an identity crisis in Turkish society.  He claims that the body of a 
society is its history and geography.  Subsequently, he associates a society’s alienation 
from its history and geographical realities with the “self´s” alienation from its body, 
which causes identification with a “false self”. Davutoglu claims that in order overcome 
this problem Turkey needs to make peace with its history and culture. 224 In this regard 
Aydin also detects an identity crisis in Turkey, due to the fact that the self-image of 
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Kemalist elites, who identified themselves with Western secular values, is not shared by 
the larger part of public opinion.225    
 
Another scholar, who has paid extra attention to the division in Turkish society, is 
Samuel Huntington, who describes Turkey as a “classic torn country”. He defines a 
torn country as follows: “A torn country has a single predominant culture, which places 
it in one civilisation but its leaders want to shift it to another civilisation.”226 He also 
indicates two features of torn countries; the first being referred to by their leaders as a 
bridge between two cultures, and the second being described by scholars as Janus-faced. 
This definition almost perfectly matches the situation of Turkish society. According to 
Huntington, a successful redefinition of civilizational identity requires three conditions, 
although he also mentions that “it also to date has failed”: 
• The overall support of the political and economic elite 
• The willingness and acceptance of the public 
• The acceptance by the dominant elements in the host civilization227  
 
Although Huntington overestimates the support of the Turkish public he claims that for 
many years Turkey met two of the three conditions for a civilizational shift, namely the 
support of the overwhelming majority of elites and public. Yet the unwillingness of the 
elites of Western civilization to accept Turkey prevented this transformation. 
Meanwhile the rise of political Islam activated anti-Western ideas among the public, 
which in return undermined the secularist pro-western orientation of the Kemalist elites. 
Therefore Turkey would remain a torn country.  Huntington also highlights the fact that 
a growing number of Turkish politicians in the 90s described Turkey as a “bridge 
between cultures”, which confirms that Turkey is a torn country, because “a bridge is 
an artificial creation connecting two solid entities but is part of neither”.228 
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The above mentioned split in Turkish society has been affecting Turkish political life 
since the establishment of the Republic. At the same time it has had some inevitable 
consequences for Turkish foreign policy making, one of which is a focus on internal 
problems causing a lack of strategic thinking and planning towards surrounding regions. 
The categorical rejection of the Islamic and Ottoman heritage and the desire to become 
a part of Western culture resulted in an alienation from the Middle East and the Third 
World. This has caused an imbalance in Turkish foreign policy with an overemphasis 
on ties with the West to the neglect of Turkey’s interests with other regions.  During the 
Cold War Turkey had been regarded an agent of America in the Middle East. Turkey 
was denounced by non-western and non-aligned countries at the 1955 Bandung 
Conference and was attacked as blasphemous by Islamic countries.  It was not until the 
crisis of Cyprus that Turkey understood the consequences of such isolation from the 
Muslim world and the Third World.  Furthermore, the 90s witnessed an increase in the 
role of NGOs and public opinion in Turkish foreign policy making, which put pressure 
on the Kemalist elite to take into consideration the public’s views regarding issues such 
as Bosnia, Chechnya and Azerbaijan229. 
In conclusion, considering all of these facts, one might claim that the split in Turkish 
society has been and will be affecting the country’s political life until some consensus 
can be reached in Turkish society about the country’s identity.  Until that time it will 
remain a considerable obstacle to Turkey focusing its energy on foreign policy 
objectives effectively.   
 
 
3.1.5 The Extraordinary Role of the Turkish Army: “Ruling but not Governing”230 
 
 
There is almost a consensus among scholars that the military in Turkey has been 
playing a substantial role in its political life since the establishment of the Republic, and 
that there seems to be a regular pattern of military intervention in political life. 
Furthermore, compared to other institutions, the Turkish army has enjoyed a great deal 
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of legitimacy in the eyes of the Turkish public throughout history as a result of its role 
in the Independence War.231 However, the roots of the Army’s involvement in Turkish 
political life has to be understood in the context of Turkish history, since throughout 
history the military has always been regarded one of the main features of Turkish 
culture. In the earliest historical records regarding the Turks, they were mentioned as 
riding nomads and mercenaries in Central Asia.232 They had no formal organs of a 
government, and their livelihood mainly came from raising flocks. From the early 
second century, because of the changing climatic, military and political conditions these 
nomadic Turkic tribes (Oguz Turks) were forced to migrate to the West, where they met 
settled civilizations. From the 8th century onwards the Turks came into contact with 
Islamic civilization for three centuries. As a result of this contact the majority of Oguz 
Turks converted to Islam. Many of them served as members of the Abbasid caliphate 
armies, in which they rose to powerful positions. Some of them established their own 
states such as the Karahandis and Gaznevids. However, the most powerful of them was 
the Great Seldjuq Empire, which assumed the role of protectors of the Abbasid caliphs 
and orthodox Islam. After the Mongol invasion in the 13th century Seldjuq Empire was 
weakened and was replaced by various Turcoman principalities in Anatolia.233  
 
One of these principalities was the Ottomans, who inherited the spirit of “ghaza” (holy 
war) from the former Turkic Seljuq Empire.  Beside its complex political organization, 
the Ottoman Empire was a vast military establishment, which was created and sustained 
by territorial expansion. During the battle Ottoman soldiers shouted: “If I return I’ll be 
a ghazi, if I die, a martyr.” 234 Inalcik notes that for six centuries the Ottoman state’s 
existence had been shaped by the “ghaza” character.235 Therefore, martial values and 
virtues were always praised by Ottoman society and the Ottoman military played a 
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central role in Ottoman political life.236 The terms “gazi” and “sehid” (martyr) have 
been inherited by the modern Turkish state as well.  The founder of modern Turkey, 
Mustafa Kemal Pasa, was granted this title during the Independence War by the Turkish 
National Assembly. Ironically, despite his commitment to secularism, Ataturk used this 
term during his life.  The terms “ghazi” and “sehid” are used in Turkey even today for 
soldiers killed in action and diplomats who have been assassinated.237 
   
During the Ottoman Empire’s decline the Ottoman Army, once the source of its power, 
was constantly involved in plots against sultans and in palace politics.  When the 
Ottomans attempted to create a modern army, Janissaries and the “ulema” opposed the 
idea. After an unsuccessful attempt by Sultan Selim III (reigned 1789-1808), who was 
killed after a Janissary revolt, Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839) succeeded in destroying 
the Janissaries and established a modern army in 1826. Subsequently new military 
schools and academies based on the Western model were established, out of which a 
new generation of reformist officers emerged. These officers also had been politicized 
by the end of the 19th century in their struggle to impose a constitution on Sultan 
Abdulhamid II (1876-1909).  They established the secret Committee of Union and 
Progress (CUP) in 1889 and revolted against Sultan Abdulhamid in 1908 forcing him to 
restore the constitution.  However, there were two main groups in the Ottoman Army at 
the time, the radical reformers (Unionists) and the moderate liberals, therefore the CUP 
did not have united support.238   
 
Because of their lack of experience in terms of ruling a country the CUP was reluctant 
in seizing power entirely.  The first five years of the constitutional period (1908-1913) 
witnessed two unsuccessful rebellions in favor of the old regime (1908 and 1909) and 
one successful military rebellion led by anti-Unionist officers, who placed the liberals in 
power.  However, the defeats of the Ottoman Army in the first Balkan War and the 
liberal government’s willingness to accept the enemy’s conditions ruined the image of 
the liberals. Thus the CUP successfully seized complete power through a military coup 
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in 1913.  The Unionists converted the Army into an instrument of their policies. Ahmad 
notes that for the first time the government and the Army was under Unionist control 
and supported the same reform program, which has affected almost every aspect of 
society between 1913 and 1918.239 
 
The modernization of the Army created alienation between society and the military. 
While Turkish society was mainly shaped by traditional religious beliefs, the Army 
adopted modern ideas such as positivism, nationalism and secularism.  With the 
establishment of the modern Turkish state the military became the guardian of Kemalist 
state principles.240 It also considered itself the guarantor of political stability and ”the 
embodiment of the soul of the Turkish nation”.241 In order to protect these principles the 
Turkish army increasingly intervened in political life in favor of Kemalist principles 
after the transition to a multi party system, which needs to be analyzed in more detail.  
 
It is obvious that the Army played a crucial role in the last decade of the Ottoman 
Empire.  Yet the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War had not 
influenced the Army’s role, because even in defeat it was the only organized force able 
to resist the invasion of the country.  Therefore it is not surprising to see that the 
founding fathers of Turkey were overwhelmingly commanders of the former Ottoman 
Army.  However there was no consensus among them regarding the nature of the new 
regime.  After the proclamation of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Pasa was 
elected as the first president in 1923. He had a clear vision about Turkey’s future and 
wanted to create a secular state. Yet he had rivals and opponents in the parliament and 
especially in the Army, which could cause a serious threat. In order to solve this 
problem, Ataturk insisted that the officers who wished to enter politics should resign 
from the Army.  Many of Ataturk’s opponents such as Kazim Karabekir, Ali Fuad 
Cebesoy and Refet Bele choose to retire and were disqualified from politics by Ataturk 
during his time. As a result of this, throughout the single party period (1923-1945) the 
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military was removed from political life and became the instrument of the one party 
state.242 However one should also bear in mind the fact that it was still the military who 
ruled Turkey in this period because both Ataturk and Inonu were retired soldiers, who 
established an authoritarian regime with the assistance of the Army.243   
 
Ahmad claims that during this time the military tradition declined and individualistic 
civil society thrived.244 However Jenkins notes that Ataturk was influenced by the Von 
der Goltz concept of a “nation in arms”, who was appointed to reform the Ottoman 
Army corps in the 19th century. His book “The Nation in Arms” was translated into 
Turkish in 1884 and read by Ottoman officer corps, and “called on the military to play 
an active role in reshaping society and regarded the armed forces as representing 
almost distilled essence of the nation.”245  The new Turkish Republic started to impose 
from early the 1930s this concept of a military nation through the education system. The 
propaganda claimed that the Turks had been always an organized army’s soldiers.  
Interestingly, even today the Turkish Army considers its roots back in the 209 BC, 
when the first organized army was formed by Mete Hun in Central Asia.  The Turkish 
Army claims that the “Turks have proven to be an army nation by dedicating 
themselves to the military profession throughout the history”. Jenkins also notes that the 
introduction of obligatory military service in 1927 contributed to the propaganda of an 
army nation, as military service played an educational and civilizing role in order to 
reshape the views of the male population. This propaganda also found a ready 
agreement in Turkish society, which was to a considerable amount hierarchical, 
patriarchal and authoritarian. 246  
 
After being out of political life in the single party period, the Cold War brought the 
Turkish army into political life once again. The Truman Doctrine (1947) and Turkey’s 
membership in NATO (1952) increased the role of the Turkish army in political life. 
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While the junior officers were trained by American instructors on modern warfare, the 
old generals were unable to adopt new technologies, which divided the Turkish army 
into two main camps. Thanks to the transition to the multi party system in 1945 the DP 
(Democrat Party) won the elections in 1950. The Democrats attempted to exploit the 
division in the Army by supporting the generals, who were seen politically important, 
and neglecting junior officers.  Furthermore, the 50s witnessed a deterioration in the 
working and economic conditions of junior officers. Additionally, the bitter political 
dispute between the RPP (Republican People’s Party) and the governing DP contributed 
to the unrest among junior officers, who considered the DP anti-Kemalist and supported 
the oppositional RPP. All these resulted in Turkey’s first military intervention in 27th 
May 1960, in which junior officers performed a coup against their high command. 
Ahmad notes that the coup followed the tradition of the Young Turk revolution in 1908, 
whose aim was to change the society’s fundamental structures radically. The new 
constitution made the Turkish General Staff (TGS) directly responsible to the prime 
minister and created a National Security Council (NSC) to serve as an advisory corps to 
the ministry council.  All these measures increased the prestige and autonomy of the 
Turkish armed forces. Thus the political parties lost their influence on the Army and the 
generals were recognized as the guardians of the Kemalist regime and as a stabilizing 
factor, which started to shape the economic and political life of Turkey. For instance in 
1961 the Army mutual assistance associations were created, which brought the Turkish 
Army into business and industry. As a result of these developments, the generals 
enjoyed a privileged status in Turkish society, which they were determined to 
maintain.247  
 
After a political dispute between political parties represented in the parliament blocked 
the state apparatus in 1971, the Turkish military made another coup on the 12th March 
1971. This time TGS did not seize power directly, instead forcing the government to 
resign and replacing them with a government of technocrats. This intervention did not 
improve the political situation in Turkey. In sharp contrast Turkey found itself on the 
brink of a civil war as the fight between rightist and leftist groups constantly increased 
during the 70s, which resulted in another military coup on 12th September 1980.  
However, within this time the Army seized power entirely and remained in power for 
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three years. Before reintroducing civilian rule in 1983 the military imposed a new 
constitution in 1982, which is still in force despite major changes voted by a referendum 
in September 2011.  After the military coup, the TGS was reluctant to give complete 
freedom to civil governments, which resulted in an army controlled system through a 
number of institutional and informal mechanisms.248 
 
The rise of political Islam in the 80s and 90s resulted in the Islamist WP’s (Welfare 
Party) victory in the general election on 25 December 1995.  The WP formed a coalition 
government with the conservative TPP (True Path party) and WP’s leader Erbakan 
became Turkey’s first Islamist prime minister. The Turkish General Staff was 
concerned with the Islamist nature of the WP, which led them to articulate their belief 
that the secular state was under threat.  However this time they did not to seize power 
directly. On the contrary, TGS coordinated and provoked public opposition to the 
government in order to remove the WP from power. Furthermore in the National 
Security Council the generals presented the government with a list of anti-Islamist 
measures, which the government was reluctant to implement.  They also launched a 
number of briefings to inform the media, judiciary and business community about the so 
called Islamist threat, which led to an application of a public persecutor to the 
constitutional court for the closure of the Welfare Party.  At the same time, the generals 
discreetly lobbied the TPP party members to persuade them to resign from their parties. 
Following the resignation of some TPP MPs, the coalition government lost its majority 
in the parliament and had to resign from the government. As a result of the specific 
methods used in this intervention, it is defined as a “post modern coup”.    
 
The last military intervention into Turkish political life occurred in 2007, when the 
tensions between the secularist Kemalist elite and the governing Justice and 
Development Party due to the nomination of the Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül as 
president led to mass street protests and political turmoil, as Gül’s wife’s headscarf was 
considered by Kemalists to be against secularism. On the midnight of 27th April 2007 
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the Turkish Armed Forces published an e-memorandum249 on its website warning the 
government not to select a person as president who could jeopardize the foundation of 
the Kemalist regime. This indirect intervention affected the constitution court’s decision 
about the election procedure of the president in the parliament, which blockaded the 
election process. The response of the JDP government was the early general elections in 
22th July 2007, in which JDP achieved a sensational victory.   
 
As clearly seen from the historical context there is an obvious tradition of military 
intervention into Turkish political life, which resulted in two coup d'états (1960 and 
1980) and three indirect military interventions (1970, 1997 and 2007). Interestingly, 
these interventions have a legal ground explained in the Turkish Armed Forces internal 
service law No. 211 (January 1961), which states that “the duty of the armed forces is to 
protect and preserve the Turkish homeland and the Turkish republic as defined in the 
constitution”. Subsequently, the Army used this article to justify its intervention in 1980 
and it is in force even today.  Regarding the Turkish Army’s role in the country’s 
political life one should also consider the legitimacy of the Army in public opinion 
because of its crucial role in the founding of the Republic. Thus a considerable 
proportion of the Turkish population (especially Kemalists) has regarded the Army as 
the savior in case of external and internal political or economic crisis. In this regard 
Baran notes that “Instead of shouldering the duty to make sure that their secular system 
is preserved through normal democratic process, a significant number of Turks assume 
that they can remain passive and count on the soldiers to put all right if things threaten 
to go off track”250 Subsequently, throughout the Turkish Republic’s history this notion 
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led to many invitations from the so called Kemalist civil society to the Army to 
intervene into political life in favor of secularism.  
 
Apart from this, the Army’s most important mechanism of controlling political life was 
the National Security Council, which was created according to the military imposed 
1961 Constitution as an advisory body to the Council of Ministers. The 1982 
Constitution upgraded the status of the NSC, so its views would be given priority by the 
Council of Ministers. The NSC meetings were held once a month and chaired by the 
Turkish president, and consisted of five generals and 4 government members. In theory 
that meant a power equilibrium. However the generals were able to dictate their agenda, 
as the secretary general of the NSC was always a general and its under-secretariat was 
mainly dominated by retired army personnel. Furthermore, the NSC general secretary 
had unlimited access to any civilian authority to observe the implementation of the 
advice imposed by the NSC.  Additionally, the military had various informal 
mechanisms to control political life, such as private meetings with bureaucrats and 
public pronouncements.251   
 
The Army has also always maintained close ties with the foreign ministry bureaucracy, 
because the Kemalist elites have considered foreign policy a natural corollary of 
Turkey’s Westernization and modernization process.  The Army participated in the 
foreign policy process during the one party period to some extent.252 However it was 
due to Turkey’s membership to the NATO that the Army officers started to enjoy a 
considerable role in the making of security policies. Furthermore, the creation of the 
NSC in 1960 increased the Army’s role in foreign policy making, as it granted a legal 
and institutional framework for the involvement of the military in this process. During 
the 50s and 60s the Army officers in their meetings with foreign colleagues regarding 
security and NATO issues were mainly supported by experienced Turkish diplomats, as 
the majority of officers were not able to speak foreign languages fluently. However, the 
increasing experience of army officers in international institutions in the 80s increased 
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the independence of army officers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). 253 The 
90s witnessed an increasing role of the TGS in foreign policy making, because of the 
security issues surrounding Turkey after the end of the Cold War.  During this time the 
TGS developed its own policies regarding the issues of Cyprus, the Aegean Sea and 
security, and was able to dictate its policies to weak governments at that time. 
Furthermore the TGS was in charge of the preparation of two vital strategic concepts 
regarding security issues, namely the “National Military Strategic Concept” and the 
“National Security Policy Concept”.  The influence of the Army in relations with Israel, 
in particular, was of considerable importance at the time.254  
Ahmad notes that, as in the past, the Turkish military’s role will be decided by Turkey’s 
place in the new world order.255 In this context, Turkey’s European Union membership 
process was crucial. European Council Helsinki Summit in 1999 granted Turkey the 
candidacy status for EU membership, which Turkey had been waiting for desperately, 
for over two decades.  The Helsinki decision opened the way for an intensive reform 
process in Turkey to reach the Copenhagen criteria, in which the removal of military 
supremacy over civilian rule was the one of the main issues. In order to reduce the 
institutional influence of the TGS the following reforms were launched by the coalition 
government in 1999 and the JDP in 2003; 
 
• The removal of military judges from the state security courts (June 1999) 
• The increase of the number of civilian members in the NSC (October 2001)  
• The requirement for Council of Ministers to give priority consideration to the 
recommendations of NSC, replaced by just a notification of Council. 
• The abolishment of the obligation that the secretary of the NSC be a member of 
Army (July 2003) 
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• The abolishment of the general secretary’s unlimited access to civilian 
institutions and the power to oversee the realization of NSC decisions (July 
2003) 
• Submission of the Turkish Armed Forces under the judicial control of the Court 
of Accounts  
• Reduction of NSC meetings to once every two months, in order to reduce the 
pressure of the NSC on governments (July 2003)256 
 
The TGS accepted these reforms and its loss of power, because the military, which 
considers Turkey’s integration with the EU one of the main objectives of Turkish 
modernization and Westernization, was rhetorically entrapped. The military’s 
intervention into civilian politics became contrary to the ideals of Kemalist ideology, 
namely being a part of European civilization and culture. Thus the military accepted the 
reforms in order to not to damage its credibility and legitimacy.257  According to some 
scholars one of the reasons for the military’s acceptance of its loss of power was the 
Chief of Staff Hilmi Özkök’s personality, who had spent most of his career in NATO 
postings, where he became familiar with the ideals of liberal democracies.258 This 
notion has been proven to be accurate by the military intervention into the presidential 
elections in 2007 under the command of Yasar Büyükanit and his successor Ilker 
Basbug’s involvement in political life.  
 
To sum up, despite its loss of power in political life due the European Union reforms, 
which will be discussed in the coming chapter under Europeanization of Turkish foreign 
policy in more detail, the Turkish Army still plays a crucial role in Turkish political life 
behind the scenes, and is likely continue to exert its influence in the immediate future. 
The most obvious proof for this claim is the fact that there have been six different 
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unsuccessful military coup plots259 since the JDP took the power in December 2002, 
which explains the Army’s deeply rooted role in Turkish political life.  
 
3.1.6 Geographical Determinants 
 
One important factor that affects a country’s political power and its relations with other 
states is its geography. Geography influences choices and alternatives of a state’s 
policies and imposes limitations to its actions. The geographic location of the Anatolian 
peninsula has affected policies of all states that were established in this strategic 
territory. Therefore the peculiarities of Turkey’s geographical position have been 
influencing Turkish foreign policy since the Republic’s establishment. This geostrategic 
location enables Turkey to play a role in world politics far greater than its real power. 
At the same time it brings some disadvantages regarding security issues as well.260  
Figure 3: Turkey’s Geostrategic Location in the Midst of Three Continents 261 
 
Turkey occupies one of the most strategic territories, being situated between Europe, 
Asia and Middle East. Turkey’s geographic location allows it to oversee the historic 
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migration and invasion routes from the Balkans and Caucasus Mountains onto the high 
Anatolian plateau. Turkey borders the oil rich Fertile Crescent in the Mesopotamia, 
Caspian Sea in the Caucasus, and the strategic Persian Gulf and the Red Sea are in 
Turkey’s proximity.  Moreover it is also located at the crossroads of major air, sea and 
land transport routes of the modern world, which connect the industrially advanced 
countries of Europe with the natural resources (gas and oil) rich regions such as Asia, 
the Middle East and the Caucasus. 262  (See Figure 3)  
 
As mentioned above, the peculiarities of the Anatolian peninsula determine Turkish 
foreign policy.  The high mountains in the east and west of the Anatolian Peninsula 
allow only small entryway between the mountains. In the north, west and south, the sea 
surrounds the Anatolian peninsula, while parallel mountain ranges with forests and 
rivers along the north and the south coast make it hard to penetrate. (See Figure 4)  
 
Figure 4: Turkey’s Topographical Features 263  
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These geographic features contribute to the defense of the Anatolian Peninsula making 
it hard to penetrate from the outside. On the other hand, in the European Turkey there 
are no natural barriers such as mountains, which make it open to attacks. Furthermore, 
the Straits offer political and military advantages to Turkey. The fact that Turkey 
controls the only seaway connecting the Black Sea with the Mediterranean has always 
been an issue in Turkish foreign policy, as it brought the Ottoman Empire as well as 
Turkey into continuous conflict with Russia. Thus the attractions of the Straits for 
potential aggressors are one of the main security concerns of Turkey. The deployment 
of Turkey’s most powerful First Army for the protection of the Straits explains the 
perception of this threat by Turkey. The dispute about the territorial waters around the 
Aegean Island with Greece has been always another main security concern for Turkish 
foreign policy. These concerns resulted in Turkey’s declaration of casus belli against 
any Greek attempt to extend its Aegean islands’ territorial waters up to twelve miles, 
which would include all open sea exits from the Aegean within Greece territorial 
waters. In 1996 these concerns almost brought Turkey and Greece onto the brink of war 
over the dispute of sovereignty of two uninhabited islets in Aegean Sea.  (See Figure 5) 
264 
 
Figure 5: Greek and Turkish Claims in Aegean See 265 
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Another important factor that has affected Turkish foreign policy is the number of its 
neighbors and the character of their regimes.  It is a fact that a country that is 
surrounded by a large number of other countries may have to cope with an especially 
high risk of being threatened or attacked by at least some of its neighbors, which in 
return may force this country to confront its neighbors in order to protect itself. Turkey 
borders 8 countries on land, 6 of whom are in the politically unstable Caucasus and the 
Middle East. There are a number of states around the Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea, 
which can be considered Turkey’s neighbors as well, in a broader sense, as they have an 
open access to Turkey via the sea. This unique geographic location increases the 
numbers of threat and opportunities Turkey faces concurrently and explains the deeply 
rooted sense of insecurity in Turkish foreign policy, which has been also escalated by 
Turkey’s Ottoman legacy and the Sevres Phobia.  In order to maintain its security 
Turkey has always been a part of regional alliances and sought alliance with great 
powers outside the region such as the USA.266  
In sum, Turkey connects three continents to each other, which makes it a Eurasian 
country.  It is in the proximity of the oil rich Middle East, the Caspian Basin and Central 
Asia, and links the important trade route from the Mediterranean Basin to the Black Sea 
Basin via the Turkish Straits and connects all these strategically important regions to 
each other. Davutoglu argues that Turkey is a central country in the midst of the Afro-
Eurasia landmass with multiple regional identities which cannot be minimized to one, 
unified category.  As a result of this geographical position Turkey can be considered a 
Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf, and 
Black Sea country all at the same time.267  This unique geostrategic location makes 
Turkey extremely sensitive to developments in its neighboring regions and cautious 
towards international and regional changes in the balance of power. This has influenced 
Turkish foreign policy since the establishment of Republic. It is a fact that everything 
changes but geography does not. However, the perceptions about a country’s 
geopolitical position are subject to change as a result of the developments in 
transportation technologies and other areas. Therefore, the geostrategic position of 
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Turkey has always been an important factor in Turkish foreign policy, and will continue 
to exert its influence to some extent in the coming future as well.   
 
3.1.7 The Lack of Strategic Thinking and the Dominance of Elites in the Decision 
Making Process 
 
There are various agents who contribute to the Turkish foreign policy decision making 
process, such as the president, the government, the NSC, the MFA, the military and 
public opinion. However, until the end of the Cold War Turkish foreign policy had 
mainly been shaped by the Kemalist elite in the MFA and the military. These elites 
considered themselves as the guardians of the Kemalist regime and its principles. The 
Army and the foreign ministry bureaucracy always maintained close ties, as the 
Kemalist elite considered foreign policy a natural corollary of Turkey’s Westernization 
and modernization process.  These elites always emphasized the difference between 
“state policy”, which was represented and implemented by them, and “government 
policy”, in Turkish political life. Military-civilian bureaucracy always attempted to 
implement the Kemalist state policy regardless of different governments and their 
policies. Therefore they demonstrated a constant resistance against any shift in Turkey’s 
orientation towards the West and Kemalist foreign policy principles, 268 which can be 
observed in the opposition of these elites towards Özal’s aspirations in the Middle East 
during the first Gulf War and also Erbakan’s Islamist oriented foreign policy between 
1996 and 1997. Furthermore, due to the weakness of Turkish governments and civil 
society, foreign policy making remained a privilege of the small Kemalist elite. 
 
This dominance of Kemalist elites in Turkish foreign policy may have resulted in one of 
the main structural weaknesses of Turkish foreign policy making culture, which is its 
lack of strategic thinking and theory. Considering Turkey’s foreign policy history, one 
can argue that besides Turkey’s constant orientation towards West, which was derived 
from the Kemalist state identity; there has been no consistent alternative grand strategy 
for Turkey’s foreign policy until the end of the Cold War. As a result of this 
phenomenon, Turkish decision makers have adopted a reaction oriented defensive and 
conservative policy, which almost constantly avoided taking any initiative. This policy 
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manifested itself in Turkish diplomats’ and decision makers’ main feature, which is the 
preference of caution to daring action. The reasons for this phenomenon may be 
analyzed under four categories, namely, ideological, historical, psychological, and 
institutional-structural determinants.269    
 
To begin with it can be said that the characteristics of Kemalist ideology are influential 
in the lack of strategic thinking in Turkish foreign policy. As put forward by Oran “the 
intellectuals of Turkey who have Western educations are admirers of the West and do 
not oppose the West. This admiration and application of Western model in Turkey has 
led Turkish intellectuals not to think about any alternative to the West in foreign 
policy.”270  The former social democrat foreign minister Ismail Cem also criticizes this 
one sided orientation of Kemalist elites. He suggests that the break with the Ottoman 
past resulted in an approach which does not take Turkish history and culture into 
consideration.  Furthermore, this one sided orientation of Kemalist elites alienated 
Turkey from its neighbors and surrounding regions since they believed that showing 
interest towards the Middle East, Central Asia or Africa represents “backwardness”. 271 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, preserving the status quo is one of the main 
fundamentals of Turkish foreign policy culture, which was inherited from the Ottoman 
experience. This policy is based on the notion of “either absolute hegemony or absolute 
retreat”, which prevented the Ottoman Empire and Turkey from developing strategies in 
order to create spheres of influence outside of their borders. One can observe the 
influence of this notion on Turkey’s policies towards the Caucasus, the Middle East and 
the Balkans from the establishment of the Republic until the end of the Cold War, 
where it resulted in absolute isolation and alienation from these regions.  Furthermore, 
the bitter memories of CUP’s adventurism in the last decade of the Ottoman Empire 
also prevented the young Turkish state from developing a reasonable foreign policy 
strategy towards these regions. This attitude of the new Turkish Republic towards 
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former Ottoman regions in its early years became one of the fundamental principles of 
Turkish foreign policy until the end of the Cold War.272   
 
At the same time there is a psychological dimension in this phenomenon as well, which 
is the fact that the nature of the new regime in Turkey caused a deep-rooted division in 
Turkish society as discussed in the previous chapter.  This split in Turkish society has 
caused many problems in Turkish political life and has some inevitable consequences in 
Turkish foreign policy making, one of which is the focus on internal problems causing a 
lack of strategic thinking and planning towards surrounding regions. Furthermore, one 
should also bear in mind the effect of “Sevres Phobia” in the psychological dimension 
of the lack of the strategic thinking, which prevented Turkey from seeking improved 
relations with its neighboring regions.273  
 
The last factor in the lack of strategic theory is institutional-structural determinants. The 
institutions that can contribute to developing strategic and alternative theories in Turkey 
are the MFA, the Turkish parliament, the political parties, the National Security 
Council, the Turkish General Staff, universities and think tanks. However, until recently 
the universities and think tanks were not inncluded in this process because the foreign 
policy process was considered an official procedure. In addition, there has been 
insufficient coordination between the different bureaucratic institutions, which were 
influential in the decision making process.274 
 
The main institution responsible for developing foreign policy strategies is the MFA. 
Interestingly, the MFA does not have the basic instrument for such a task: a well-
organized archive. The archive of the MFA is stored in different locations and therefore, 
cannot be used efficiently. Thus, a former Foreign Minister Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil 
suggested that the MFA does not have a memory. Moreover, the MFA has mainly been 
overwhelmed with the bureaucratic process and financial handicaps. Being aware of this 
problem, the MFA has established a strategic research institute in the 90s, which does 
not have sufficient personal and financial funding. Furthermore, because of the nature of 
                                                            
272 Ibid.; pp. 52-59. 
273 Ibid.; pp. 59-63. 
274Ibid.;, pp. 48-52. 
 100 
 
the MFA it is hardly possible for the diplomats to develop alternative and objective 
strategies, which clash with their official policies.275   
 
As mentioned above, there has been always an emphasis on the difference between state 
policy and government policy in Turkish political life. Turkish foreign policy is mainly 
shaped by the military-civilian bureaucracy regardless of different governments, who 
have their own opinions and priorities about Turkish foreign policy. Like the Turkish 
Army the MFA considers itself as the guardian of Kemalist foreign policy principles. 
Therefore, the foreign policy bureaucracy showed a constant resistance against any 
government in Turkey that attempted to implement a foreign policy that clashed with 
state policy.276 As a result of this phenomenon, majority of Turkish political parties did 
not attempt to establish research institutions in order to produce alternative foreign 
policy strategies according to their own perceptions. This phenomenon also applies to 
the universities, which are normally supposed to supply the government with policy 
alternatives. Furthermore, the increasing demand of Turkey’s young population for 
higher education and the financial difficulties turned the Turkish universities into formal 
education institutions, where only teaching takes place.  The think tanks, which are the 
vital institutions for any country to develop strategies and provide expert advice on 
international issues, are a new phenomenon in Turkey starting in the 90s.277 However 
the influence of the think tanks in the foreign policy process is still very modest in 
comparison to other Western countries, because of the authoritarian character of Turkish 
politicians and bureaucrats. 
 
Considering all of this, it is possible to see that from the establishment of the Republic 
Turkish decision makers neglected the significance of developing alternative grand 
strategies for Turkish foreign policy. Furthermore, there was a clear dominance of 
Kemalist elites in the Turkish foreign policy decision making process until the end of 
the Cold War. These issues are also subject to change in the post Cold War period. For 
instance, the increasing number of think tanks provides alternative strategies and 
theories for Turkish foreign policy decision makers. At the same time the 
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Europeanization and democratization process is also decreasing the dominance of the 
Kemalist elites in Turkish foreign policy as well. 
 
 
3.2 External and Internal Conjunctural Determinants in the Making of Turkish 
Foreign Policy (1919- 1980) 
 
This section analyses the conjunctural factors that have affected the evolution of the 
Turkish state’s identity, interests and its foreign policy under two main categories, 
namely external and internal determinants.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
conjunctural factors do exert temporary influence on a country’s foreign policy and its 
daily implementation. These factors include the systemic changes in the international 
system, shifts in the balance of power, domestic political changes, economic factors and 
characters of decision makers. These various factors will be taken into account during 
the analysis of Turkish foreign policy history. However this analysis will not cover a 
detailed history of Turkish foreign policy but instead will analyze the major influential 
factors for the evolution of the Turkish state’s identity, interests and its foreign policy. 
The determinants of the transformation of Turkish foreign policy will be discussed in 
the coming chapter (4) in detail.  
In order to achieve a detailed analysis, Turkish foreign policy history will be periodized 
according to major influential factors. In this regard it has to be mentioned that some 
scholars have only focused on domestic factors and analyzed Turkish foreign policy 
according to influential domestic factors in the decision making process. For example 
Uzgel has periodized Turkish foreign policy history as follows: 
• The period of leader decisiveness 1919-1950 
• The era of MFA’s increasing influence 1950-1960 
• The phase of increasing influence of public opinion 1960-1980 
• The September 12 military coup period 1980-1983 
• The increasing role of the business community in foreign policy 1983-1991 
• The increase of the Army’s role 1990s278  
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On the other hand, others have mainly focused on systemic changes in the world system 
and its consequences on Turkish foreign policy, such as the end of the Cold War. For 
example Sönmezoglu has periodized the history of Turkish foreign policy as follows:  
 
• 1923-1945 Interwar period 
• 1946-1964 Rigid bipolar world system and Cold War period 
• 1965-1980 Detente in the Cold War 
• 1981-1991 The return to rigid bipolar world system  
• 1991- The end of the Cold War 279 
 
To begin with, it may be interesting to highlight the fact that the most of the systemic 
changes in the international system coincided with the major domestic changes in 
Turkey280 such as the beginning of the detente in the bipolar world system in the 1960s 
and Turkey’s first military coup in 1960, which absolutely changed Turkish political 
life. Yet at the same time one can also argue that some of the domestic changes in 
Turkey were a direct result of systemic changes in the international system, such as the 
beginning of the Cold War and Turkey’s transition to the multiparty system in 1945. 
This interaction between domestic and internal factors requires a holistic approach to 
Turkish foreign policy history. Therefore this study will deploy a combination of the 
two approaches mentioned above in order to highlight the significance of various 
factors in different times. 
 
3.2.1 Interwar Period 1919-1945 
 
3.2.1.1 Internal Factors:  The leader`s Decisiveness and Kemalist Ideology  
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Although the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923) may be considered an anti-
imperialist war in nature281, its leaders did not follow an anti-Western policy. Even 
during the war, Mustafa Kemal sought to establish relations with Western powers. Thus 
Turkey signed a treaty of friendship with France in 1921 despite the dispute over the 
status of Hatay. During the Independence War Mustafa Kemal deployed the old 
Ottoman policy using the differences between England, France and Italy to obtain 
independence. After the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923, in which Turkey’s 
independence was recognized, Turkey immediately started to develop friendly relations 
with Western countries. Despite some unsettled territorial problems with Western 
powers, such as Hatay and Mosul, the young Turkish Republic rejected any revisionist 
policy and preserving the status quo became the main subject of its policies. The famous 
dictum of Ataturk, “peace at home, peace in the world”, was a clear representation of 
this notion. As a result of this, the main subject of Turkish foreign policy became 
preserving its territorial integrity and freedom. 282 
 
As mentioned before, there was no consensus among the national movement about the 
nature of the new regime as the national movement consisted of a loose political 
coalition between the military-civilian bureaucracy, the newly emerging bourgeoisie, 
the notables and landlords of Turkey. Thus the secular Kemalists were in minority in the 
first Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) in 1923. However, Mustafa Kemal 
employed a step-by-step approach to transform the country into a secular system. The 
religiously motivated Kurdish uprising in eastern Anatolia in 1925 gave Mustafa Kemal 
the pretext to oppress his political opponents. The law for the maintenance of order 
passed by TGNA provided the government with absolute power until 4 March 1929. 
Armed with this law the government established the special courts (Independence 
Tribunals), in which more than 500 regime opponents were sentenced to death. During 
these four years the Kemalists carried out radical reforms and after a long and painful 
reform process Mustafa Kemal was successful in eliminating or silencing almost all of 
                                                            
281 For a critical approach see: Başkaya, Fikret (2002); Paradigmanın İflası: Resmi İdeolojinin 
Eleştirisine Giriş (The end of the Paradigm: Introduction to the critic of State Ideology), Özgür 
Üniversite, Ankara.  
282 Çalış, Şaban (1996); The role of identity in the making of modern Turkish foreign policy, 
pp. 64-68. 
 104 
 
his opponents in 1929.283  Thus Mustafa Kemal emerged as the undisputable leader of 
Turkey, and later took the surname Ataturk, meaning father of the Turks. 
 
The undisputable status of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk inevitably influenced Turkish 
foreign policy. Therefore the period after the Independence War was marked with the 
decisive role of Ataturk in the foreign policy making process. His understanding of 
foreign policy was decisive in the formulation of foreign policy goals and the foreign 
minister’s role was to implement his policies. The Kemalist state identity and its 
interests were defined by Ataturk, and as discussed in the previous chapter, it has been 
shaping Turkish foreign policy up until today. Additionally, as mentioned before, the 
young Turkish MFA mainly consisted of former Ottoman diplomats, who carried 
experiences of Ottoman diplomacy into the new state. As result of bitter memories of 
the past two decades of the Ottoman Empire, these diplomats followed a cautious 
diplomacy in World War II.284  
 
As can be seen clearly from this brief account of Turkish political history after the 
Independence War, the young Republic focused on internal problems and reforms. 
Therefore in the period between 1923 and 1930 foreign policy issues were not 
considered priority issues. Turkey received financial and military aid from the Soviet 
Union during the Independence War. After independence Turkey maintained close ties 
with the Soviet Union resulting in “The Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship” between 
Turkey and the Soviets in 1925.  Furthermore, the dispute over the status of Mosul with 
Britain was solved in 1926 through negotiations.  However, the 30s witnessed an 
increasing conflict between revisionist and status quo powers in Europe, which 
inevitably forced Turkey to take measures in order to preserve its security and territorial 
integrity against revisionist powers.285  Therefore the 30s witnessed a development in 
Turkey’s relations with Western liberal countries and deterioration in its relations with 
the Soviets.  
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As mentioned before, Turkey witnessed fundamental reforms after the Independence 
War (1919-1923), which sought to create a Westernized and secular Turkey. This 
process of secularization and the abolition of the caliphate caused deterioration in 
Turkey’s relations with Islamic countries. Additionally, the impact of Ottoman 
domination in the Middle East contributed to this mutual alienation between Turkey and 
Muslim countries. Furthermore, Turkish and Arabic secular intellectuals, who wanted to 
build nation states, considered the Ottoman and Islamic past as an obstacle for their 
ambitions. Thus they exaggerated the differences and problems between Arabs and 
Turks. Additionally, conservative Arabs considered the Kemalist reforms in Turkey a 
break away from Islam. All these factors contributed to Turkey’s political, cultural and 
economic alienation from Islamic countries during this period.286 
 
3.2.1.2 External Factors:  Facing the Italian Threat and World War II 
 
During the 30s the most influential external factor that affected Turkish foreign policy 
was the Italian threat as Mussolini claimed that Italy’s historic mission lay in Asia and 
Africa. At the time the Dodecanese Islands in the proximity of Turkey were still 
occupied by Italy, and the memory of the Italian invasion of southern Turkey was still 
fresh.287  Calis notes that from three aspects the Italian threat to Turkish integrity played 
the same role in Turkish foreign policy as the Soviet’s threat did during the Cold War. 
Firstly, facing the Italian threat, Turkey was forced to follow a more active foreign 
policy in its surrounding region in order to establish a security belt along its borders. 
Consequently, Turkey and Greece anticipated a leading role in the establishment of the 
Balkan Entente in 1934, which brought Turkey, Greece Rumania and Yugoslavia 
together. Furthermore, in order to establish its security in the Middle East, Turkey 
entered the Sadabat Pact in 1937, consisting of Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan. Secondly, 
the fascist Italian threat brought Turkey and liberal Western countries closer. Thirdly, as 
a result of these two, Turkey assumed the role of protecting Western interests in the 
region. Furthermore, due to this threat Turkey became a member of the League of 
Nations in 1932. Finally, the change of the Straits’ status in the Montreux Agreement in 
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1936, which restored Turkey’s sovereignty over the Straits, was also a direct response to 
the Italian threat.288  
    
When Ataturk died in 1938, Ismet Inönü became the President of both Turkey and the 
Republican People’s Party, as Turkey was ruled under a mono party system. The new 
president Inönü was a committed Kemalist and did not change the main pillars of 
Turkish foreign policy. However, the approaching World War II pushed Turkey to make 
an alliance with France and Great Britain in 1939 in order to strengthen Turkey’s 
security. Despite this alliance, Turkey preserved its neutrality through well-calculated 
diplomacy until the very end of the war, which has been praised as one of the significant 
achievements of Turkish diplomacy in the interwar period.289  
 
 
3.2.2 The Impact of the Beginning of the Cold War and the Transition to a Multi 
Party System (1945-1960) 
 
Turkish foreign policy during the interwar period is marked with Turkey’s cautious 
diplomacy. Although Turkey became a member of regional security pacts, this did not 
result in economic, political or military Western dependency of Turkey. Thus until 1939 
Turkey attempted to avoid any formal attachment with Western powers and followed a 
balanced, neutral foreign policy towards these countries. Even during the war, Turkey 
sought to maintain its balanced policy and did not enter the war. However after World 
War II, a number of external and internal factors forced Turkey to alter its balanced 
foreign policy, which resulted Turkey’s absolute dependency on the Western bloc.  
During this period Turkey witnessed significant changes both to foreign and domestic 
policy. These changes occurred almost simultaneously, as there was an interaction 
between them. As mentioned before, Turkey’s transition to the multiparty system in 
1945 can be interpreted as a direct result of the systemic changes in the international 
system, namely the beginning of the Cold War. Furthermore, the major systemic 
changes in world politics had inevitable consequences for Turkish foreign policy in the 
post World War period as well. 
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3.2.2.1 External Factors: The Systemic Changes and the Soviet Threat 
 
Two major interrelated external factors were decisive in Turkish foreign policy after the 
Cold War.  Firstly the world system was transformed from a balance of power to a 
bipolar world system. In a bipolar world system, it was not a realistic and possible 
policy for Turkey to maintain its neutral policy due to its strategic geopolitical situation. 
Due to the nature of the bipolar world system, Turkey could not exploit the balance of 
power between rival European powers anymore. Furthermore, Turkey did not have the 
military and economic strength to follow a neutral foreign policy after World War II.  
Besides these conjunctural factors, in order to fully understand Turkey’s decision to 
become a political and economic ally of the Western bloc, one should also consider the 
influence of Kemalist Turkey’s orientation towards the West, which was discussed 
among the structural determinants of Turkish foreign policy.290  (See Chapter 3.1.3)   
 
Secondly, apart from these factors, there was a real security threat to Turkey’s territorial 
integrity from the emergence of the Soviets as a superpower. The Soviets had already 
pursued an expansionist policy during the war, which was aimed at gaining territorial 
concessions from Turkey. In the secret German-Soviet talks in 1940 Turkish soil was 
discussed as a bargaining chip. After the war, the Soviets repeated their territorial 
demands in the Yalta and Potsdam conferences in 1945. Regarding the status of the 
Turkish Straits, Stalin stated in the Yalta conference that “it is impossible to accept a 
situation in which Turkey has a hand on Russia´s throat”.291 Furthermore, on 19 March 
1945 the Soviets denounced the Treaty of Friendship and Non-aggression of 1925 
between Turkey and the Soviet Union. To make matters worse, on 7 June 1945 the 
Soviet Union demanded Soviet bases on the Turkish Straits and territorial concessions 
in the eastern Soviet-Turkish border.  As a result of these Soviet pressures, Turkey was 
pushed into an alliance with the Western bloc.292 
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Facing these serious Soviet threats towards its territorial integrity, Turkey first 
attempted to involve the United States and the United Kingdom in this issue. However, 
the USA and the UK left Turkey alone due to their misinterpretation of Stalin’s post war 
aspirations and Turkey’s neutrality during the war. In the meantime, the Western 
powers realized that the Soviets sought to take advantage of the power gap in the post 
war era. Thus, the UK declared on March 1946 that its treaty of alliance (1939) with 
Turkey was still in force and would help Turkey against any aggression.  At the same 
time the USA president Truman started to consider the Soviet demands as a part of an 
expansionist grand strategy.  These changes in the Western perception of the Soviet 
threat ended Turkey’s isolation in the post war period. Subsequently the USA included 
Turkey in the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and in the Marshall Plan in 1948, which 
provided Turkey with financial and military aid.  Thus between 1947 and 1961 the USA 
supported Turkey with 1,862 million US dollars military aid and 1,394 million US 
dollars economic aid.293  
 
As a result of the above mentioned immediate Soviet threat and Kemalist orientation 
towards the West, Turkey gradually became part of the Western alliance and its 
institutions.  Firstly, Turkey entered the United Nations (UN) as a founding member in 
1945. Then Turkey became one of the founding members of the Organization of 
European Economic Cooperation (OECC later known as OECD) in 1948 and the 
Council of Europe in 1949. At the same time, Turkey also applied for membership 
status in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was declined in 1950 
as it was initially perceived to be for Northern Atlantic countries only. However the 
Korean War altered the US strategy towards Soviet expansionism. Thus with the 
Eisenhower Doctrine the USA changed its perceptions about Turkey’s strategic 
position. According to this doctrine, Turkey had a crucial geostrategic position in the 
southern flank of Europe in order to prevent Soviet aggression towards NATO 
countries. This new geostrategic role granted Turkey NATO membership status in 1952 
and therefore its place in the Western alliance was confirmed.294   
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All these developments resulted in Turkey’s financial, political and military dependency 
on the Western alliance, particularly the USA. During this period Turkey also became 
an agent of Western interests and policies in its surrounding regions. For example, 
Turkey played an active role in the establishment of the Baghdad Pact (1955) and the 
Balkan Pact (1954), which were established to prevent the Soviet expansionism in these 
regions. Furthermore, Turkey strongly opposed the military coup in Iraq (1958) and 
threatened to invade Syria in case a communist regime took over; hence Turkey 
considered these regime changes in its neighboring states a part of the Soviet grand 
strategy.  
 
3.2.2.1 Internal Factors: The Transition to a Multi Party System and the Increasing 
Role of the MFA 
 
As mentioned previously, Turkey witnessed major domestic political and economic 
changes in the post World War II period.  In 1945 Turkey witnessed a transition to the 
multi party system. Although Hale underestimates the impact of the systemic change in 
the international system on Turkey’s democratization process, 295 it is obvious that 
Turkey’s decision was in line with its engagement with democratic Western countries. 
Apart from Kemalist Turkey’s orientation towards the West, the President Inönü also 
realized that the future lay on the side of Western democracies, as they were victorious 
in World War II.296 Furthermore, it must be also mentioned that Turkey’s need for 
financial aid required an orientation in foreign policy towards Western countries. 
Although the ruling Democrat Party were in favor of the liberal economic system and 
supported the notion that the Turkey’s economy should be based on free enterprises and 
foreign direct investment, because of the lack of indigenous capital and low foreign 
direct investment they continued to establish state enterprises, for which they needed 
foreign financial aid.297  As a result of these factors it can be argued that a number of 
internal and external developments influenced Turkey’s transformation from a single 
party rule to a more democratic multi party system, which in return influenced Turkey’s 
foreign policy in post World War II period. 
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After the transition to the multi party system in 1945, the DP won the elections in 1950 
ending the long rule of the Republican People’s Party between 1923 and 1950. The DP 
remained in power until the military coup in 1960. During this period the DP’s leader 
and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes had the same dominance in foreign policy as in 
the single party period’s leaders, Ataturk and Inönü. However, this period also 
witnessed an increasing role of foreign ministers and the MFA in the shaping of Turkish 
foreign policy, as Menderes was inexperienced in foreign policy matters.298  During this 
period, the DP’s foreign policy was based on the maintenance of Western financial, 
military and political aid. Although the Soviet Union denounced its territorial demands 
from Turkey after Stalin’s death in 1953 and there was a limited détente in the Cold 
War, the DP sought to exaggerate the size of the Soviet threat to Turkey’s integrity and 
NATO in order to obtain more financial aid. Thus Turkey also became a spokesperson 
for Western interests in the Third World and the Middle East. For instance, Turkey 
supported the Western powers during the Suez crisis in 1956 and defended Western 
countries fiercely in the Bandung Conference against non-allied countries, which 
resulted in an absolute isolation and alienation of Turkey from non-Western regions.299 
Turkey also did not realize the major political changes in its surrounding region, where 
decolonization resulted in the creation of new independent states. These states were 
strongly anti-Western and Turkey’s engagement with the West and its interventionist 
policies towards the Middle East reminded them of their colonial past. However, it was 
not until the Cyprus issue that Turkey realized the consequences of this isolation, which 
led to a reevaluation of Turkey’s Western dependency.    
 
3.2.3 Détente in the International System and a Military Coup (1960-1980) 
 
In 1960 Turkey witnessed its first military coup, which radically changed Turkish 
political life.  At the same time, a détente in the Cold War based on the concept of 
peaceful coexistence began to emerge out of the recognition of a possible mutual 
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nuclear destruction.  All of these external and internal developments had their imprints 
on Turkish foreign policy during the period between 1960 and 1980, which will be 
discussed in this chapter in more detail. 
 
3.2.3.1 Internal Factors: Military Coups and the Increasing Influence of Public 
Opinion  
 
Turkey’s first military coup in 1960, as discussed in the previous section (see 3.1.5), did 
not directly alter Turkey’s pro-Western foreign policy orientation. However the 1961 
Constitution, created under a military regime, led to a liberal political atmosphere 
opening the discussion of foreign policy issues to the public and press opinion. Before 
that time, foreign policy involvement was the privilege of a narrow, bureaucratic elite 
and foreign policy issues were not discussed publicly. Yet the liberal Constitution of 
1961 guaranteed fundamental civil rights such as freedom of thought, expression, 
association, publication and other civil liberties.300 As a result of this, foreign policy 
issues became a part of inter-party debates and attracted public and press attention. 
Therefore the public opinion about foreign policy issues became increasingly influential 
and had to be taken into consideration, which was obvious in case of the Cyprus issue.  
At the same time Turkish political life witnessed the emergence of socialist, nationalist 
and Islamist movements. The liberal Constitution’s electoral law enabled various small 
parties to enter the parliament. The ideological differences between these parties made it 
very hard to reach a consensus on foreign policy issues. The weak coalition 
governments and the lack of consensus caused an ineffectiveness and inactivity in 
Turkish foreign policy during the 1970s. The increasing public pressure about foreign 
policy issues also prevented governments from following an active foreign policy, 
which could create strong opposition from various political movements. Furthermore, 
the discussion between the ideological camps led to a radicalization of Turkish youth in 
the 70s with armed clashes, which in return gave the Army the pretext to intervene into 
Turkish political life in 1970 and 1980.301   
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3.2.3.2 External Factors: Détente and the Cyprus Issue  
 
 
During the period between 1960 and 1980 two major external factors were influential in 
Turkish foreign policy. Firstly, the world witnessed a détente in the bipolar balance of 
power, which resulted in the growth of economic interdependence between the two 
blocs and an increase in the role of medium powers.  This change also affected Turkish 
foreign policy causing increasing economic relations with the Warsaw Pact and Third 
World countries. For example, in 1963 a Turkish parliament member’s delegation paid 
a visit to the Soviet Union for the first time since 1932.  Furthermore this détente in 
international politics also caused a deterioration of Turkish-American relations as the 
differentiation of interests came to the surface.  
 
The deterioration started after the Cuban Missile crisis between the Soviet Union and 
the USA in 1963. In 1959, the USA installed the Jupiter Missiles in Turkey with nuclear 
warheads. The Soviet response was to install Missiles in Cuba in 1962 causing a crisis 
between the USA and the Soviet Union. During the Soviet-American negotiations, the 
Jupiter missiles in Turkey became a bargaining chip in order to achieve a settlement. 
Without consulting Turkey, the USA removed the Jupiter Missiles from Turkey in 
1963, which gave Turkish leaders the impression that in case of a crisis the USA would 
act according to its own interests only, jeopardizing Turkey’s security. Furthermore, in 
response to the development of thermonuclear weapons by the Soviet Union, NATO 
abandoned the massive retaliation concept according to which a Soviet attack on any 
NATO country would be responded to with an automatic nuclear strike. Instead, NATO 
developed a flexible response strategy that did not require an automatic nuclear 
retaliation. This new strategy also caused great concerns among Turkish leaders about 
Turkish security.  The outcome of all these development was a reevaluation of Turkey’s 
dependency on the West, particularly the USA.302 
 
 
During this period the second influential external factor was the Cyprus Issue, which 
has been affecting Turkish foreign policy until today. In order to protect Turkish 
Cypriots’ rights, Turkey became involved in the Cyprus issue in the early 1950s when 
the Greek Cypriots sought independence from Britain.  After long and difficult 
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negotiations both sides agreed to create the independent Republic of Cyprus in 1959. A 
treaty of guarantee was signed between Turkey, Greece and Britain in 1960, which gave 
the guarantor powers the right to unilaterally intervene in Cyprus after seeking 
cooperation between guarantor countries. However, three years after the establishment 
of the Republic of Cyprus the president Makarios declared the constitution as 
ineffective and he had intentions to alter it, which led to Turkish protests and communal 
conflict in Cyprus. After unsuccessful attempts to involve NATO and the USA, under 
heavy public pressure Turkey decided to intervene unilaterally. The response of the US 
was the infamous letter of President Johnson to Turkish Prime Minister Inönü, warning 
Turkey not to intervene.  In this letter Johnson informed Turkey that the USA weapons 
could not be used without American permission and the USA would not help Turkey in 
case of a Soviet involvement in this conflict.303   
 
The impact and consequences of this letter on Turkish foreign policy and public opinion 
towards America were of significant importance. Firstly, there was an increase in anti-
Americanism in Turkish public opinion, and more importantly, the Turkish decision 
makers realized that they cannot always rely on American aid.  As a result of this shock, 
and Turkey’s isolation in international community, Turkey changed its pro-Western 
policy to a multifaceted foreign policy that sought to improve relations with non-
Western countries. This change had three consequences in Turkey’s foreign affairs.  
Firstly, Turkey altered its policies towards the Soviet Union, improving the relations. 
Secondly, Turkey changed its security policies to be able to carry out independent 
military operations without American or NATO assistance. Thirdly, Turkey realized the 
importance of improving relations with non-Western countries. Thus Turkey followed a 
neutral policy during the Arab-Israeli Wars in 1967 and 1973304 and became a member 
of the Organization of Islamic Conference in 1967. However, despite Turkey’s attempts 
to improve its relations with non-Western countries, the memories of Turkey’s past 
policies towards these regions prevented a successful rapprochement. Turkey realized 
this fact after its intervention in Cyprus in 1974, when the overwhelming majority of 
UN member countries condemned Turkey’s actions.  
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To sum up, one can claim that during the period between 1960 and 1980 there were 
significant changes in the Turkish foreign policy structure. During this period, Turkish 
decision makers started to highlight the importance of Turkish national interests and 
Turkey’s independence in decision-making. However, the foundation of Turkish foreign 
policy, namely its orientation towards the West, as determined by Ataturk, remained 
unchanged. As discussed above, this change in Turkish foreign policy was affected by a 
number of major domestic and external factors. Among these factors one should also 
mention the impact of the oil crisis in the 70s and the American arms embargo to 
Turkey after the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974, which severely deteriorated the 
Turkish economy.  All these factors forced Turkey to reconsider its Western 
dependency and Turkey seemed to enter a period of alienation from the West during the 
period between 1960 and 1980.  
 
3.3 Conclusion: Dominance of a Lockean Culture and Realpolitik Thinking 
 
 
As discussed in the theoretical framework Wendt suggests three main distinct forms of 
cultures of anarchy, namely Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian. The logic of Hobbesian 
culture is “war of all against all” resulting states considering each other as enemies and 
not accepting the right of existence of others. The violent method of survival makes war 
endemic. Wendt points out that the state system was mainly dominated by Hobbesian 
anarchy until the seventeenth century. The second type of anarchy culture is Lockean 
culture, in which states see each other rivals with restraint. However, in contrast to 
Hobbesian culture, the states accept the other states’ existential right and elimination of 
other states is not the main object. Wendt suggests that after the peace of Westphalia in 
1648 Lockean culture has become the main feature of the modern state system.305 
According to Wendt there are three influential factors in the adaptation of cultural 
norms by actors: force, price and legitimacy which are a reflection of the “three 
different degrees to which a norm can be internalized and thus as generating three 
different pathways by which the same structure can be produced.306  Consequently 
Wendt concludes that a culture can be internalized in three different degrees. 
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Considered in this context, one may clearly argue that the foreign relations of the 
Ottoman Empire, which is the predecessor to modern the Turkish state, had been mainly 
shaped by a Hobbesian culture of anarchy during early centuries of its history. In a 
Hobbesian culture “kill or be killed” is the prevailing logic, states do not accept the 
other states’ existential rights and elimination of other states is the main object. As 
discussed above, the Ottomans inherited the spirit of “ghaza” (holy war) from the 
former Turkic Seljuk Empire.  Apart from its complex political organization, the 
Ottoman Empire can be considered as a vast military organization that relied on 
territorial expansion by the expense of other states. One of the prominent historians of 
Ottomans, Halil Inalcik, points out the fact that for six centuries the Ottoman state’s 
existence had been shaped by the “ghaza” character307, which was demonstrated by 
Ottoman soldiers’ motto during the battle; “If I return I’ll be a ghazi, if I die a martyr.” 
308 Starting from its foundation back in the beginning of the 14th century, the Ottoman 
Empire steadily expanded its territories at the expense of other states. As mentioned 
before in its early centuries, the Ottoman Empire’s foreign policy was mostly motivated 
by its military offensive character. Thus it can be argued that during its first four 
centuries the Ottoman Empire had internalized the Hobbesian culture to the third 
degree.  As mentioned before, in the third degree actors comply with the norms because 
they consider them as legitimate. It is only in third degree that the state’s identity and 
interests are absolutely constituted by this culture of anarchy.  The process of 
internalization of Hobbesian culture from the first degree to the third degree in the 
Ottoman Empire will not be discussed here, hence it is the beyond the scope of this 
study. Yet it should be noted that the early history of the Ottoman Empire clearly 
demonstrates that it had internalized the Hobbesian culture to the third degree.  
 
Yet, the Ottoman Empire gradually lost its military superiority to the European powers, 
for which the second unsuccessful siege of Vienna in 1683 can be seen as a turning 
point.  Thus starting with this date, the Ottoman Empire had to adopt a defensive 
foreign and military strategy vis-à-vis the European powers.  After a long 18th century, 
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in which the Ottomans fought and lost many wars against the European powers 
resulting in the loss of its European territories in the Balkan Peninsula, the Ottoman 
state realized that its only chance was to deploy a status quo policy in order to preserve 
it territorial integrity. For this reason, the Ottoman Empire had built its foreign policy 
strategy around the tactic of playing one great power against another for survival. 
Gradually this strategy became one of the pillars of Ottoman diplomacy in the 19th 
century.  Consequently, the Ottoman Empire was accepted into the European state 
system in the 19th century and its territorial integrity and independence was been 
guaranteed by the European powers in the Paris Treaty of 1851.  
 
As described by Wendt, in the first degree of internalization of the cultures of anarchies 
“force” plays a substantial role and states comply with the Lockean norms just because 
of the coercive power of other states or material limitations.  In the Ottoman context it 
can be argued that starting from the 18th century, due to European military superiority, 
the Ottoman Empire had to embrace the Lockean values of the European state system 
and had to accept the existential rights of other states. The force factor has been the 
main reason for the Ottoman internalization of Lockean values to its first degree. The 
Ottoman Empire did not internalize the Lockean culture to further degrees. Therefore, 
whenever an opportunity arose, such as the First World War and the Balkan wars 
between 1912 and 1913, it did not hesitate to return to the revisionist policies of 
Hobbesian culture. In this regard Wendt also observes returns to Hobbesian culture in 
the last three centuries of the post Westphalian era, however, he argues that each time 
the revisionist states were confronted and prevented by the status quo powers. To sum 
up, one can argue that it was not until the establishment of the Turkish Republic that 
Turkey totally abandoned the Hobbesian culture of the Ottoman state.  
 
As discussed above, the modern Turkish State, the successor to the Ottoman Empire, 
had rejected the Ottoman Empire’s culture and history. The modern Turkish state 
attempted to create a totally new nation based on the principals of European civilization. 
Consequently with the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Turkey has abandoned 
the conquest oriented policy of Ottomans and accepted the existential rights of other 
states.   The founder of modern Turkey, Ataturk, who determined the basic principles of 
Turkish foreign policy, confirmed in a speech that Turkey will not follow a conquest 
oriented policy as the Ottoman Empire: “For us, there can be no question of the lust of 
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conquest... The political system which we regard as clear and fully realisable is 
national policy... I meant it in this sense: To work within our national boundaries for 
the real happiness and the welfare of the nation and the country by, above all, relying 
on our own strength in order to retain our existence. But not to lead the people to follow 
fictitious aims, of whatever nature, which could only bring them misfortune, and except 
from the civilised world civilised human treatment...”309  
 
This speech and the history of Turkish foreign policy as discussed above clearly 
demonstrate that Turkey has not followed a revisionist or irredentist foreign policy and 
accepted the right of existence of other states, which mainly places Turkey into Lockean 
culture. A prominent Turkish scholar also points out that Alexander Wendt’s theory of 
“culture of anarchies” may be of particular interest in the Turkish context, although he 
erroneously places Turkey in a Hobbesian culture.310  
 
As described by Wendt in the first degree of the internalization of the cultures of 
anarchies “force” plays a substantial role and states comply with the Lockean norms just 
because of the coercive power of other states or material limitations.  In the Turkish 
context it can be argued that the new Turkish Republic had rejected the Hobbesian 
culture of the Ottoman Empire and embraced the Lockean values because the post First 
World War power relations forced Turkey to do so. There are many factors in the 
acceptance of Lockean values by the newly founded Turkish state.  First of all, the 
founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, a realist politician, was well aware 
of the fact that it was no longer possible for a vountry like Turkey that was ruined in the 
First World War to continue with the conquest oriented policies of the Ottoman Empire. 
Consequently he denounced what he calls the adventurist nature of Ottoman policies 
and proclaimed his famous motto for Turkish foreign policy: “peace at home peace 
abroad”.  Secondly, Ataturk also realized that no non-western country was able to stop 
the advance of Western civilization.  Thus in his project of Westernization of Turkey it 
was imperative that Turkey had to embrace the values of Western countries.  All in all, 
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one may argue that starting from its establishment in 1923 the Turkish state had 
embraced the Lockean norms, in which the factor of force played the main role.  
 
Wendt points out that price is the main driving force behind the second degree of 
internalization of the culture of anarchies. In the second degree the actors adopt the 
norms because they believe it is in their self-interest, which makes their behavior 
towards the norms instrumental. The institution of sovereignty decreases security risks 
and makes cooperation between states for mutual benefits possible. Considering the 
history of Turkish foreign policy, one can argue that having internalized the Lockean 
culture to the first degree after the establishment of the Republic in 1923, Turkey also 
reached the second degree of internalization in a very short time for two reasons.  
Firstly, the Ottoman Empire’s experience in the internalization of Lockean values to the 
first degree in its last century had paved the way of the rapid acceptance of Lockean 
cultures values in republican Turkey. Secondly, the new Kemalist state ideology has 
also played a substantial role in this process.  The founder of the modern Turkish state, 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, was a convinced Westernist and strongly believed that the 
future of Turkey was within the Western culture and civilization. He envisaged adopting 
all Western values and an absolute integration of Turkey into the Western civilization. 
Ataturk’s practice of foreign policy and his commitment to the Westernization of 
Turkey has shaped the principals of the new Turkish state’s foreign policy, which 
confirms Turkey’s adherence to Lockean values:  
 
• Orientation towards the West; adoption of  Western values in the every 
aspect of life 
• International peace, derived from the “peace at home, peace abroad” axiom 
• Preservation of the status quo, rejection of revisionism and irredentism  
• Realism: realization of the country’s power limits and rejection of so called 
“Ottoman adventurism”  
• Legality, solving international issues by legal means, such as issues of the 
Straits and Mosul311 
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Wendt argues that in the third degree case, the states adopt the norms of Lockean 
culture just because they consider them legitimate and identify themselves with the 
norms. Wendt makes a distinction between interest and self-interest, and explains 
interest as follows: “our behaviour is still interested in the sense that we are motivated 
to obey the law, but we do not treat the law as merely an object to be used for our own 
benefit.” Therefore, in the third degree states follow status quo policies both at the level 
of behavior and interests.  In the Turkish context one may claim that the Turkish state 
had moved from the second degree to the third degree of internalization in the post 
Second World War era. Turkey’s membership to the UN and NATO can be considered 
as the milestones in the internalization of Lockean culture to the third degree. It is in 
this era that Turkey internalized Lockean values to the third degree. 
 
As discussed in the second chapter, the rationalists claim that the states’ interests and 
identities are given and are not influenced by the interaction between states. 
Accordingly, the only change occurs in the behavior of the states, which they modify 
according to their interests and incentives. On the contrary, constructivists argue that the 
identities and interests of the states are constructed in the process of interaction between 
states312. Wendt argues that a change in the culture and identities of states occurs via 
two mechanisms: natural selection and cultural selection. He further argues that natural 
selection, which is based on the survival of the strongest one, can only explain the 
emergence and dominance of the Hobbesian culture in the most part of human history; 
however it fails to explain the survival of small states in the Westphalian era.   
 
Wendt notes cultural selection can explain the transition the a Lockean culture, which 
has two mechanisms, i.e. imitation and social learning. The first mechanism shapes the 
identities and interests of states, “when actors adopt the self-understandings of those 
whom they perceive as successful.” both in material and status means.  Wendt notes that 
imitation may change a population’s characteristics within a single generation, whereas 
natural selection needs many generations for such a change. 313 Wendt notes that 
imitation plays a significant role in “the tendency of many Third worlds and former 
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communist states to adopt the institutional and ideological attributes of Western 
states”.314 Social learning constitutes the second mechanism of cultural selection, whose 
“basic idea is that identities and their corresponding interests are learned and then 
reinforced in response to how actors are treated by significant Others... actors come to 
see themselves as a reflection of how they think Others see or appraise them, in mirror 
of Others` representations of the Self”315     
 
In the Turkish case, as discussed previously, like many Third World countries the main 
motive behind the Kemalist identity’s Western orientation is the imitation of Western 
culture and civilization, which they perceive to be successful both in material means and 
status. As put forward by Wendt, the imitation of Western values imposed by Kemalist 
elites on Turkish society has transformed the Turkish state’s characteristics within a 
single generation from a Hobbesian culture to a Lockean culture.  The second 
mechanism, the social learning, has been also influential in this process, since Turkey 
gradually Turkey become a part of the Western alliance and institutions such as NATO, 
OECD and etc., through which Turkish  decision makers acquired new identity and 
preferences. As described in the previous section, international organizations such as 
NATO and OECD also plays a constructivist role in the identities and interests of the 
states.  
 
Apart from the mechanisms discussed above, some domestic factors have also played a 
substantial role in the evolution of the Turkish state’s identity and interests from a 
Hobbesian to a Lockean culture.  To begin with the Turkish state inherited the Ottoman 
bureaucratic elite, its institutions and political culture. First of all, the main strategy of 
the Ottoman Empire in its period of decline, i.e. playing one great power against another 
for survival and the preservation of status quo, was inherited by Turkish state. Secondly, 
another main feature of Turkish political culture called Sevres Phobia was also inherited 
from the Ottomans.  This phenomenon is responsible for Turkey’s deep skepticisms and 
cautiousness against other states’ intentions and the conviction that the external world is 
conspiring to weaken and divide Turkey. Thirdly, to a certain extent Turkey’s long 
troublesome relations with its neighbors such as Armenia and Greece can also be 
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considered as an Ottoman legacy in Turkish foreign policy.  Fourthly, the consistence of 
the perception of a Russian threat is also a direct result of the long-lasting conflict 
between Russia and the Ottoman Empire which caused thirteen Russo-Turkish wars. 
Fifthly, Turkey also had to take the responsibility of the religious and ethnic minority 
groups in the former Ottoman regions in Turkey’s neighboring countries, who 
considered the Turkey as their protector.  
 
Finally, the Turkish Army’s extraordinary role in Turkish political life may be also seen 
a legacy of the Ottoman Empire. Throughout the Turkish Republic’s history, the 
Turkish military considered itself as the guardian of Kemalist state principles, the 
guarantor of political stability and “the embodiment of the soul of the Turkish 
nation”.316 The result of this notion presented itself in the continuous intervention of the 
Turkish military into political life.  The Turkish Army’s extraordinary role weakened 
the role of Turkish governments and civil society in the foreign policy making process, 
which remained a privilege of the small Kemalist elite consisting of civil and military 
bureaucracy. The monopoly of Kemalist elites in the foreign policy making process led 
to another weakness of Turkish foreign policy, which is the lack of strategic thinking 
and theory. Consequently, no consistent alternative grand strategy to Kemalist foreign 
policy was developed until the end of the Cold War. Turkish decision makers have 
adopted a reaction oriented defensive and conservative policy, which almost constantly 
avoided taking any initiative. This policy manifested itself in Turkish diplomats’ and 
decision makers’ main feature, which is the preference of caution to daring action. 
 
Another main feature of Turkish state identity is the fact that Turkish society represents 
a torn country between East and West. This phenomenon, which is also called the 
“divided self”, has caused great problems in Turkish political life. Turkey’s unique 
geostrategic location had also its imprints on the threat perceptions of Turkish decision 
makers, who were extremely sensitive to developments in its neighboring regions and 
cautious towards international and regional changes in the balance of power.  
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Considering the history of Turkish foreign policy as discussed above, one can clearly 
argue that the Turkish state’s identity and its foreign and security policy-making culture 
has mainly been influenced by a Realpolitik view of international relations. The key 
Turkish decision makers perceived the international environment as anarchical, which 
required being militarily strong and ready to deploy hard power military force for win-
lose outcomes.317 National security was considered a vital issue, for which political and 
economic sacrifices could be made. As previously discussed in this chapter, Turkey’s 
Ottoman past and the Sevres syndrome also contributed the notion that Turkey is 
surrounded by enemy states and the Turks does not have any ally other then Turks.    
 
The history of Turkish foreign policy clearly demonstrates that Turkey has not followed 
a revisionist or irredentist foreign policy and accepted the right of existence of other 
states, which mainly places Turkey into a Lockean culture. However, Wendt notes that 
the political culture of a given country does not necessarily reflect the global system. 
Therefore, the states may live in a Kantian culture in their immediate neighborhood, but 
find themselves in a Lockean anarchy in the world system.318 It is a fact that Turkey is 
surrounded by Hobbesian anarchy in the Middle East, where the elimination of “Others” 
and “war of all against all” is the prevailing logic of anarchy. Thus it can be claimed 
that although Turkey has internalized Lockean culture in the third degree and 
recognized other states’ sovereignty and their right to exist, as a result of the Hobbesian 
nature of the Middle East, Turkey’s foreign policy has faced great challenges which 
might have caused a return to a Hobbesian culture in Turkey.  
 
All in all, one may argue that Turkey has internalized the Lockean culture to the third 
degree, which is based on the concept of rivalry rather than cooperation. As a result of 
this perception and Kemalist foreign policies preferences Turkey had isolated itself 
from its neighboring countries and regions, and followed a one sided foreign policy 
strategy, which aimed to integrate Turkey into the Western civilisation and its 
institutions. Turkey’s foreign policy making culture has been mainly shaped by 
Lockean values and a Realpolitik view of international relations. However the impact of 
this culture was particularly clear in Turkey’s relations in the 90s, when Turkey faced a 
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number of serious security threats from the Kurdish terrorist organization, PKK (Partiya 
Karkerên Kurdistan- Kurdistan Workers Party). This threat brought Turkey into 
constant conflict with its neighbors, namely Syria, Iraq and Iran, whom Turkey accused 
of providing support for the PKK.  At the same time, Turkey’s conflict with Greece and 
Cyprus reached its peak in 1995, when Turkey declared casus belli against Greek claims 
about Aegean territorial waters. Consequently, in this period Turkey was referred to as a 
coercive regional power, which was ready to deploy military force to achieve its foreign 
policy aims.  
 
In this context one may argue that Turkey’s foreign policy until the Helsinki Summit in 
1999 can be considered to be within a Lockean culture. The dominance of a Lockean 
culture based on rivalry started to change with the transition to a liberal economy in 
1980, long before the Helsinki Summit in 1999. In the era between 1980 and 1999 and 
afterwards, there are a number of domestic and external factors which paved the way for 
the Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy, which in return promoted the emergence 
of a Kantian culture based on friendship and cooperation in the Turkish foreign policy 
culture. The determinants and consequences of this transformation process will be 
discussed in the coming chapter in more detail.   
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4. A Holistic Analysis of the Transformation of the Turkish state’s 
Identity, Interests and Foreign Policy (1980-2012) 
 
The main hypothesis of this study is that Turkey’s foreign policy has been going 
through a fundamental transformation process since the end of the Cold War, which 
began with Turkey’s transition to a liberal economic system in 1980. Economic 
liberalization and many other factors opened Turkish society to the outside world and 
prepared the basis for the transformation of the Turkish state’s identity and interests, 
which in return reshaped its foreign policy making culture fundamentally. There are 
several external and internal factors influencing this transformation process, which can 
be summarized as follows:  
• Globalization,  
• The end of the Cold War and transformation of the geo-political and geostrategic 
position of Turkey.  
• The EU membership process: Europeanization and democratization,  
• The rise of counter elites and ideologies,  
• Economic liberalization and the rise of economic politics,  
• The rising role of civil society, i.e. NGOs, think tanks and public opinion, 
• The rise of the JDP,  
• A new grand strategy for Turkish foreign policy: “strategic depth”. 
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All these factors together contributed to the transformation of the Turkish state’s 
identity which in return reshaped Turkish foreign policy in the last three decades. As a 
result of this, Turkey obtained a multi-dimensional and balanced foreign policy strategy 
towards various regions and a Kantian culture started to emerge in Turkish foreign 
policy making after the Helsinki Summit decision to grant Turkey candidate status for 
EU membership in 1999. Therefore it can be argued that the JDP’s foreign policy since 
2002 is a reflection of the normalization and transformation of the Turkish state and 
society. This transformation started with economic liberalization in the 80s, accelerated 
with the end of the Cold War and reached its peak in the post Helsinki era with the 
emergence of a Kantian culture in Turkish foreign policy and with the implementation 
of a new foreign policy doctrine, i.e. “strategic depth”. Thus it can be claimed that the 
notion that the JDP’s foreign policy practice is just driven by its Islamic orientation may 
not be accurate. 
It is clear that the candidate status for the EU did not transform Turkey overnight and 
there must be some internal and external factors which facilitated this transformation. 
One can argue that the roots of this transformation can be traced back to 1980, when 
Turkey went a fundamental economic transformation, namely the transition to a liberal 
economic model, which in return affected Turkish foreign policy making and Turkish 
society radically. It is clear that Turkey was under the influence of a Lockean culture 
until as late as 1999.  However, starting from Turkey’s transition to a liberal economic 
model in 1980, which opened Turkey to the outside world transforming it radically, 
some internal and external factors facilitated the emergence of a Kantian culture in 
Turkish foreign policy. Thus it can be said that the emergence of a Kantian culture has 
depended on the interplay of several internal and external factors. Therefore this chapter 
will include the period between 1980 and 2012, and will analyze the determinants and 
the results of the transformation of Turkish foreign policy. The determinants will be 
analyzed under two main categories, namely external and internal factors.  As 
mentioned in the second chapter this study will adopt a holistic constructivist approach 
combining the two facets of international politics, namely internal and external, since 
this approach might be useful in order to achieve a better understanding of the forces 
behind the transformation of the Turkish state’s identity and interests. At the end of this 
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chapter the result of this transformation process, namely the emergence of a Kantian 
culture in Turkish foreign policy, will be discussed.  
 
4.1 External Factors:  
 
As discussed in the theoretical chapter, this study will adopt a holistic approach in order 
to analyze the transformation of Turkish foreign policy. This means this study will take 
external as well as internal factors into consideration. It seems appropriate to start with 
the external factors since the developments in the international arena have been one of 
the main driving forces behind the transformation of Turkish foreign policy.  
 
 4.1.1 Globalization 
 
One can argue that the process of globalization is the light driving force behind the 
drastic changes in Turkish society, which facilitated the transformation of Turkish 
foreign policy in the last three decades. As put forward by Held et al. globalization is 
“the cliché of our times”. Furthermore it is “the big idea which encompasses everything 
from global financial markets to the internet but which deliver little substantive insight 
into the contemporary human condition.”319  As can be clearly seen from this statement 
the concept of globalization is very controversial and ambiguous and therefore there is 
no widely accepted canonical definition of it.  Therefore “globalisation has come to 
mean a variety of rather different things to a range of different authors.”320  
Some scholars consider globalization as a new phenomenon limiting its scope to the 
post Cold War era or post World War II era, whereas others consider it as a long-term 
phenomenon. For instance Steger identifies “five historical periods that are separated 
from each other by significant accelerations in the pace of social exchanges as well as a 
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widening of their geographical scope.”321 Whether or not it is a new phenomenon does 
not change the fact that the contemporary world is facing globalization to a level that 
was not experienced in history.  
In IR theory the main discussion about globalization presents an ontological dispute 
between the state centrism of neo-realism and non-state centrism of neo-liberalism. 
Against the neo-realist assumptions which consider the state in the center of 
international relations, neo-liberals and globalization theories suggest that the nation 
state is no longer the principal actor in world politics. Accordingly the potential indices 
of globalization can be summarized as follows: 
• “Cross-border flows of goods, investment and information 
• Trans-national processes of political deliberation and decision-making  
• Inter-dependence between states  
• The development of a world system whose dynamic and developmental 
trajectory is not reducible to the simple product of the units (states) which 
comprise it 
• The proliferation of problems to which global solutions are required 
• The development of institutions charged with responsibility for fashioning 
genuinely global public policy” 322 
 
Globalization has different dimensions such as economic-technological, political, 
cultural, and financial. However it has been used primarily as “a synonym for the effects 
and development of a neo-liberal global capitalist economy of the last five decades.” 323 
Therefore it should be noted that in essence globalization is an economic phenomenon 
as the evolution of the world economy is central to any reasonable account of 
globalization.  
The first dimension, economic-technological globalization, refers to the fact that “the 
global economy is now larger, more geographically extensive and produces more goods 
and service than at any previous point in the history.” As a result of the rise of 
multinational and transnational firms the semi-skilled manufacturing jobs have moved 
to developing countries. The emergence of transnational firms created a globalized 
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world economy. Furthermore “with new forms of information and communication 
technologies, and mirrored by global financial integration, the global productive 
economy has moved beyond the scale of nation states and even regional trading blocs” 
The second dimension is political which refers to the increasing power of transnational 
corporations, global financial integration and supranational institutions such as the 
World Bank and IMF, resulting in a decline in the nation states’ sovereignty. It is 
argued that the Westphalian state system is not able to deal with these changes. The 
third dimension, cultural globalization, focuses on the question of whether or not 
cultural globalization is contributing to the emergence of a homogeneous global culture, 
which is mostly associated with Americanization.  The last dimension refers to the 
proliferation of global problems such as climate change to which global solutions are 
required.324 
Considering the vast literature about this topic it is clear that it is beyond the scope of 
this study to cover all the discussions and literature around the nature, extent and 
consequences of globalization.  However this does not necessarily mean that the 
consequences of globalization should not be taken into account in a foreign policy 
analysis since “it would be truly extraordinary if the momentous changes in the way 
ordinary people live throughout the world did not have some impact both on 
international relations and the theories we develop to understand these relations.“325 
Thus this study will consider globalization and its consequences at its most general level 
in order to achieve a better understanding of the transformation of Turkish foreign 
policy in the last three decades.  
According to Jones, in a broader sense “globalisation can be defined as the growing 
interconnectedness and interrelatedness of all aspects of society”.326 Held et al. 
developed a more detailed and general definition of globalization. Accordingly 
“globalisation is a process (or set of process) that embodies a transformation in the 
spatial organisation of social relations and transactions, generating trans-continental 
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or inter-regional flows and networks of activity, interaction and power.”327 As can be 
clearly seen from these definitions the core issue in globalization is the increasing 
relations in every dimension of contemporary life or in Anthony Giddens’ words “the 
intensification of worldwide social relations”.328 In the context of constructivism the 
increasing relations between societies and states is also important since it claims that the 
interaction between states may change the identity and interests of the actors which in 
return may create a new culture of anarchy. In this regard globalism, as in its broader 
sense, has been playing a significant role in the intensification of Turkey’s relations 
with the outside world, which in return has affected and changed the Turkish state’s 
identity and interests in the last three decades.   
It is clear that like any other country Turkey has been strongly affected by the process of 
globalization. Considering the strategic geopolitical location of Turkey as discussed in 
the previous chapter (see 3.1.6) one may also claim that the impact of the globalization 
on Turkey has been more than on other countries in the third world. One can also argue 
that Turkey’s transition to a liberal economic model in 1980 and the integration of the 
Turkish economy into the world and capitalist economy was a direct result of the 
globalization process. Alıcı and Ucal summarized the effect of globalization on Turkish 
economy as follows:   
“Globalization has started to show its effects on Turkish economy in the form of 
structural adjustments and legislative regulations in early 1980s, especially after the 
January 24th decisions. In this context, transition to free market economy, opening to 
foreign markets, export-led growth, reducing the weight of public sector in the 
economy, privatization, liberalization of the financial system, facilitating to enter the 
banking sector, developing non-banking financial institutions, utilization of flexible 
interest and exchange rates, lifting restrictions in foreign currency and free flow of 
capital or at least alleviating these restrictions, allowing those living in Turkey to open 
foreign exchange accounts (FX deposits), establishing a capital market, re-organizing 
the body of Istanbul Stock Exchange and activating it, encouraging both foreign and 
local investments, funding public expenses heavily with debt due to loss of public 
revenue because of tax incentives and discounts could be regarded as the effects of 
globalization over economy.”329  
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Before 1980 Turkey implemented an economic model based on import substitution and 
Turkey was a “closed society” as a result of these economic policies. However the 
adoption of an export oriented growth policy and the impact of globalization 
transformed Turkey in three decades into an “open society.” As mentioned before, this 
transformation had direct consequences on Turkish foreign policy, introducing the 
obtainment of necessary foreign direct investment and the finding of new foreign 
markets for Turkish exports to the Turkish Foreign Ministry agenda. The need for fresh 
markets for Turkish exports forced Turkey to improve its relations with the Eastern bloc 
and Middle Eastern countries in addition to the existing European markets.  
Although there are different indicators for the effects of the globalization stretching 
from abstract indicators to more material ones, this study will take into consideration 
the most significant and material ones.  For instance, over the period of 1981 to 2011 
there was a staggering increase in Turkey’s exports, which rose more than thirty-
threefold from $ 4 billion330 in 1981 to $ 134 billion331 in 2010. Another significant rise 
was in the number of tourists visiting Turkey. Foreign tourist arrivals increased in 
Turkey between 1980 and 2007 nearly twenty fivefold from 1.2 million to 27 million, 
which made Turkey a top-10 destination in the world.332 One of the important indicators 
of globalization is the percentage of Internet users in a country. Although Turkey was 
far behind the developed countries in the beginning of the 21th century, it has shown a 
rapid growth in this era in the last decade. The percentage of the population using 
Internet in Turkey has risen from %3.76 in 2000 to % 34.8 in 2008.333 Furthermore in 
the last two decades pipeline projects such as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC), Nabucco, 
Blue Stream and etc. carried Turkey to the midst of the energy transport routes between 
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east and west, north and south. Its strategic location as an energy bridge between 
various regions has also strengthened Turkey’s political power.  
Lastly, as mentioned above, another significant symbol of globalization is multinational 
and transnational firms moving semi-skilled jobs to developing countries. In the last 
three decades a considerable amount of multinational and transnational firms, such as 
Ford, Toyota etc., invested in Turkey transporting their semi-skilled manufacturing 
facilities to Turkish soil. Foreign direct investment in Turkey has flourished in the last 
three decades reaching 21.000334 foreign firms investing in Turkey today.  
All of the numbers mentioned above indicate an increase in Turkey’s relations with the 
outside world in every dimension of contemporary life. This in return transformed the 
Turkish state’s identity and interests producing a more open and liberal culture, which is 
substantial for the emergence of a Kantian culture in Turkey. As mentioned before, 
globalization has different dimensions such as economic-technological, political, 
cultural, and financial, which have been affecting and transforming Turkish society in 
the last three decades. It is clear that it is beyond the scope of this study to cover all the 
dimensions and consequences of globalization in Turkey. However, in order to better 
understand the bigger picture of the transformation of Turkish foreign policy the general 
consequences of globalization should be taken into consideration. 
 
4.1.2 The End of the Cold War and Transformation of the Geopolitical and 
Geostrategic Position 
 
Another important factor in the transformation of Turkish foreign policy is the end of 
the Cold War. It is a fact that the Cold War and Turkey’s membership in the NATO 
increased Turkey’s strategic value for Western countries. As a result of this, Turkey 
enjoyed a considerable amount of foreign financial and military aid throughout the Cold 
War. However, Cold War power relations also posed lots of limitations for Turkey’s 
foreign policy options alienating Turkey from most of its neighbors. Makovsky 
summarizes characteristics of Turkish foreign policy until the end of the Cold War as 
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follows: “Throughout the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy was typically insular and 
passive, encapsulated by Turkish diplomats with the saying attributed to Kemal Atatürk 
"peace at home, peace abroad." Turkey focused its energy on internal development and 
sought to avoid foreign tensions that could divert it from that goal... It remained neutral 
during almost all of World War II, joining the allied side only in the war's waning days 
with the outcome already decided. Almost from birth, Turkey sought to avoid conflict 
with the Soviet Union --only Stalin's post-World War II claims on Turkish territory 
drove Turkey into alliance with the West-- and to demonstrate to its neighbors in former 
Ottoman Middle Eastern and Balkan territories that it had left its imperial past behind. 
In the first decades of its existence, Turkey had little interest in its Middle Eastern 
neighbours, neither to woo, nor antagonize. For the Turkish republic, the Arab world 
represented the backward ways Turkey itself hoped to shed. Later, when states like 
Syria and Iraq aligned themselves with the Soviet Union, Ankara had all the more 
reason to avert clashes”.335 
The end of the Cold War meant the opening of vast opportunities and challenges for 
Turkish foreign policy. It is no exaggeration to say that outside of the Soviet Union 
Turkey was one of the most affected countries by the end of the Cold War as this 
process transformed Turkey’s strategic position significantly.336 Hale notes that this 
transformation changed “Turkey’s international environment as profoundly as either of 
two previous transformations, of 1918-1923 and 1945.”337  In the Cold War Turkey was 
a barrier to the Soviet threat in NATO’s southern flank contributing to Western 
Europe’s security. Its strategic value was limited to this role in the Western bloc. 
However, with the end of the Cold War “The game that Turkey played for 45 years 
ended and was replaced by a new game, the rules of which were not yet known”.338 
Thus it can be said that initially Turkey did not welcome this drastic systemic change, 
because Turkey developed all its Cold War foreign and security policies according to its 
strategic importance in the Western alliance against the Soviet threat.  
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Furthermore, the Europeans started to discuss the necessity of NATO, which was 
thought to have lost its raison d'être after the dismantlement of the Soviet Union. 
However, the developments in the post Cold War era such as the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism and the “War on Terror” have shown that Turkey’s geopolitical 
importance for the West has not been diminished. On the contrary, it can be claimed 
that has Turkey acquired a much more important role for the Western world.339 In this 
regard Calleya notes that:  
“contrary to the prediction of some pundits that Turkey’s strategic importance would 
wane as a result of the end of the Cold War, Turkey’s strategic star has been constantly 
rising. Its geographic location between Europe and the Middle East has ensured that 
Turkey plays a pivotal role in the unfolding relationship among the United States, 
Europe, and Europe’s Middle Eastern neighbours. Turkey’s role in the 1990 – 91 Gulf 
War re-established its position as an essential component in the Western security 
alliance at precisely the time when the end of the Cold War forebode that Turkey could 
become a less significant player in the European region. Turkey’s geostrategic 
credentials were again in the limelight when it decided to adopt a somewhat 
obstructionist attitude during the American war against Iraq in 2003, with Turkey 
denying the United States access to Turkish bases in the run-up to the war.”340  
 
In this regard former Turkish Foreign Minister (1997-2001) Ismail Cem described 
Turkey’s foreign policy vision in the post Cold War era as follows: “We envisage an 
international mission that is no longer peripheral and confined to the outskirts of 
Europe. Our mission envisions a pivotal role in the emerging Eurasian reality.”341 
As mentioned already, the end of the Cold War was a mixed blessing for Turkey. On 
the one hand, because of the power vacuum in Turkey’s surrounding regions the 
number of security threats to Turkey increased significantly. As a result, Turkey found 
itself in the middle of 13 potential threat producing regions as described by NATO in 
the post Cold War era. During the 90s Turkey faced ethnic and religious conflicts in its 
immediate regions, stretching from conflicts in the Balkans, such as Bosnia and 
Kosovo, to conflicts in the Caucasus, such as Chechnya, Abkhazia and Nagorno-
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Karabakh. Traditionally, Turkey has always sought to stay away from regional 
conflicts. However the growing public pressure forced Turkey to take a side and follow 
an active policy in these conflicts.342   
Although the end of the Cold War indicated a decline in security challenges leading to a 
decreasing role for armies and declining defense spending for some countries, this was 
not the case for Turkey. Turkey’s defense expenditures doubled in the period between 
1985 and 1995.343 Furthermore, as discussed in the previous chapter, the Turkish Army 
has always played a substantial role in Turkish political life. In the 80s this was not 
much visible, as the decisions of Özal did not clash with the Army’s preferences. 
However in the 90s the role and the influence of the Army in Turkish foreign and 
domestic politics became visible. There were several factors in the rising influence of 
the Army.  Parallel to external security challenges, Turkey witnessed the rise of political 
Islam leading to the Islamist Welfare Party’s election victory in 1995. Additionally, 
Turkey witnessed increasing terror attacks from the secessionist Kurdish terror 
organization, PKK, which equated to a civil war.  At the same time Turkey’s increasing 
participation in NATO and UN international missions enabled the Army to increase its 
influence in the decision making process. The Turkish Army’s role in the increasing 
Turkish-Israeli cooperation, in the S-300 Missile Crisis with Greece and Cyprus and the 
threatening of Syria with war for the expulsion of PKK’s leader Öcalan from Syria can 
be regarded as examples of the increasing influence of the Turkish Army in Turkish 
foreign policy in the 90s. 344 In this regard, in the 90s, Turkish-Israeli relations 
increasingly became a symbolic battle ground between Islamists and secularists. 
Altunisik claims that the Turkish Army used Turkish-Israeli relations as an example to 
demonstrate to the Islamist party government led by Erbakan (1996-1997) its power 
limitations in foreign policy.345  
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All of these external and internal security challenges led to a securitization of Turkish 
foreign policy in the 90s, which continued until the EU Helsinki Summit decision to 
grant Turkey candidacy status in 1999, leading to the Europeanization of Turkish 
foreign policy. 
Apart from these negative consequences, this systemic change also opened a vast area to 
Turkey’s influence extending from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall in China.  Turkey 
realized that it could extend its influence in new Caucasian, Balkan and Central Asian 
countries using its common cultural, religious and linguistic bonds. In this regard 
former Turkish Foreign Minister (1997-2002) Ismail Cem points out that “This strategic 
change corresponds with a new consciousness in Turkey. The role of a shared history 
and of parallel cultural characteristics is highlighted and put into practice in all 
spheres of our foreign policy. It is worth noting that there are twenty-six countries with 
which we have shared a common history, a common state and a common fate for 
centuries. This background provides for strong economic relationships and a unique 
platform for political cooperation. In this vast socio-political geography, Turkey has the 
optimal conditions and the required assets to become a provider of peace, stability and 
welfare, and to enjoy the opportunities presented by the new “Eurasian Order.”346  
Despite these ambitious plans Turkey could only realize its vision to a small extent as a 
result of its limited economic and human resources and lack of strategic planning in the 
90s. 347 Furthermore, Turkey’s static and cautious foreign bureaucracy was not prepared 
for these massive changes and had difficulties in adapting to the new international 
environment and its requirements.348 
Makovsky finds a new activist trend in Turkish foreign policy starting from Turkey’s 
involvement in the Gulf War, contrary to Turkey’s cautious defensive foreign policy in 
the past decades. In the 90’s Turkey attempted to acquire a more active foreign policy 
by initiating and participating in several regional organizations. The formation of the 
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Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC) by Turkey’s initiation can be 
seen as an example of this new active foreign policy approach. There are several 
reasons for Turkey’s new activism in the international arena: “more prosperity; a 
better-equipped and more experienced military; the decline of neighbouring states; 
greater regional opportunity; and a greater sense of policy independence marked by the 
ending of restraints imposed by the Cold War.”349 
Turkish foreign policy in the 90s can be analyzed in three phases. The first phase is 
dominated by President Turgut Özal’s personality and leadership until 1991. Özal’s 
foreign policy style led to dismantlement in the institutionalized foreign policy decision 
making process. In the second phase between 1991 and 1994 the role of the president 
declined and the cooperation between Foreign Minister Cetin and the foreign ministry 
bureaucracy resulted in a relatively stable period in the decision making process. This 
period was marked with an increasing role for institutions and a decreasing role for 
leaders and personalities in the formation of Turkish foreign policy. However, in the 
third phase between 1994 and 1997, a fragmented and competitive approach dominated 
the Turkish foreign policy process as political instability and weak coalition 
governments led to a high turnover of foreign ministers, which in return increased the 
role of the Turkish Army in the formation of Turkish foreign policy.350 After 1997 
Ismail Cem served as foreign minister for five years, which brought more stability for 
Turkish foreign policy. The continuity in the post of foreign minister for five years and 
Cem’s mild personal approach were influential in the relative stability of Turkish 
foreign policy during this period despite the changes in governments and the economic 
crisis.351 
Cem claims that his period differed from conventional Turkish foreign policy as a result 
of his “realist” approach. He argues that during his period Turkey attempted to improve 
its relations with several regions using cultural and historical bonds. Accordingly, he 
notes five factors that supported his policies: 
                                                            
349 Makovsky, Alan (1999); The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy: Turkey's Role in the 
Twenty-First Century, p. 95. 
350 Robins, Philip (2003); Suits and uniforms: Turkish foreign policy since the Cold War, Univ. 
of Washington Press, Seattle, pp. 53.61 
351 Özcan, Mesut (2008); Harmonizing foreign policy, Turkey, the EU and the Middle East, p. 
97. 
 138 
 
• A redefinition of Turkish identity as a meeting point between East and West 
• The benefits of being an Asian and European country at the same time 
• Turkey’s significant economic development potential  
• Turkey’s contributions to peace and stability in a region of instabilities and 
challenges 
• Being a model for other Muslim countries as a secular and democratic 
country352 
 
Apart from these developments it should be mentioned that the main cornerstones of 
Turkish foreign policy, namely its orientation towards West, remained unchanged in the 
post Cold War period.  Turkey continued to apply its conventional foreign policy 
principles, which were discussed in the previous chapter, in its relations with the newly 
independent states, whilst evaluating new challenges and opportunities for its foreign 
policy options. Calis concludes that Turkish foreign policy showed continuity with its 
conventional foreign policy principles in the 90s.  Thus during this period there was no 
evidence proving that Turkish decision makers attempted to change the basic principle 
of Turkish foreign policy rather than responding to the challenges within the traditional 
approach.353 However this does not mean that nothing changed in this period. Above all, 
as a result of the transformation of the geopolitical position of Turkey, new vast regions 
entered into Turkish foreign policy agenda and Turkey started to follow a more 
multidimensional and active foreign policy approach towards its surrounding regions. 
 
4.1.3 The EU Membership Process: Europeanization and Democratization 
   
Among the external factors contributing to the transformation of Turkish foreign policy 
and Turkish society, Turkey’s relations with the EU can be seen as the most important 
one. The impact of the European Union on its member and candidate states’ domestic 
political structures is referred to as Europeanization. This process is one of the main 
driving forces behind the emergence of a Kantian culture in Turkish foreign policy. It is 
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clear that EU membership or even prospects of it leads to significant domestic changes 
in the subject states and in their foreign policies. 
Turkey’s relations with the European Union started five decades ago when Turkey 
applied for associate membership to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 
1959. As discussed in the theoretical framework, Wendt argues that imitation 
constitutes one of the mechanisms of cultural selection, which shapes the identities and 
interests of the states.  It plays a significant role in “the tendency of many Third worlds 
and former communist states to adopt the institutional and ideological attributes of 
Western states”. 354 In the formation of Kemalist identity the imitation of Western 
countries and its values also played a substantial role since they perceived the West and 
Europe as successful both in material and status means, which should be imitated and 
adopted in order to become more successful. Therefore Kemalist elites have always 
considered being a part of Europe and Western civilization as their ultimate goal. The 
following statement of the founder of the modern Turkish Republic, i.e. Kemal Atatürk, 
poses a remarkable example of the logic behind the Kemalist identity. “The west always 
been prejudiced against the Turks... but we Turks have always consistently moved 
towards west... In order to be a civilized nation, there is no alternative”355  
As a result of this notion, membership to the EU and other Western institutions, such as 
NATO, OECD etc., has been considered by the Kemalist elite as part of Turkey’s three 
centuries long history of modernization and Westernization process, which has been 
perceived as the only option for Turkey. “In the post Second World War period, 
predominantly from the early 1960s onward, eventual membership into the EU has been 
interpreted as a necessary counterpart, motivating Turkey toward Westernization and 
modernization, which has been proclaimed as official state ideology.”356 That is why 
despite its considerable amount of troubles Turkey never gave up its hope to become a 
part of the European Union and its predecessor institutions during the last five decades.  
Despite this long running relationship one can claim that the EU and its predecessor 
institutions exerted only limited influence on Turkish political life until the late 
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1990s,357 because the Kemalist elites were reluctant to make the necessary political 
reforms required for EU membership, as this could undermine their status in the Turkish 
political system. Additionally, Turkey’s relations with Europe were strained because of 
the human rights abuses in Turkey following the 1980 military coup. Despite this 
troubled relationship neither the EU nor the Kemalist elites in Turkey were ready to 
break the relations totally because of the high price involved. As a result of this, they 
played a game which did not produce any results in terms of Turkey’s accession to the 
EU until 1999. Although Turkey had applied for EU membership as early as in 1987 
and entered the EU customs union in 1996, the EU did not declare Turkey as a 
candidate country but referred to it as eligible for membership at its Luxemburg Summit 
in 1997. The Luxemburg Summit pointed out that “Turkey did not meet the standards 
for candidacy, and offered instead a European Strategy based on the exploitation of the 
integration prospects foreseen under the existing contractual relationships.”358 This 
rejection was considered discrimination in Turkey, to which Turkey responded by 
freezing its political dialogue with the EU, threatening to remove its application for 
membership and annex the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to Turkey. The danger 
and high costs of an alienation of Turkey from Europe forced the EU to grant Turkey 
candidate status in its Helsinki Summit in 1999. From many aspects the Helsinki 
decision can be seen a turning point in the long democratization process of Turkey 
which started with a vast political and economic reform process, which in one decade 
transformed Turkey radically. 
As discussed in the theoretical chapter, conditionality and power asymmetry are the 
main features of the relations between the EU and a candidate country. EU as an 
international institution has compulsory power on its candidate countries. Compulsory 
power is in effect when one actor can unilaterally force another actor to accept certain 
policies. The EU exerts compulsory power because of its normative values and the 
material advantages stemming from prospective membership. The asymmetric relation 
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between the candidate country and the EU makes the candidate countries more 
vulnerable and open to pressures from the EU to adapt to EU norms, since it forces the 
candidate countries to adopt certain policies and reform their domestic institutions to 
reach European standards. Therefore the nature of the relations between the EU and the 
candidate countries shows a top-down rather than a bottom-up interaction, which should 
be kept in mind throughout the analysis of the effects of the European Union on Turkish 
political culture and structures.  
It is a fact that the Turkey-EU relationship is two sided. Each side has its own 
preferences and motives for Turkey’s membership in the EU.  As discussed above, in 
the Turkish context the imitation of Western countries and institutions should be seen as 
the basic factor in Turkey’s bid for EU membership since the elites in Turkey have 
always perceived the West as a model. Thus it can be concluded that the desire to 
become a European/Western country is the main motive behind Turkey’s elites’ 
continuous bid for EU membership. Another important factor in Turkey’s desire for an 
EU membership was Turkey’s notoriously bad economic performance until the 
beginning of the new millennium.  Turkey suffered four economic crises between 1994 
and 2001, which made the Turkish economy very fragile. Thus the business community 
also pushed forward for EU membership, since they “increasingly viewed the EU 
anchor as a means to consolidate the kind of economic environment conducive to their 
long-term interests, fearing that the economic reform process itself could easily be 
reversed in the absence of EU membership prospects”359 
As discussed in the theoretical chapter the EU affects a candidate country through 
several mechanisms such as adaptations through membership and the socialization of 
decision makers. Based on this framework, firstly the adaptations through EU 
membership should be analyzed. Secondly, the socialization of decision makers and its 
impact on Turkish foreign policy will be elaborated on. Finally, the foreign policy 
changes on concrete issues such as Cyprus, Greece and Armenia will be analyzed. 
As a result of EU conditionality, adaptations through membership lead to significant 
legal changes in candidate countries.  As a candidate country Turkey has had to adapt its 
institutions and political structures to EU standards in order to become a member state. 
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First of all, Turkey had to meet the EU Copenhagen political criteria in order to start 
accession negotiations with the EU.  Accordingly any country wishing to enter the EU 
has to fulfill following criteria: “stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights and respect for protection of minorities; a functioning market 
economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces in the EU; and 
the capacity to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the 
objectives of political, economic and monetary union and the adoption of the acquis and 
its effective implementation through appropriate administrative and judicial 
structures.”360  
As mentioned in the theoretical chapter the transformation depends on the political 
culture and goodness of fit of the member states.  In order to meet the Copenhagen 
criteria Turkey has had to implement wide ranging political reforms. Considering the 
history of democratization in Turkey, one can argue that it is a very slow, painful and 
fragile process, which always requires pressure and incentives from the outside. 
Between 1987 and 2004 the Turkish Constitution was amended 8 times in order to 
change the 1982 Constitution imposed by military rule. Additionally, the Turkish 
parliament also accepted nine harmonization packages between 2002 and 2004 in order 
to meet the Copenhagen political criteria.361 As a result of these legal changes the 
European council concluded that Turkey had met the political criteria and accession 
negotiations started on 3 October 2005.362  It is no exaggeration to claim that this was a 
breakthrough in the history of Turkish-EU relations as well as in Turkish modernization 
history. Furthermore, it is clear that Turkey would not be able to make these radical 
reforms without the prospect of an EU membership since this was the main driving 
force behind the Turkish reforms. However the farthest-reaching constitutional 
amendment came after 5 years of EU accession negotiations. In order to bring the 
Turkish Constitution in compliance with EU standards 26 articles of the Constitution 
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were amended with a referendum in October 2010. It is clear that it is beyond the scope 
of this study to mention all of these legal changes in detail. However the changes which 
affected the Turkish foreign policy process should be mentioned.   
As discussed in the previous chapter the Turkish Army has always played a substantial 
role in Turkish political life. In the post Helsinki era the removal of military supremacy 
over civilian rule was the one of the main issues in Turkey in order to reach the 
Copenhagen criteria. The Army exerted its influence mainly by the NSC. As mentioned 
in the previous chapter, the legal changes regarding the composition and structure of the 
NSC resulted in a decrease of military influence in the foreign policy process. (S. 
Chapter 3.1.5) Kirisci draws attention to the “erosion of the influence that traditional 
central players in foreign policymaking, such as the military and civilian hardliners, 
have enjoyed.” As a result of the political reforms the “elected officials are today more 
likely to have their views and interests taken into consideration then was the case in the 
past. Furthermore, public opinion and civil society have been able to make their voice 
heard on foreign policy issues.”363 
 
EU also exerts influence on Turkish political culture and institutions via socialization 
and the social learning of decision makers. As discussed in the theoretical chapter, 
socialization or social learning is also an important factor in Wendt’s concept of cultural 
selection, which forms the identities and interests of states.  Social learning is “a 
process whereby actors, through interaction with broader institutional context, acquire 
new interests and preferences.” 364 Wendt says that instead of the rationalists’ “simple 
learning” model, which claims that social learning only affects the behaviors of states, 
constructivist theories drew attention to “complex learning” which argues that social 
learning may also affect identities and interests of states. He summarizes his point as 
follows: “the basic idea is that identities and their corresponding interests are learned 
and then reinforced in response to how actors are treated by significant Others. This is 
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known as the principle of ``reflected appraisals'' or ``mirroring'' because it 
hypothesizes that actors come to see themselves as a reflection of how they think Others 
see or ``appraise'' them, in the ``mirror'' of Others' representations of the Self. If the 
Other treats the Self as though she were an enemy, then by the principle of reflected 
appraisals she is likely to internalize that belief in her own role identity vis-a-vis the 
Other.” 365 
In the Turkish context the socialization of decision makers also plays a substantial role 
in the transformation of Turkish foreign policy. The increasing contact between Turkish 
and EU officials in the troika meetings, summit diplomacy and accession negotiations 
contribute to the “socialization of decision makers around the concepts of common 
reflexes and norms of behaviours and thinking”. This process may positively influence 
Turkish officials’ thinking of “Others” and may help Turkey to overcome the impact of 
historical fears such as Sevres Phobia. This increasing contact does not only include the 
military and the foreign ministry bureaucracy but also affects all levels of Turkish 
bureaucracy, such as the Ministry of the Treasury, Transportation, Health and etc.  
Furthermore, NGOs and interest groups are also involved in this process as a result of 
increasing low politics issues such as organized crime, illegal migration and human 
trafficking. Thus the identities and norms of Turkish bureaucrats from different state 
institutions as well as Turkish NGOs are increasingly affected by their European 
counterparts. 366 This interaction may have led to a change in the mindset of Turkish 
decision makers, which might have helped them to internalize the common values of the 
European Union. In this regard Kirisci demonstrates in his study367 in the examples of 
Turkey’s policies towards Cyprus, Greece and Armenia that “Turkish Foreign policy 
mindset is becoming much more open to cooperation, dialogue and the notion of win-
win outcomes to international conflicts.” Thus, as a result of socialization, Turkish 
decision makers are increasingly turning away from considering international relations 
from a zero-sum game perspective and embracing a win-win approach.368     
 
                                                            
365 Wendt, Alexander (2009); Social Theory of International Politics, p.327. 
366 Özcan, Mesut (2008); Harmonizing foreign policy, Turkey, the EU and the Middle East, pp. 
150-151. 
367 Kirişçi, Kemal (2006): Turkey's foreign policy in turbulent times, p. 18, 51. 
368 Ibid: p. 51. 
 145 
 
One of the staggering examples of the socialization of Turkish decision makers is the 
attitude of Hilmi Özkök, the Chief of Staff, towards EU reforms. Some scholars argue 
that in the military’s acceptance of its loss of power during the EU reforms the Chief of 
Staff Hilmi Özkök’s personality played a substantial role. They argue that because he 
had spent most of his career in NATO postings, where he became familiar with the 
ideals of liberal democracies, he decided not to intervene into political life as in the 
Western democracies.369 Furthermore, during his tenure he also prevented two coup 
d’état attempts planned by some of his peers. The notion that Özkök’s personality was 
influential in the Turkish Army’s non-involvement in Turkish political life during his 
tenure seems to be accurate because of the attitude of his successors in Turkish political 
life. Under the command of his successor (Yaşar Büyükanıt) the Turkish Army 
intervened in the presidential elections in 2007.  
 
The foreign policies of the member states are less affected by Europeanization in 
contrast to other areas because the integration to the CSFP in the EU is still relatively 
weak and it has not replaced national foreign policies. As mentioned in the theoretical 
chapter, in the context of the CSFP the required legal changes for candidate countries 
are limited. They are expected to adopt the acquis politique. This means that they have 
to harmonize their national foreign policies with the positions of the member states 
within the framework of the CFSP. They are expected not to do unexpected things such 
as attacking their neighbors, to resolve their border problems peacefully and to have 
good relations with their neighbor countries. It is argued that, as a result of the 
intergovernmental nature of the CFSP, Europeanization in the foreign policies of 
candidate countries is much more voluntary and non-hierarchical. 
In this context Turkey has to resolve its border problems peacefully, show restraint in its 
policies and improve its relations with neighboring countries and harmonize Turkish 
foreign policy with the positions of the member states within the framework of the 
CFSP. It is this area, in which the most concrete examples of the Europeanization of 
Turkish foreign policy can be observed. Therefore, the changes of Turkish foreign 
policy towards Turkey’s deep rooted issues such as Cyprus and Greece should be 
analyzed.   
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The Turkish-Greek rapprochement in the last decade can be considered as one of the 
most obvious results of Europeanization in Turkish foreign policy making. After 
decades of rivalry and border disputes, which brought two countries to the brink of a 
war on two uninhabited islets in the Aegean Sea, Turkish-Greek Relations started to 
improve starting from 1999. It is argued that without the prospect of an EU membership 
this kind of improvement would not have taken place. The following developments in 
Turkish-Greek relations were mentioned as the indicators of this rapprochement: “the 
increased level of official visits between the two countries, ongoing ‘exploratory talks’ 
between foreign ministries, the building of direct links between the armed forces of the 
two countries, the removal of landmines along the border, the reduction of military 
exercises and the exchange of information about them, as well as the inauguration of a 
natural gas pipeline project in July 2005. The positive trend at the official level has 
been accompanied by positive statistics in inter-societal and trade relations, indicating 
a deepening of the relationship, despite the unresolved underlying disputes regarding 
the territorial waters, airspace and continental shelf in the Aegean.”370 In a nutshell, 
there is a consensus among scholars that the main reason in the change of Turkey’s 
policies towards Greece was the conditionality of the EU.371  
EU conditionality was also the main driving force behind the major transformation in 
Turkey’s Cyprus policy. For decades Turkey was involved in fruitless negotiations in 
Cyprus aimed to consolidate the status quo on the island. In 2004, Turkey replaced this 
foreign policy with an active, solution oriented policy, which built on a win-win 
approach.  Turkey campaigned in the Turkish side of the island for the acceptance of the 
Annan Plan, which aimed for the unification of the Island.  In many aspects it was a 
breakthrough in Turkish foreign policy since “Turkish policy on Cyprus has evolved 
from a more nationalist and confrontationist stance to one that accommodates options 
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open to dialogue, cooperation, win–win solutions, activism and multilateralism.”372 It is 
clear that in both cases Europeanization explains the major changes in Turkish foreign 
policy through conditionality. 
To sum up, the EU has been a major factor in the democratization and Europeanization 
of Turkish foreign policy making, transforming its mindset radically. In this context the 
Helsinki Summit decision to grant Turkey candidate status was a turning point. In the 
post Helsinki era the EU has exerted enormous influence on Turkish institutions and 
decision makers through adaptations forced by conditionality and the socialization of 
decision makers. Consequently, the legal changes required by the EU led to a loss of the 
Turkish Army’s influence in the formulation of foreign and security policy. Above all, 
the wide ranging EU reforms brought Turkey closer to European values and its foreign 
policy closer to a Kantian culture. As a result of this “Turkey’s political and economic 
relations with the countries within its vicinity have been improved through an active, 
cooperative and constructive policy; using diplomacy and trade rather than coercion 
and pressure. Dialogue and a ‘win–win’ attitude have been mentioned frequently. In 
regional conflicts, rather than taking sides, Turkey has been adopting a balanced 
hands-off approach, coupled with mediation efforts and a role of trustworthy regional 
stabilizer. In other words, Turkey has moved to become a ‘benign regional power’, 
rather than a post-Cold War warrior.”373 
4.2 Domestic Factors:        
 
It is clear that beyond the transformation of Turkish foreign policy there are also 
domestic forces, which facilitated and supported this process. The aim of this section is 
to provide a comprehensive analysis of these internal factors. 
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4.2.1 The Transition to a Liberal Economic System and the Rise of Economic 
Politics  
 
It might sound odd to claim that a military coup facilitated the emergence of a liberal 
culture in Turkey.374 However, beside its human rights abuses and its authoritarian rule, 
the military regime introduced a liberal economic system in Turkey in 1980, which in 
turn contributed to the embedment of liberal values in Turkish state and society. 
Consequently, in the past three decades the free market economy and its values settled 
into Turkish society producing an export oriented business elite and a more liberal 
political atmosphere.  
The conflict between the leftist and rightist ideological camps led to a radicalization of 
Turkish youth in the 70s with armed clashes, which in return gave the Army the pretext 
to intervene into Turkish political life directly on 12th September 1980.  It was not until 
the clashes in the street reached their peak, and started to resemble a civil war, that the 
Turkish Army intervened. There are also indications of an indirect American 
involvement through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Turkey’s second direct 
military coup.  
It is important to note that, unlike the other coups in the past, this time the Turkish 
General Staff was determined to reshape Turkish society fundamentally. Thus the army 
seized power completely and remained in power for three years. Before reintroducing 
civilian rule in 1983 the military imposed a new constitution in 1982, which despite 
major changes is still in force today.  The TGS was reluctant to give complete freedom 
to civil governments, which resulted in an army controlled system through a number of 
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institutional and informal mechanisms. Although the influence of the military was 
increased in the foreign policy making process, which was granted by the new 
constitution, it was not visible until the middle of the 90s, when an Islamist party came 
to power and attempted to change the foreign policy course drastically.375   
The three year military rule and the slow return to democracy afterwards had its 
influence and consequences for Turkish foreign policy as well. The military rule in 
Turkey and its human rights abuses created tensions between Turkey and the European 
community. The Western European countries attempted to apply pressure on Turkey to 
improve its human rights records and its democracy. Because of Turkey’s desire to 
become a part of Western European culture, Turkey was susceptible and responsive to 
pressures from European countries.  However, because of Turkey’s growing 
geopolitical importance due to American strategic interests in the Middle East after the 
Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980, the US was not 
interested in human rights issues in Turkey.376 Thus, after almost two decades of 
deteriorating relations, the US and Turkey started to improve their relations 
significantly. At the same time, in order to overcome European criticism, the military 
regime in Turkey attempted to improve relations with Islamic countries, in which the 
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sympathetic attitudes of Middle Eastern countries towards the military regime played a 
significant role.377           
 
Apart from these developments, Turkey went through a fundamental economic 
transformation process in this period, which in return affected Turkish foreign policy 
radically.  Instead of the economic model based on import substitution, which was 
implemented in the past, Turkey began to implement an economic policy based on 
export oriented growth.  From a rigid, centralized economy, the Turkish economy 
transformed towards a free market system.  As a result of this policy, the influence of 
the business community on foreign policy issues started to increase. The liberal 
economy was introduced to Turkey with the economic program of 24 January in 1980. 
This program required considerable amount of net foreign currency inflow into the 
Turkish economy. This included securing foreign loans, foreign direct investment and 
increasing Turkey’s exports.   
The economic liberalization led to staggering changes in Turkish economy and society. 
Laciner summarizes the economic boom in the 80s as follows: “the Turkish economy 
grew at an annual rate of over 5 %, the highest among the OECD countries. The 
volume of Turkish exports rose from $ 2,910 million in 1980 to over $ 20 billion in the 
1990s, with an annual increase of 15,6 %; a staggering 350 % increase in 10 years. 
Moreover, the share of industrial products in Turkish exports rose from 41,1 % to 84 % 
in 1990. Now only 14 % of the exports were agricultural. Likewise, imports rose from $ 
7,909 million in 1980 to $ 22.5 billion in 1990 (a 182% increase) while tourism leaped 
from a marginal industry to a major earner of foreign currency with a increase from 
$212 million in 1980 to about $3 billion in 1990”.378  It should be noted that because of 
the underground economy in Turkey the real figures may be even higher than the 
official statistics. Turkish economy in the 80s is described as a miracle economy and a 
young tiger. Furthermore, this radical economic boom also led to radical changes in 
Turkish society. Before this transition the Turkish economy had been controlled 
exclusively by a handful bureaucrats and state sponsored businessmen. However with 
the transition to a liberal economic model “the periphery, villagers, workers and 
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traditional religious groups entered the economy, and as a result, strengthened their 
autonomy against the core, namely the bureaucracy, the military and the state-created 
industry” 379 
The integration of the Turkish economy into world and capitalist economy was the 
result of this transformation process. Thus, obtaining the necessary foreign direct 
investment and finding new foreign markets for Turkish exports entered into the 
Turkish foreign ministry agenda. Accordingly economic issues became an important 
factor for Turkish foreign policy making. The need for fresh markets for Turkish 
exports forced Turkey to improve its relations with the Eastern bloc, Central Asia and 
the Middle East.380  With the growing economic interdependence and increasing export 
figures, Turkish businessmen started to impose their own agenda on the Turkish state, 
manipulating its foreign policy according to their own interests.    
 
4.2.2 The Rise of Counter Elites and Identities 
 
As discussed in the theoretical chapter, constructivism highlights the significant and 
equal role of norms, material structures and identity in the formation of political 
decisions.381 It suggests that identities shape interests of the states which in return 
influence their policies. Constructivists drew attention to actors’ social identities as 
“identities are the basis of interests.”382 The constructivist school does not dismiss the 
notion that actors are self-interested however it suggests that this does not provide a 
sufficient explanation until “we understand how actors define their selves and how this 
informs their interests.”383  
Constructivism argues that national identities are constructed by external as well as 
internal interactions. As put forward by Kösebalan “National identity does not emerge 
                                                            
379 Ibid.; p. 164. 
380 Aydin, Mustafa (2004); Turkish foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis, pp. 53-54. 
381 Reus-Smit, Christian; Constructivism; in: Burchill, Scott et. al. (2009); Theories of 
International Relations, p. 212. 
382 Wendt, Alexander (1992); Anarchy is what states make of it, p. 398. 
383 Reus-Smit, Christian; Constructivism, in: Burchill, Scott et. al. (2009); Theories of 
International Relations, p. 221. 
 152 
 
only out of state-to state interactions in international system, but rather from a clash of 
competing interpretations of such interactions at the domestic level.”384  Domestically, 
the identities and interests of states are often shaped by the clash between the dominant 
and non-hegemonic subnational identities. Therefore, it is not accurate to assume that 
only dominant identities shape and influence the policies of states since perceptions of 
politically weak actors might be deeply rooted in society and therefore may survive 
throughout time and continue to exert their influence on policy debates. 385 It is a fact 
that identities are not fixed and are subject to change over time. Furthermore, as a result 
of the clashes between different identities new elites may emerge in a society 
transforming the identity of the state. This new identity in return may result in the 
redefinition of the interests and policies of the state. 
In the Turkish context it can be said that, throughout the history of the Turkish Republic 
its foreign policy has mainly been shaped by the Kemalist identity. The main elements 
of this identity are the rejection of the Islamic culture together with Turkey’s Ottoman 
past and the radical secularization of the Turkish society and the state. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, this Kemalist project caused a split in Turkish society which 
divided Turkish society into two main camps. Consequently many scholars labeled 
Turkey as a torn country since the majority of its population was bound to Islamic 
culture and values whereas its Kemalist elites identified themselves with Western 
values. Until the last decade, Turkey’s Kemalist elite, consisting of civil and military 
bureaucracy, had absolute power in the state apparatus and in the formation of Turkish 
foreign policy. As a result of their admiration and orientation to the West, these elites 
alienated Turkey from its neighbors and surrounding regions since they believed that 
showing interest to the Middle East, Central Asia or Africa represents 
“backwardness”.386 As mentioned previously, the lack of strategic thinking and 
alternative strategies for Turkish foreign policy was the result of this phenomenon since 
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“admiration and application of Western model in Turkey has led Turkish intellectuals 
not to think about any alternative to the West in foreign policy.”387   
 
However, starting from 1980s, the Kemalist elite faced a legitimization and identity 
crisis because their Westernization project failed as a result of “the negative effects of 
the top-down implementation of secularism by the secularist elite and the positive 
effects of neoliberal economic policies as well as relentless efforts towards 
democratisation.” in Turkish society.388 The transition to a liberal economic model 
integrated the Turkish economy into the global economy and rapid urbanization brought 
conservative masses into cities. Additionally “the expansion of higher education, mass 
media, and communications and the development of a very substantial bourgeoisie”389 
facilitated the rise of alternative identities in Turkey. To sum up, in one decade Turkey 
witnessed “a total revolution of the social texture from top to bottom” which allowed 
many “repressed, disadvantaged or relatively deprived groups”390 to begin to articulate 
their political views more freely than ever before.  In this regard Kasaba’s evaluations 
are noteworthy: 
“During the early decades of twentieth century, the tired and defeated people of 
Anatolia were in no position to debate or resist Ataturk’s radical message. Some were 
even enthusiastic in supporting the national leader in his determination to remake the 
Turkish state. By the 1980s, the situation had changed completely. The Turkish people, 
few of whom now remembered the early years of the republic, had grown extremely 
suspicious of, and downright cynical about, the latest incarnations of the promises of 
‘enlightened and prosperous tomorrows.’ Instead of making further sacrifices for a 
future that kept eluding them, they were starting to inquire about the histories, 
institutions, beliefs, identities, and cultures from which they had been forcefully 
separated. This reorientation of the social compass spread to all segments of the 
society, not only affecting people’s political outlook but also influencing the way they 
dressed, which music they created and listened to, how they built their houses and office 
buildings, and how they thought about the history of modern Turkey...The nature and 
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contents of these debates and conflicts show that as a monolithic force that tried to 
mould Turkish society and mentality, Kemalism is losing its grip”391  
 
Externally, the end of the Cold War forced Turkey to face its historical, cultural and 
religious legacy in its surrounding regions, which increasingly challenged the Kemalist 
ideology and identity. The conflicts involving Muslims in the Balkans and Caucasus 
and the emergence of independent Turkic speaking states in Central Asia reminded 
Turkey of its long forgotten historical responsibilities. Thus “no matter how hard 
Turkey tried to escape from its imperial legacy, it has always come back to haunt it.”392 
This transformation in Turkey’s surrounding regions also triggered the articulation of 
different foreign policy perceptions stemming from different ideologies and identities in 
Turkey, which were suppressed from the very beginning of the Republic throughout the 
single party rule and the Cold War era.  
Starting from 1980, Yavuz observes “a profound change in the composition of the 
Turkish elite as a result of domestic transformations,” and draws attention to the 
“several competing perceptions of "self" and of "others" to inform perceptions of 
national interests on the part of the nation's elite.”393 The articulation of different 
foreign policy orientations and interests is the result of this process.  Fuller argues that  
“Growing democratisation inside Turkey affects public participation in foreign policy 
more than ever before, including articulation of interests by private Turkish business 
interests, Islamic-oriented politicians interested in ties with Muslim world,... broad 
public opinion that is sympathetic for “Turkish brothers” around the world, and a 
handful of leftists who find value in Turkey´s closer association with Third World 
nations than with Western “imperialist” states.”394 
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As stated above, domestically, Kemalist identity was challenged by various ideologies 
such as Islamism, Turkish and Kurdish nationalism. While the rising Kurdish 
nationalism and the terrorist activities of the PKK in the 90s provoked an increase of 
Turkish nationalism,395 the Islamist challenge also made the Army’s role in Turkish 
political life visible since the Turkish Army perceives itself as the guardian of the 
Republic. President Özal’s396 neo-Ottomanism was a response to these challenges, as it 
attempted to include different identities in the Turkish national identity, which was 
narrowly defined by the Kemalist elites and had therefore excluded the different 
identities in the past.397 It should be noted that these ideologies and identities were not a 
new phenomenon in Turkey since their origins can be found back in the 19th century 
when the Ottoman Empire faced substantial identity crises. As discussed previously, the 
last quarter of the 19th century witnessed a long debate among the Ottoman intellectuals 
to find a new identity for the declining Ottoman Empire.  These intellectuals gathered 
around four political movements, namely Ottomanism, Islamism, Turkism and 
Westernism.  
As stated previously, Westernism constitutes the foundation of Kemalist identity, which 
was the only dominant ideology in the Republic’s history until the end of the Cold War.  
However, the post Cold War era witnessed a revival of the other three ideologies with 
major modifications. Some scholars398 add conservatism to these three ideologies as 
well. Thus, considering their support in Turkish society, one can detect four influential 
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alternative ideologies in contemporary Turkey, namely Islamism, neo-Ottomanism, 
conservatism and Turkism, which have distinctive foreign policy perspectives. To say 
that does not necessarily mean that there is no overlap between these ideologies. In 
some areas they share common foreign policy goals with different motives, in other 
areas they do not agree. For instance, although both Islamism and Turkism favor 
developing relations with the Central Asian states, they differentiate in their motives 
since Islamism aims to unite all Muslims, whereas Turkism’s goal is to unite all Turks. 
In the coming pages the stance of these identities towards Turkey’s foreign policy will 
be examined.  
 
4.2.2.1 Turkism  
 
Turkism or Turkish nationalism prefers “a model of Turkish nationalism beyond the 
Kemalist territorial nationalism and favours cooperation with Turkic people abroad.” 
In the rise of Turkish nationalism there are external and internal factors. Externally, the 
emergence of independent Turkic states in Central Asia and the problems of Turkish 
speaking communities in the Balkans promoted the old pan-Turkist ideas in Turkey. 
Internally, the terrorist activities of the PKK and separatist Kurdish nationalism also 
provoked the rise of Turkish nationalism in Turkey. Turkish nationalism is suspicious 
about the intent of the EU and its required reforms in Turkey. They also favor military 
solutions for Turkey’s Kurdish issue and support interventionist policies regarding the 
northern Iraq based Kurdish terrorist organization PKK.  Turkism highlights ethnic 
nationalist values in Turkey. The main pioneer of this movement in Turkey is the 
Nationalist Action Party (NAP).  Although the NAP accepts Turkey’s goal of EU 
membership it is highly suspicious about the intent of the EU and its required 
democratization reforms in Turkey. Thus it has shown immense opposition to EU 
reforms during its participation to the coalition government between 1999 and 2002. 399  
NAP favors the idea of developing economic, cultural and social relations with Turkic 
speaking countries in Central Asia. It aims to establish a “Ministry of the Turkish 
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World” within the Turkish government and a market union among the Turkic speaking 
countries. 400 
 
4.2.2.2 Neo-Ottomanism 
 
It can be said that neo-Ottomanism emerged as a response to the identity crisis Turkey 
faced in the post Cold War era. Before going into detail about neo-Ottomanism one 
should remember its origin, namely Ottomanism. As discussed in the third chapter, 
Ottomanism was also a response to the identity crisis the Ottoman Empire faced in its 
last century. It aimed to build a new national identity for the multi ethnic Ottoman 
Empire around the concept of an Ottoman Nation.  Accordingly, regardless of their 
religious-ethnic origin everyone living in the Ottoman state would be equal in rights and 
duties.401 It was an attempt to build a new concept of Ottoman identity and citizenship 
compatible with the rising European values at that time.402 However, as a result of the 
increasing separatist nationalist movements among the Ottoman Empire’s different 
subjects this project failed at the beginning of the 20th century. 
After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the secular Turkish 
Republic, Kemalist elites turned away from the Ottoman legacy and did not show any 
interest in maintaining ties with former Ottoman regions. This isolationism was a result 
of the preferences of Kemalist ideology and the restrictions imposed by Cold War 
power relations. After nearly one century, the rise of conservative elites and the end of 
the Cold War triggered the emergence of neo-Ottomanist ideas under the leadership of 
Turgut Özal in Turkey.  
In a nutshell, neo-Ottomanism favors Turkey’s reconciliation with its Ottoman legacy 
and the improvement of its economic and cultural ties with the former Ottoman regions. 
It also attempts to include different ethnic and sectarian identities such as the Kurds and 
Alevites into the Turkish national identity, since the Turkish national identity has been 
narrowly defined by Kemalist elites excluding these different identities. Contrary to 
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what its name reveals, neo-Ottomanism does not envisage building a new empire and 
pursuing an irredentist or expansionist foreign policy. However, this movement favors 
expanding Turkey’s soft power by improving Turkey’s economic and cultural relations 
with countries that have emerged out of the Ottoman Empire. Yavuz summarizes the 
concept of neo-Ottomanism as follows: “Neo-Ottomanism, for the neo-Ottomanists, 
however, is not an imperialist ideology. Rather, neo-Ottomanism calls for (1) the 
rearticulation of Turkish nationalism and increased political and cultural tolerance for 
diversity as in the Ottoman past; (2) the elimination of economic borders among the 
Balkan, Caucasian, and Middle Eastern countries; and (3) respect for the political 
borders of neighbouring countries. Neo-Ottomanism does not aim to eliminate state 
boundaries nor seek a resurrection of an unified Ottoman super-state but rather to 
create a new sense of a macro-identity among populations that share the Ottoman 
Islamic heritage.”403 
It should be noted that Özal’s neo-Ottomanism was not a fully developed doctrine and 
had a pragmatic approach towards Turkish foreign policy. It is argued that Özal’s neo-
Ottomanism was a journalistic endeavor rather than a clear concept developed by 
academics.404 Thus it can be argued that after Özal’s tenure neo-Ottomanism stayed as a 
light figure and exerted only a limited influence on Turkish foreign policy until the JDP 
came to power in 2002. In this regard in 1998 Yavuz concluded that neo-Ottomanism 
“has yet to develop into a fully coherent doctrine or set of ideas firmly endorsed by 
policy makers”. He also predicted that “it is more likely that one will see a more 
pronounced "Islamically" shaped neo-Ottomanist foreign policy in the future.”405 
As predicted by Yavuz, one can observe a strong neo-Ottomanist tendency in Turkish 
foreign policy in the last decade.  In this context it is argued that Davutoglu’s “strategic 
depth” doctrine represents the handbook or manifesto of neo-Ottomanism and JDP’s 
foreign policy under Davutoglu’s influence has been mainly shaped by his neo-
Ottomanist vision. In his influential book i.e. Strategic Depth, like other neo-
Ottomanists Davutoglu argues that Turkey has to reconcile with its Ottoman legacy and 
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improve of its economic and cultural ties with the former Ottoman regions.406 In an 
interview, Davutoglu notes that Turkey is not a classical nation state, and because of its 
imperial past it has historical duties and cannot isolate itself from its surrounding 
regions.407 In another interview he has argued that "as much as we don't use this 
conceptualization, the fact that it is being used against us is either because of 
misunderstanding or lack of goodwill. I have said that Turkey as a nation-state is equal 
with any other nation-state of our region whether it is small in population or area. We 
don't have any hegemony on anyone. Rather what we are trying to do is to contribute to 
the establishment of a permanent peace in our region. If by order they mean is Pax 
Ottomana, Pax in the meaning of order, we are trying to establish am order, it is not 
wrong to say such thing".408 
As can be clearly seen from the statement above, despite their clear neo-Ottomanist 
ideas, Davutoglu and other prominent JDP figures have always avoided describing their 
foreign policy vision as neo-Ottomanist because of the negative connotations of this 
term. In this regard they claim that they do not envisage building a new Ottoman 
Empire and pursuing an irredentist or expansionist foreign policy. Considering 10 years 
of JDP praxis in Turkish foreign policy one may claim that their understanding of neo-
Ottomanism is to expand Turkey’s soft power by improving Turkey’s economic and 
cultural relations with countries that have emerged out of the Ottoman Empire. 
 
4.2.2.3 Islamism 
 
The Milli Görüs (National View) represents the main leading movement of political 
Islam in Turkey. A former member of this movement, Altan Tan, argues that the idea of 
Milli Görüs is based on four main principles: “First of all, it is based on the idea of 
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ümmet (Muslim community), “but in this ümmet Turks are the bosses.”... Secondly, it is 
nationalist when it comes to the issues concerning Turkey. Third, it promotes statism in 
the economical sense; and, finally, it has always been very careful and respectful of the 
military.”409 Islam, and moral and spiritual values represent the essence of the Milli 
Görüs movement. Other goals of the Milli Görüs movement, “such as industrialization, 
closer ties with other Muslim countries, just economic order, or the establishment of a 
Greater Turkey”410, constitute the sub-ideas of this holistic ideology.  
The first party of the Milli Görüs movement, National Order Party (NOP), was 
established in 1970 under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, which was closed down 
in 1971 on the grounds that its anti-secular actions violated the Constitution. Its 
successor, the National Salvation Party (NSP), gained 11.8% of votes and 48 seats in 
the Turkish Parliament in the 1973 general elections. For the first time in the Republic’s 
history Islamists entered the government forming a coalition government with the RPP 
in 1974. Despite this success, during their tenure the Islamists were not influential in the 
formation of foreign policy as this area was controlled exclusively by the secularist 
Kemalist elite at the time. NSP was also closed down after the military coup of 1980 
and was succeeded by the Welfare Party in 1983.  Despite their continuous and well 
organized efforts the Islamists were not able to mobilize Turkish society around their 
ideology until the end of the Cold War.  
With the end of the Cold War identity issues entered the political arena, which triggered 
the rise of the Islamist movement in Turkey. In the 90s Turkey witnessed the continuous 
rise of the Islamist Welfare Party in domestic politics. Consequently in the 1996 
elections the WP became the largest party and Erbakan became the first Islamist Prime 
Minister of Turkey. Erbakan was keen to apply his Islamist agenda in Turkish foreign 
policy and followed a clear Islamist oriented foreign policy. For instance, during his 
tenure Erbakan made his first official visit to Iran and initiated the Developing 8 (D8) 
project with some Muslim countries. However, the military was determined to protect 
the secular principles of Turkey and forced Erbakan’s coalition government out of 
power with a well-organized campaign which was later described as a post-modern 
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coup because of its sophisticated methods. The Turkish judiciary followed suit and 
closed down the WP in 1998 banning its prominent leaders from political activities for 
five years for acting against the principle of secularism in the constitution. 
The WP was succeeded by the Virtue Party (VP) and its parliamentary group joined this 
instead. William notes that by 1999 in order to escape another closure the VP “had 
dropped the references to a Muslim Union and even accepted the project for Turkish 
Membership of the EU as the basic goal as well as the need to continue Turkey´s 
effective role within the NATO.”411 In this change a reformist group in the VP led by 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gül were influential. It is argued that “the post-
modern coup initiated a learning process among political islamists, with the latter 
realizing that a party not respecting secularism would have no chance of sustained and 
effective participation in the Turkish political system given its constitutional 
boundaries.”412 However, despite these signs of change in its Islamist rhetoric, the VP 
also could not escape from being shut down by the constitutional court in 2001 for 
being the center of anti-secular activities.  
Consequently the Islamists were divided into two main camps, traditionalists and 
reformists or innovators. After the closure of the VP by the constitutional court, Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan established the JDP together with the reformists of the VP and rejected 
the Islamist rhetoric stating that “JDP is not a political party with a religious axis.”413 
The JDP is labeled by its founders as a conservative democrat party which embraces 
Turkey’s EU membership bid and liberal economic values. The traditionalist hardliners 
continued the former Islamist rhetoric and established the FP (Felicity Part) in 2001, 
which has had a very limited influence in Turkish political life since then. 
In sum, Islamism favors a more active foreign policy and aims to increase relations with 
the Muslim world. For instance, as mentioned above, as soon as Erbakan, Turkey’s first 
Islamist prime minister came to power in 1996, he attempted to improve Turkey’s 
relations with Muslim countries such as Libya, Iran and Syria and initiated the D-8 
project.  Until the late 1990s the Islamist parties opposed the idea of becoming a 
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member of the EU and advocated a Muslim Union among Islamic states. Furthermore, 
the Islamists also took a clear negative stance against NATO calling for an Islamic 
NATO. Finally, the Islamists have a very strong anti-Israeli language calling for Turkey 
to cut all ties with Israel.   
4.2.2.4 Conservatism 
 
Defining the conservative identity in the formation of Turkish foreign policy is a very 
difficult task because “it did not appear as compact and autonomous identity but has 
been displayed as an attitude in several contexts.”414  Conservative parties entered into 
Turkish political life with the establishment of the DP and with the transition to a multi-
party system in 1946.  The successors of the DP such as the Justice Party (JP) the 
Motherland Party (MP) and the True Path Party (TPP) can be considered within this 
category. As will be discussed in the coming pages, to a certain extent Turkey’s ruling 
party, JDP, may be seen as a conservative party as well.   
Conservative identity does not have a clear cut doctrine and it shares some common 
principles with Islamist, nationalist and Kemalist identities. For instance, in the 90s the 
conservative parties such as MP and TPP supported Turkey’s bid for EU membership 
and at the same time they called for developing relations with Central Asian and Middle 
Eastern countries.415 Özcan notes that conservative identity “favours increasing 
contacts with the Turkic and Muslim groups in the neighboring regions of Turkey, but 
they are also not against to the EU membership as long as this membership is not 
against the culture and identity of the Turks.”416  Conservative parties such as the DP, 
JP and MP all promoted the idea of Turkey’s Europeanness and pursued a foreign 
policy in accordance with the Kemalist Westernization project. However, conservative 
parties favor a more liberal approach to Islamic values in Turkish society and do not 
support the Kemalists’ authoritarian Westernization project.   
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4.2.3 The Rise of the JDP: Conservative Democrats, Radical Islamists or Neo-
Ottomanists?  
 
Among the domestic factors that have exerted an essential influence on the 
transformation of the Turkish state’s identity and interests is the rise of the JDP and 
therefore it should be analyzed in more depth. It is clear that in the last decade the 
Justice and Development Party governments have been one of the main driving forces 
behind the transformation of Turkish foreign policy. Although it is a relatively new 
party in the Turkish political landscape, the JDP has radically transformed Turkish 
domestic politics as well as its foreign policy in the last 10 years. Compared to the 90s, 
which are described as the lost years of Turkey because of political instabilities and 
economic crises, in the last eight years Turkey has witnessed stable JDP majority 
governments. The JDP administration successfully made long needed necessary 
political and economic reforms which led to an unprecedented rapid growth of the 
Turkish economy and the increase of Turkey’s influence in the international arena.    
 
Although it was established just one year previously, in the first general elections it 
participated in, the JDP gained a stunning 34.29 % of the votes and 363 seats in the 550 
member Turkish unicameral parliament in November 3, 2002. All other well established 
parties except the Republican People’s Party failed to pass the 10 % threshold and 
stayed out of the Turkish parliament. The RPP won 19.38 % of the votes with 178 seats 
in the parliament.417 Many analysts described the JDP’s landslide election victory as a 
political earthquake418 or even a tsunami. As put forward by Özel, in the November 3 
elections  “Turkish voters had swept aside a whole cohort of established but corruption- 
tainted parties, possibly in defiance of the country’s politically powerful military, and 
opted instead for a group of self-avowed “Muslim Democrats””419  
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There are many reasons for the JPD’s unprecedented election victory in 2002. These 
reasons may be analyzed under two main categories, namely conjunctural factors and 
deep social transformations which gave birth to the JDP. Firstly the conjunctural 
factors, which paved the way for the rise of JDP, should be mentioned. Firstly, the 
Susurluk scandal in 1996 revealed the dirty relations between some state officials, 
politicians and members of the Turkish mafia, which made the “lawless dirty war that 
Turkey´s shadowy deep state had been waging against”420 Kurdish secessionist 
movement visible. This in return increased the Turkish public’s desire for “a clean 
society, a transparent state and accountable politicians”.  However the state apparatus 
and politicians did not show any interest for this demand and were not ready to make 
the necessary reforms. Secondly, the postmodern coup in 1997 against Turkey’s 
Islamist government resulted in a learning process among the reformist faction of 
Islamists who rejected radical views and embraced liberal values and Turkey’s EU 
membership bid. Islamists realized that in order to decrease the influence of the military 
the only option was the EU reforms. In this regard Dagi’s observations are noteworthy:  
 
 “In the wake of the February 28 process, however, the Islamists found themselves on 
the defensive against the power of the Kemalist-secularist establishment. Fantasies 
about Islamizing society and the state came to an end; some Islamists declared that the 
idea of an Islamic state had failed. Islamic elements in Turkey began questioning both 
the feasibility of Islam as a political project and the conformity of an Islamist political 
project to Islam itself. Islamic groups, noticing that the social and economic networks of 
Islam had been damaged most when “political Islam” was at its peak in the late 1990s, 
started to withdraw their support from Islamist political movements. Many in Islamic 
circles opted for a conservative-centrist approach that they expected to help them 
preserve Islamic social and economic networks. The idea of a “social” rather than 
“political” Islam gained ground. The way was opened for the transformation of 
political Islam and the emergence of the AKP. For the AKP leaders, it was clear that 
the rise of political Islam had been detrimental to Islam’s social and economic influence 
in Turkey. A new “conservative democratic” approach, they hoped, would offer a way 
out of the selfdefeating success that political Islam had experienced in the late 
1990s.”421 
 
Thirdly the tragic earthquake in 1999, which cost more than 30.000 people their lives, 
shook the trust of the status quo–oriented middle class towards their state since 
Turkey’s civil and military state apparatus totally failed and was incapable in the face of 
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such a devastating disaster. Consequently “the social contract between the state and 
this important segment of society was broken. Thenceforth the drive toward an 
accountable, transparent, and efficient government ruled by law would go forward on a 
stronger social basis than ever before.”422 Lastly the worse economic and financial 
crises that Turkey has witnessed in its history, which were just before the elections in 
2001, also mobilized electorates around the JDP, which they perceived a new and 
untested party.   
 
In a nutshell, all these conjunctural factors paved the way for a new party which called 
for further democratization, the EU membership, the rule of law, economic growth and 
anti-corruption measures and good governance. Özel concludes that “The net results of 
Susurluk, the coup, the quake, and the economic downturn have been surging pro-EU 
sentiment, a broad-based demand for further democratic reform, and fury directed at 
any and all institutions— no matter how previously sacrosanct—deemed responsible for 
the calamities of recent years.”423  
 
Apart from these conjunctural factors, a deep running social transformation in Turkish 
society may be considered as the main driving force behind the rapid rise of the JDP in 
Turkish political life. As mentioned previously, as a result of Turkey’s transition to a 
liberal economic model, a new conservative middle class that is religiously observant 
emerged in Turkey starting from the 80s.  This new class gradually challenged the old 
statist and protectionist economic structure which had been controlled exclusively by a 
handful bureaucrats and state sponsored businessmen represented by TÜSIAD 
(Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen). Consequently a new 
conservative middle class represented by MÜSIAD (Association of Independent 
Industrialists and Businessmen) began to replace the old secular traditional middle 
class. In this regard Insel’s observations are noteworthy:  
 
“The conservative cultural affinity between the traditional class of provincial artisans 
and traders on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the small- and midrange 
enterprisers who live mostly in midsize cities and some of whom are employer and 
employee simultaneously, and the young executives who have received university 
education, especially in technical fields, caused these groups to become united and to 
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constitute the nucleus of a new middle class. The great distance separating the 
traditional republican bourgeoisie from this new middle class, which is culturally 
conservative, politically nationalist and moderately authoritarian, economically liberal, 
or rather, on the side of free enterprise, became considerably more marked during the 
last period.).”424 
 
Turkey’s integration into the world economy and the customs union with the EU in 
1996 forced this new conservative middle class towards an export oriented growth 
strategy, which radically changed their perceptions of the EU and globalization. As a 
result of this deep running social transformation, “even farmers, small businesspeople, 
and less-skilled workers who once supported antiglobalization Islamist or nationalist 
parties now vote for the avowedly pro-market and pro-EU AKP.”425 According to many 
observers, this new middle class, also called the “Anatolian tigers”, represented by 
MÜSIAD and TUSKON (The Confederation of Turkish Businessman and 
Industrialists), may be considered as the main driving force behind the rise of the JDP in 
Turkish political life.  In the November 3 elections in 2002 the JDP took over the 
representation of this rising new middle class from other center right parties such as 
TPP and MP that lost almost all of their electoral support because of their inefficient 
policies in the 90s.    
 
The 10 year history of the JDP proves that it is not a temporary political party and has 
solid roots in Turkish society. In this regard it is noteworthy that the JDP’s success story 
continued in all elections in which it has participated to date. So in the 2004 local 
elections the JDP increased its votes to 42.18 % and in the 2007 general elections it won 
nearly half of the votes with a staggering 46.58 %.426  For the first time in its history 
JDP witnessed a slight decrease in its votes in the 2009 local elections, in which it won 
38.18 % of the votes.  However in 2010 the JDP amended 26 articles of the Turkish 
Constitution, which was put to a referendum on 12 September 2010. Despite the 
tremendous vote “no” campaign led by opposition parties the amendments were 
accepted with a 58 % “yes” vote.  Although the amendments were supported by other 
small groups and parties, it can be concluded that the JDP increased its popularity 
                                                            
424 Insel, Ahmet (2003); The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey, pp. 297-298. 
425 Özel, Soli (2003); Turkey at the Polls: After the Tsunami, p. 86. 
426 Ahmadov, Ramin (2008); Counter Transformations in the Center and Periphery of Turkish 
Society and the Rise of the Justice and Development Party, p. 15. 
 167 
 
among Turkish electorates because of the democratic nature of the amendments. Thus 
the general expectation was that the JDP most likely would hold its votes and majority 
in the parliament in the coming general elections in June 2011. This notion has been 
proven accurate in the June 2011 general elections, in which the JDP showed an 
unprecedented victory increasing its votes to %49.83.  This success made the JDP the 
only party in Turkish history that won three consecutive general elections with 
increasing its votes each time. 
As mentioned above, the JDP was established under the leadership of Erdogan in 2001 
by the reformist faction of Turkey’s Islamist movement after the closure of the VP by 
the constitutional court. It is argued that from the very beginning of the Milli Görüs 
movement it had internal problems and conflicts which did not cause a division until the 
closure of VP in 2001 by the constitutional court.  However, with the closure of the VP 
the reformist faction of the Milli Görüs movement established a new party and rejected 
the principles of their former ideology and declared that they took off the shirt of the 
Milli Görüs. Despite their Islamist background, the prominent figures of JDP such as 
Erdogan and Gül argue that they have changed their ideological views and label their 
party as conservative democrat. However, what many scholars points out is the fact that 
the JDP represents the coalition of different conservative and moderate Islamist groups 
and lacks a clear ideology because of the ambiguity of the concept of conservative 
democracy, which needs to be defined clearly.427 
 
In its party program the JDP rejects the use of religious symbols and values for political 
purposes and at the same time calls more religious freedom for pious people: “Our 
Party refuses to take advantage of sacred religious values and ethnicity and to use them 
for political purposes. It considers the attitudes and practices which disturb pious 
people, and which discriminate them due to their religious lives and preferences, as 
anti-democratic and in contradiction to human rights and freedoms. On the other hand, 
it is also unacceptable to make use of religion for political, economic and other 
interests, or to put pressure on people who think and live differently by using 
religion.”428 
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Many analysts such as Dagi429, Ahmadov430, Heper431, Hale432 and others accept this 
self-definition and label the JDP as a conservative or Muslim democrat party. For 
instance a prominent Turkish scholar Soli Özel defines the JDP as a conservative party 
and draws attention to Rustow’s studies about democratization, who suggests that “we 
should allow for the possibility that circumstances may force, trick, lure or cajole 
nondemocrats into democratic behaviour and that their beliefs may adjust in due course 
by some process of rationalization or adaptation.”433  
The 10 years of JDP rule in Turkey also confirm this claim, as the JDP has shown 
significant differences compared to hard line Islamists in terms of its foreign and 
economy policies. For instance, unlike the hardline Islamists who oppose an EU 
membership of Turkey, the JDP embraced Turkey’s EU membership goal and made the 
necessary political and economic reforms in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria since 
“the only way for this party to survive in power and endure is through a liberal 
transformation of the Turkish polity and its civilianization. This explains why the AKP’s 
drive for EU accession is genuine: It is a matter of enlightened self-interest, and the 
party clearly knows it.”434 Furthermore, in sharp contrast to Islamists who advocate 
statist economy policies and oppose privatizations, the JDP favors a free liberal market 
economy and implemented an unprecedented privatization program during its 8 year 
tenure. 
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Only a few controversial analysts accuse the JDP of having a hidden agenda and 
describe it as a radical Islamist party. Considering the 8 year JDP tenure in Turkey and 
its pro-EU stance it can be said that those who describe the JDP as a radical Islamist 
party, such as Bassam Tibi435 and Daniel Pipes,436 base their opinions on ideological 
prejudices and lack clear evidence for their claims. Wishful thinking might be the 
correct description for this sort of analysis.  
Although the JDP labels itself as conservative democrat some analysts also suggest that 
the JDP is following a neo-Ottomanist foreign policy agenda. Considering the 10 years 
of foreign policy praxis of the JDP it can be concluded that it represents a conservative 
democrat party with light neo-Ottomanist motives in its foreign policy. The JDP’s neo-
Ottomanism aims to increase Turkey’s soft power by improving Turkey’s economic and 
cultural relations with countries that emerged out of the Ottoman Empire. However, the 
prominent figures in the JDP always reject that they have a neo-Ottomanist vision since 
the term itself indicates an expansionist and imperialist foreign policy and therefore has 
negative connotations.  This does not change the fact that the JDP’s foreign policy 
praxis demonstrates features of a peaceful neo-Ottomanist vision. As the foreign policy 
of the JDP has mainly been shaped by Ahmet Davutoglu’s “strategic depth” doctrine, 
the impact of the neo-Ottomanist ideas in this doctrine and how it led to an emergence 
of Kantian culture in Turkish foreign policy will be analyzed in the next section in more 
depth.    
                                                            
435 For instance Tibi claims that “What the AKP seeks is……..a strategy for a creeping 
Islamization that culminates in a Shari‘a (Islamic law) state not compatible with a secular, 
democratic order.” Tibi, Bassam (2009); Islamists Approach Europe Turkey's Islamist Danger, 
Middle East Quarterly Winter 2009, p. 47 
436 Pipes, a well-known neo-con, claims that “Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan… 
plans to undo the secular Atatürk revolution of 1923-34 and replace it with the Shari'a. I 
predicted the leadership of his Justice and Development Party (known by its Turkish initials, 
AKP) will use the democratic process only so long as this serves its purpose. It will 
circumscribe, or even terminate, political participation when the right moment comes. The end 
result, I predicted, could be an "Islamic Republic of Turkey.” Pipes Daniel; Is Turkey going 
Islamist. Available at: http://www.danielpipes.org/2670/is-turkey-going-islamist (accessed on 
06.12.10, 19:06) 
 170 
 
 
 
4.2.4 A New Grand Strategy for Turkish Foreign Policy: The “Strategic Depth” 
Doctrine 
 
As discussed in the third chapter, one of the main weaknesses of Turkish foreign policy 
until the beginning of the new millennium was its lack of strategic thinking and theory. 
The official Kemalist ideology was unable to cope with the enormous systemic and 
social changes that took place after the end of the Cold War.  It was clear that Turkey 
needed a new grand strategy which took the new realities into consideration. With his 
book, Strategic Depth, published in 2001 it was Davutoglu who undertook the grand 
task of the reinterpretation of the Turkish geopolitical and geostrategic position, 
providing Turkish foreign policy with a fresh grand strategy. However, at that time 
Davutoglu was only an academic who had no influence in the decision making process 
of Turkish foreign policy. In this regard one should note that the JDP’s victory in the 
elections of 2002 was a major breakthrough which changed the course of events. 
Immediately after the new government was formed, Davutoglu was appointed as Chief 
Foreign Policy Advisor to the prime minister and began to implement his new grand 
strategy. 
It is a fact that since it came to power in 2002 the JDP has dramatically changed the 
political and economic landscape of Turkey. Today Turkey is a very different country to 
what it used to be one decade ago. Furthermore, it is also clear that Turkish foreign 
policy also has been dramatically affected by the JDP’s almost one decade of rule, 
which along with the other factors has triggered the transition to a Kantian culture. In 
the emergence of Kantian culture in Turkish foreign policy one should also examine the 
role of the “strategic depth” doctrine. The majority of analysts agree that the most 
important factor in the JDP’s foreign policy is the “strategic depth” doctrine developed 
by Prof. Dr. Ahmet Davutoglu. For instance, Walker states that “the implications of the 
strategic depth doctrine are manifest in all aspects of Turkey’s national security and 
foreign policy decisions”437 and it has gradually become hegemonic in Turkish foreign 
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policy in the last decade. 438  Along with the other internal and external factors analyzed 
in this chapter, this doctrine has played a significant role in the transformation of the 
Turkish state’s identity and its foreign policy making, which in return has also 
transformed how the Turkish state defines its interests.  Therefore this chapter analyzes 
the features of the “strategic depth” doctrine in depth and its role in the transformation 
of the Turkish state’s identity and interests, which led to an emergence of Kantian 
culture in Turkish foreign policy in the last decade.   
4.2.3.1. The Architect of the New Doctrine: Ahmet Davutoglu 
 
As mentioned above, there is consensus that Prof. Dr. Ahmet Davutoglu has been the 
intellectual architect and mastermind of the JDP’s foreign policy in the last decade. The 
foreign policy magazine has listed him among the "Top 100 Global Thinkers” in 2010 
and 2011.439 Mark Parris, former American ambassador to Turkey, has labeled him as 
Turkey’s Henry Kissinger.440 Looking into his biography one can claim that Davutoglu 
represents the elites of the new rising conservative class in Turkey.   He was born in the 
middle of Anatolia into a middle class family in 1959 in Konya. His family belongs to 
nomadic Turcoman tribes who migrated to Turkey from Central Asia centuries ago. 
After graduating from the renowned Istanbul Erkek Lisesi (High School), he studied 
Economics and Politics at the prestigious Bogazici University (former Robert College).  
He earned a master’s degree in Public Administration and a PhD degree in Political 
Science and International Relations at the same University.441 Davutoglu speaks 
German, English, Arabic and Bahasa Malaysia. In 1994 the American University Press 
published his doctoral thesis, which analyzed Western and Islamic political Theory, 
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with the title “Alternative Paradigms: The Impact of Islamic and Western 
Weltanschauungs on Political Theory.” 442 
He taught at the Marmara University between 1993 and 1999 where he became a full 
professor in 1999. He also taught in Malaysia and conducted research at the Cairo 
University for his PhD thesis. Furthermore, he worked at Beykent University in Istanbul 
as the chairman of the Department of International Relations. His postdoctoral 
publications include The Civilizational Transformation and The Muslim World, 
Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic Depth), and Küresel Bunalım (The Global Crisis). He has 
also published many articles which include critiques of the theories of Samuel 
Huntington (“Clash of Civilizations”) and Francis Fukuyama (“End of History”). 
Before the JDP came to power in 2002 and was even founded, Davutoglu published his 
signature book Stratejik Derinlik (“Strategic Depth - International Position of Turkey”) 
in 2001, in which he developed a grand strategy for Turkish Foreign policy in the post 
Cold War world. The book had reached 13 editions in its first year and brought 
Davutoglu national and international recognition. Consequently, even before the JDP 
came to power Davutoglu was asked by Turkish President Demirel to write a report 
about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and his Strategic Depth book became a handbook 
in the military academies.443  Currently in its 73th printing, the book has become a 
handbook for those who want to have a better understanding of Turkish foreign policy 
under the JDP’s almost one decade rule. This also explains why it has been translated to 
Arabic, Greek, Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian and Albanian. Davutoglu intended to write 
two other books in line with Strategic Depth, namely “Historical Depth” and 
“Philosophical Depth”. However when the JDP came to power in 2002 he was 
appointed as the chief advisor on foreign policy issues and was granted a title of 
ambassador in 2003, which put him away from his academic research. From 2002 until 
2009 he was the behind the scenes mastermind of a new assertive pro-active Turkish 
foreign policy. Finally, in 2009 Prime Minister Erdogan appointed him as the foreign 
minister of Turkey, a post which he holds up until today. 
Reading Strategic Depth one can clearly realize that Davutoglu is not an ordinary 
academic, who focuses only on one subject. He favors interdisciplinary research and 
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encourages his students to follow suit. Apart from his formal studies he is interested in 
philosophy, geography, geo-politics, literacy, sociology, history of civilizations and 
religions. During his educational life he read Western classics as well as Islamic 
classics. He refuses the Euro centrism in historical writing and, as his doctoral thesis 
title reveals, he suggests that in the analysis of history alternative paradigms and 
contribution of other civilizations should be taken into consideration.444   Therefore it is 
not surprising to see that the new grand strategy developed by Davutoglu aims to 
broaden Turkish foreign policy towards the regions such as the Middle East, Africa and 
Central Asia, which had been neglected during the most of the Republic’s history.  
 
 
4.2.3.2 Principals of the New Doctrine and Its Implementation 
 
According to Davutoglu his vision of “strategic depth” has five principals, which will 
be analyzed in the coming pages in detail in order to achieve a better picture of the 
“strategic depth” doctrine.  His principals for Turkish foreign policy can be summarized 
as follows:  
• Pivotal country: Turkey is a country with multiple identities in terms of 
geography and history, which cannot be reduced to one unified category. 
• Balance between security and democracy: In order to create an area of influence 
in Turkey’s surrounding regions a balance between security and democracy has 
to be achieved. That means Turkey’s soft power should be its democracy, 
attracting other countries in its surrounding regions.   
• Zero problems and maximum cooperation: Turkey needs to implement a zero 
problem and maximum cooperation policy which aims to improve its relations 
with its neighbors and create economic interdependence.  
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• Multi-dimensional foreign policy: Turkey has to implement a multi-dimensional 
foreign policy developing its relations with the neighboring regions such as the 
Balkans, Latin America, Africa, and Central Asia.  Turkey should not regard its 
relations with global actors such as the USA, EU and Russia as competitive but 
complementary.  
• Rhythmic diplomacy: Turkey has to increase its diplomatic activities and also 
has to be strongly presented in international organizations and forums such as 
NATO, the UN, the OIC and other vital institutions.445  
 
   a. The Re-evaluation of the Geopolitical and Geostrategic Position: Pivotal 
Country 
 
As discussed in the third chapter, during most of the Republic’s history, one can say 
until the end of the Cold War, Turkey has implemented a one dimensional Western 
oriented foreign policy strategy. The main pillars of the Kemalist foreign policy as 
discussed in the third chapter were isolationism, Western orientation and the Sevres 
Phobia. The result of this policy was the alienation of Turkey from its neighbors and 
immediate regions such as the Caucasus, the Balkans, the Middle East and Central Asia.  
Kemalist elites considered Turkey as a country surrounded by enemy states and were 
ready to use hard power in order to protect Turkey’s interests.  
During the Cold War, the West considered Turkey as a frontier and barrier country in 
the struggle against communism. The Turkish establishment tried to use the communist 
threat as a bargaining chip in order to secure financial and military aid from Western 
institutions and countries.   Turkey followed a passive and status quo oriented foreign 
policy agenda, which avoided taking any major initiative. As discussed above, the end 
of the Cold War created a power vacuum in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood with 
security challenges and possible opportunities. In the post Cold War era the old policy 
of isolationism and Western orientation simply was not enough to overcome the 
challenges created by this major systemic international change.   Thus it was clear that 
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Turkey needed to reinterpret its geopolitical position.  As discussed above, first Turgut 
Ozal (president 1989-1993) and then Ismail Cem (foreign minister 1997-2001) tried to 
achieve a multi-dimensional foreign policy strategy in order to overcome the challenges 
in the post Cold War era. However they were not successful in their efforts for of a 
number of reasons. Firstly, their strategies were not based on a clear, coherent concept 
developed by academics. Secondly, during the 80s and 90s the Kemalist establishment 
was reluctant to accept a major shift in Turkish foreign policy.  Finally, the 90s in 
Turkey were marked with the unstable coalition governments, which were unable to 
implement a multi-dimensional foreign policy strategy.    
In this context, with his book Strategic Depth, it was Davutoglu who reinterpreted the 
geopolitical position of Turkey, laying down the foundations of a new grand strategy in 
the post Cold War era. The main argument of Davutoglu is that a country’s value in the 
international system is based on its historical and geographical depth. He argues that 
geography does not change; however its interpretations are subject to change in the 
course of history.446  He rejects the notion that describes Turkey as a bridge country that 
connects West and East, stating that a bridge is a passive and an artificial creation. 
Taking into account Turkey’s special geographic position which connects various 
regions, Davutoglu considers Turkey as a central and pivotal country which has 
multiple identities. He stresses that as a major country in the midst of the Afro-Eurasia 
landmass, Turkey is a central country with multiple regional identities that cannot be 
reduced to one, unified category. Accordingly Turkey is a Middle Eastern, Balkan, 
Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf, and Black Sea country all at 
the same time. Davutoglu notes that “A central country with such an optimal 
geographic location cannot define itself in a defensive manner. It should be seen neither 
as a bridge country which only connects two points, nor a frontier country, nor indeed 
as an ordinary country, which sits at the edge of the Muslim world or the West.”447 
Davutoglu’s reinterpretation of Turkey’s geography is based on the concept of adjacent 
land and maritime basins that describe Turkey’s potential sphere of influence in its 
surrounding regions. Davutoglu notes that Turkey needs to strengthen its economic and 
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cultural ties with these regions to create economic and cultural interdependence which 
in return will promote stability, prosperity and peace for Turkey and its neighbors. He 
argues that “Turkey should make its role of a peripheral country part of its past, and 
appropriate a new position: one of providing security and stability not only for itself, 
but also for its neighbouring regions. Turkey should guarantee its own security and 
stability by taking on a more active, constructive role to provide order, stability and 
security in its environs.”448 He describes the adjacent basins of Turkey as follows: 
• Turkey’s adjacent land basin:  the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus 
• Turkey’s adjacent maritime basin: the Black Sea, the East Mediterranean Sea, 
the Persian Gulf, the Adriatic, the Caspian and the Red Sea, 
• Turkey’s adjacent continental basin:  Europe, North Africa, South Asia, Central 
Asia and the Far East.449 
To sum up, one can argue that with the reinterpretation of Turkish geopolitics and by 
describing Turkey as a pivotal country Davutoglu has achieved a paradigm shift in 
Turkish foreign policy. Turkey regained its self-confidence in the international arena, 
engaging in a hyper active diplomacy which put Turkey in the spotlight of world 
attention in the last decade. 
  
b. Zero Problem and Maximum Cooperation Policy with Neighboring Countries 
 
As discussed in the third chapter, since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 
1923, the Kemalist elites defined Turkey as a country surrounded by hostile states and 
were reluctant to engage in a serious form of cooperation with them. The Turkish 
foreign policy making culture has mainly been shaped by a Realpolitik view of 
international relations. The Kemalist establishment considered the international 
environment as anarchical, which required being militarily strong and ready to deploy 
hard power and military force for win-lose outcomes.450 Turkey’s Ottoman past and the 
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Sevres Syndrome also contributed to this perception which was manifested in the 
popular Turkish saying that Turkey is surrounded by enemy states and the Turks does 
not have any ally other than Turks.  Turkey was in constant conflict with its neighbors, 
which brought Turkey twice to the brink of war with Greece and Syria in the 90s.   
Consequently, up until the beginning of the new millennium Turkey was regarded as a 
coercive regional power, which was ready to deploy military force to achieve its foreign 
policy aims.  
 
One of the principals of Davutoglu’s “strategic depth” doctrine is the zero problem 
policy with neighbors. Accordingly, Turkey needs to implement a zero problem and 
maximum cooperation policy aiming to improve its relations with its neighbors to create 
economic interdependence and stability in its surrounding regions. One may claim that 
in the emergence of Kantian culture in Turkish foreign policy the concept of zero 
problems with neighbors has played a substantial role, since it has replaced the policy of 
confrontation and conflict with cooperation and dialogue.   
 
Turkey borders 8 countries on land, namely Greece, Bulgaria, Georgia, Armenia, Iran, 
Iraq, Syria and Azerbaijan (the exclave of Nakhchivan). Additionally, in a broader 
sense, Cyprus can be considered as Turkey’s neighbor as well, as it has an open access 
to Turkey via the sea and it is located in the immediate reach of Turkey. When the JDP 
came to power in 2002 Turkey had essential disputes with almost all of its neighbors 
except Azerbaijan. Davutoglu proclaimed that Turkey aims to achieve zero problems 
with its neighbors by settling the disputes diplomatically and by increasing the 
economic and cultural interdependence. The last decade has witnessed a number of 
ambitious and assertive foreign policy initiatives by the JDP government in order to 
achieve this aim.  It is no exaggeration to say that this has meant a paradigm shift in 
Turkey’s relations with its neighbors. Above all it has changed the image of Turkey in 
the international arena from a conflict and status quo oriented coercive regional power 
to a cooperation and solution oriented benign regional power.   
 
Today, despite some setbacks with Syria, Cyprus and Armenia, Turkey has improved its 
relations with most of its neighbors dramatically. It is clear that it is beyond the scope of 
this study to analyze the relations of Turkey with its neighbors in every aspect. However 
relations with each country will be analyzed by pointing out the main milestones in the 
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realization of the zero problem policy. Since the relations with Greece and Cyprus have 
been analyzed in the previous sections (4.1.3), they will be not included in this part of 
the study. However, one should also acknowledge the role of Davutoglu in the 
improvement of the relations between Turkey and Greece and also in the dramatic 
change that took place in Turkey’s Cyprus policy in 2004.  According to Davutoglu, the 
most striking examples of the zero problem policy have been the improvement of the 
relations with Syria and Georgia.451  Therefore it will be appropriate to start the analysis 
with Turkish-Syrian relations. 
Turkish-Syrian relations had been always troubled up until the last decade. Syria had 
territorial claims in Turkey (Hatay) and was supporting and sheltering the Kurdish 
separatist movement, PKK, in its territory. The strained relations reached to the point 
that Turkey and Syria came to the brink of a war in 1998, when Turkey threatened Syria 
with military intervention unless it expelled the rebels from its territory. Facing 
potential military intervention Syria decided to expel the head of the PKK and closed 
down its training camps.452 Consequently Turkey and Syria signed a protocol in Adana, 
which drew the framework for cooperation against terrorism. Since then Turkish-Syrian 
relations have drastically improved. Turkey and Syria have signed a considerable 
amount of bilateral agreements and Memorandums of Understanding (around 50 just in 
2009) which drew the framework in various areas such as politics, security, commerce, 
culture, health, agriculture, environment, transportation, education and water.453 
 
 In 2004 Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad paid a visit to Turkey, which was the first 
ever presidential visit in 50 years of relations. Turkey and Syria signed a free trade 
agreement in 2007, which increased the trade volume between the two countries 
dramatically from 729 million US dollars in 2000 to 2,754 million US dollars in 
2008.454 In 2010 Turkey’s imports from Syria amounted to 663 million USD and 
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Turkey’s exports to Syria were worth 1.85 billion USD. Furthermore, in 2009 Turkey 
and Syria established the “High Level Strategic Cooperation Council” which was 
assembled for the first time at ministerial level on 13 October 2009 in Gaziantep with 
the participation of 10 ministers from the two countries. In 2009 Turkey and Syria 
singed a visa exemption agreement aiming to increase the tourism between the two 
countries, which doubled the touristic visits between two countries.455 The relations 
reached such an excellent point that in 2007 Davutoglu argued that the improvement of 
Turkey’s level of relations with Syria constituted an example for the rest of the 
region.456  
 
However the Turkish-Syrian relations once again became strained when wide spread 
mass protest for democracy in Syria started in March 2011 was increasingly met by the 
harsh violence of the Syrian security forces. Firstly, Turkey opted to keep the 
diplomatic channel open and tried to encourage the Syrian regime to introduce wide 
ranging political reforms. However, with the increasing numbers of civilian casualties 
and bombing of Syrian cities by the Syrian Army, Turkey had to distance itself from the 
Assad regime and called for an immediate stop to civilian massacre. This resulted in 
harsh sanctions by the Syrian government towards Turkish imports to Syria.   Although 
the relations have reached a low point now, if the revolution in Syria succeeds, one may 
expect that the relations between two countries might exceed the previous level of 
cooperation, since a democratic government in Syria would be much more interested in 
good relations with the best established democracy in the region, i.e. Turkey.   
 
As put forward by Davutoglu, one of the best examples of the zero problem policy with 
neighbors is Turkey’s relation with Georgia,457 which has reached the point of 
maximum cooperation between two countries. Today Turkey and Georgia enjoy 
excellent relations in all areas such as tourism, education, trade and etc. For instance in 
order to increase the bilateral visits Turkey and Georgia not only introduced a visa free 
regime but also made it possible for their citizens to travel to each other’s country with 
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their national identity documents. Another example of the excellent cooperation 
between the two countries is the Georgian Batumi Airport, which is also used by 
Turkish Airplanes as a joint airport to reach the Turkish cities in the northeast of Turkey 
such as Artvin. Both countries also cooperate in international projects such as the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Natural Gas Pipeline458 and the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway which connects Turkey to Azerbaijan via Georgian 
territory459. Turkey and Georgia signed a free trade agreement which brought the trade 
volume between the two countries to 1.104 billion USD in 2010, which makes to 16.5% 
of Georgia’s total foreign trade.460 
 
Considering Turkey’s relations with its neighbors one may claim that the real challenge 
for the zero problem policy is Turkey’s troubled relationship with Armenia which has 
suffered from the tragic events that took place in the last decades of Ottoman Empire.  
In order to overcome the issues between the two countries in 2005 Turkish Prime 
Minister Erdogan sent a letter to the Armenian President Kocharian for the 
establishment of a historical commission which will study the mutual killing of 
Armenians and Muslims during World War I461. In 2009, despite domestic and 
Azerbaijani pressure, the Turkish government signed two protocols with Armenia which 
provided a framework for the establishment of diplomatic relations and the 
improvement of bilateral relations between the two countries462. The ratification of 
protocols was suspended by Armenia in 2010 due to the opposition of the Armenian 
constitutional court.463 In this regard one should also consider the fact that Armenia has 
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built its national identity around the “genocide” claims, which makes the questioning of 
the events almost impossible.   As a result of this hard position from Armenia, Turkey 
could not achieve its aim of improving relations with Armenia in the last decade. 
However, it is also clear that it demonstrated its willingness to take courageous steps in 
order to address long frozen conflicts with its neighbors.  
 
In the implementation of the zero problem policy one should also mention the dramatic 
changes in Turkish-Iranian relations. According to a former Turkish prime minister, up 
until 2001 Turkish-Iranian relations “were neither black nor white, but a shade of 
gray”.464 Although the two countries share one of the oldest borders in the Middle East 
which was drawn by an agreement between the Safavid Empire and the Ottoman 
Empire in 1639, there has been always a sense of rivalry and enmity in the bilateral 
relations because the two countries have been the leader of two different rival 
interpretations of Islam, that is to say Shia and Sunni Islam. Therefore Turkey and Iran 
have had a troublesome relationship during much of their history. The relations 
weakened especially after the Iranian Revolution and during the 90s when Turkey 
accused Iran of sheltering and supporting the PKK and also supporting Islamist 
terrorism in Turkey.  However this rhetoric changed dramatically after the JDP came to 
power in 2001.  After the second Gulf War the growing influence and strength of 
separatist Kurdish movements in both countries brought Turkey and Iran closer465.  In 
2004 Turkey and Iran signed a number of agreements in the area of economics, which 
also included an agreement for cooperation in the fight against Kurdish terrorism. As a 
result of this new sense of cooperation, the Turkish-Iranian trade volume has grown 
almost tenfold from 1.2 billion dollars in 2001 to 10.6 billion dollars in 2010.466 Turkey 
also has been actively involved in the efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the dispute 
around Iran’s nuclear program.  In 2010 Turkey and Brazil successfully brokered and 
signed a nuclear fuel swap deal with Tehran, which was rejected by US and its allies. 
As a result of this, together with Brazil, Turkey vetoed the UN Security Council 
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resolution on the fourth round of sanctions on Iran in June 2010.  There is a clear logic 
behind Turkey’s attitude towards this issue, because since the beginning of the dispute 
Turkey has been advocating a diplomatic solution and rejecting economic and other 
sanctions against Iran fearing that it will affect the Turkish trade with Iran.  
 
Turkey has also been enjoying excellent relations with its north-western neighbor, 
Bulgaria, since the fall of communism in Bulgaria in 1989. Turkey has supported 
Bulgaria in its bid to join NATO and the EU. There are regular high level visits between 
the two countries467. The Turkish-Bulgarian bilateral trade volume has reached 2.4 
billion Euros in 2010. 1500 Turkish companies have invested in Bulgaria and Turkish 
investments in Bulgaria amounted to one billion US dollars in 2010.  In 2001 Turkey 
made Bulgarian citizens visa exempt in their visits to Turkey, which increased the 
number of Bulgarian tourists to Turkey to 1.226.543 in 2010.468 
Considering Turkey’s relations with its neighbors one can say that the invasion and the 
following instability in Iraq since 2003 constituted one of the substantial challenges for 
the implementation of the zero problem policy in Turkish foreign policy. It should be 
noted that from the beginning Turkey has opposed the invasion of Iraq because of its 
fears of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq, which may have a spillover effect onto 
Turkey’s Kurds. Therefore, although backed by the JDP leadership, the majority of the 
Turkish Parliament with the support of 90 JDP MPs rejected a government motion on 
the deployment of American troops in southeast Turkey to open a new invasion route 
into Iraq.469  Since then Turkey has made the preservation of territorial integrity of Iraq 
its main priority.  On its official page Turkish MFA states that “Turkey strongly 
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supports Iraq’s sovereignty, stability, political unity and territorial integrity. We attach 
importance to remaining in equal distance to all segments of the Iraqi society”470 
In 2003 just before the invasion of Iraq, Turkey initiated the “Iraq’s Neighboring 
Countries Process” in order to find a solution to the crisis and instability in Iraq.  After 
the invasion Turkey also played a substantial role in the integration of the Sunni 
majority in Iraq into the political system and also mediated between Shia and Sunni 
groups in Iraq in order to prevent a sectarian civil war.  Davutoglu claims that with its 
efforts Turkey contributed to prevention of a possible disintegration of Iraq. He states 
that “Turkey’s influence on the fragmented groups within Iraqi society, its efforts to 
bring together Iraq’s neighbors around a common platform, its persuasive diplomacy 
over the USA, and its principled relationship with the Iraqi government have all played 
an unprecedented role in these efforts.”471 
In the context of maximum cooperation with neighboring countries Turkey established 
the “High Level Strategic Cooperation Council” with Iraq in 2008. In 2009 Davutoglu 
as foreign minister made a historical visit to Erbil first time ever in Turkish history and 
met with the Kurdish autonomous region’s president, Masoud Barzani.472 This visit 
signaled a radical change in Turkish foreign policy since for decades Turkey ignored the 
Kurdish political entity in northern Iraq.  After this visit in 2010 Turkey opened a 
consulate general in Erbil. As a result of this close cooperation Iraq became the second 
largest trading partner of Turkey in 2011.473 Today Turkish companies are involved in 
different projects in all regions of Iraq. 
Having analyzed the improvements of Turkey’s relations with its neighbors in the last 
decade, it should be also noted that recently Davutoglu has been heavily criticized that 
his policy of zero problems has collapsed due to the deteriorating relations with Syria, 
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Cyprus, Armenia and Israel. Davutoglu maintains that his policy has been successfully 
implemented. He argues that as an academic, who taught international relations theory, 
he knows that it is almost impossible to have excellent relations with all neighbors at the 
same time. However, he suggests that what he aimed to achieve with his motto was a 
mentality change in Turkish foreign policy making regarding the relations with its 
neighbors. He also aimed to improve Turkey’s image in the international arena. He 
concludes that the concept of the zero problem policy has achieved its goals by 
improving overall relations with neighboring countries, by improving the mutual 
friendship amongst the populations, by changing the mentality of Turkish foreign policy 
by implementing the win-win approach in its agenda and also by altering Turkey’s 
image in the international arena positively.474  
 
Considering Turkey’s troubled relations with its neighbors in the past one should 
acknowledge that Davutoglu achieved a mentality change in Turkish foreign policy in 
the last decade.  All in all, one can say that what Davutoglu initiated as a zero problems 
policy with Turkey’s neighboring countries one decade ago transformed itself into a 
maximum cooperation policy in all aspects ranging from economic to cultural 
cooperation.  
 
 c. Multidimensional Foreign Policy: Developing Relations with Neighboring 
Regions 
 
Recently there has been much criticism in Western media that Turkey’s foreign policy 
axis is shifting away from Europe and USA. Some Western analysts argue that Turkey 
is becoming more interested in the Middle East and Russia and accuse the JDP 
government of a creeping Islamisation of Turkey. However, as discussed previously 
(See 4.1.2) one should regard Turkey’s new active foreign policy “as a response to 
structural changes in its security environment since the end of cold war.”475  
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As discussed in the third chapter, during the much of the Republic’s history Turkey’s 
Kemalist elites followed a one sided foreign policy strategy, which aimed to Westernize 
Turkish society as that would lead to an integration of Turkey into European 
civilization. In their focus on Europe and America the Kemalist elites neglected 
Turkey’s relations with the other regions which in return reduced Turkey’s foreign 
policy options and created a dangerous dependency on Western European countries and 
the USA both economically and politically. Additionally, the Cold War power relations 
also forced Turkey to side with Western countries against an immediate Soviet threat.  
In his “strategic depth” doctrine Davutoglu criticizes this one sided foreign policy 
practice of the Kemalist elites and argues that Turkey should redefine its geopolitical 
and geostrategic position by acknowledging its multiple identities that make it as a 
central and pivotal country in the heart of the Eurasian landmass. According to 
Davutoglu the third principle of the “strategic depth” doctrine is the adherence to a 
multidimensional foreign policy strategy.  Davutoglu suggests that especially in the post 
Cold War era Turkey needs to develop its relations with its surrounding regions as well 
as with the regions beyond Turkey’s immediate proximity such as Sub-Saharan Africa, 
East Asia- Pacific and Latin America. In this regard it should be noted that Davutoglu 
does not envisage reducing or cutting Turkey’s ties with Western countries. On the 
contrary he argues that Turkey needs to have a balanced foreign policy strategy which is 
not built on a one-sided approach. Davutoglu refuses the accusations of a shift of axis in 
Turkish foreign policy and insists that Turkey’s relations with various global actors are 
complementary.  In this regard the following statement of Davutoglu is noteworthy: 
“Turkey’s relations with other global actors aim to be complementary, not in 
competition. Such a policy views Turkey’s strategic relations with the United States 
through the two countries’ bilateral ties and through NATO, and considers its 
membership process to the EU, its good neighborhood policy with Russia, and its 
synchronization policy in Eurasia as integral parts of a consistent policy that serves to 
complete each other”476 
 
It is clear that it is beyond the scope of this study to analyze Turkey’s relations with all 
its neighboring regions in detail. In order to achieve a better understanding of the new 
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multidimensionalism in Turkish foreign policy, the developments in Turkey’s relations 
with Sub-Saharan countries will be examined as a case study. Based on the principle of 
multidimensionalism, it is not surprising that Davutoglu announced in 2005, the very 
same year in which Turkey started its accession negotiations with the EU, as the year of 
Africa in Turkish foreign policy. It is no exaggeration to say that one of the staggering 
examples of Davutoglu’s multidimensionalism can be seen in Turkey’s opening up to 
Sub-Saharan Africa since 2005, which was based on a plan developed by former 
Foreign Minister Ismail Cem in 1998.477 However it should be noted that the opening to 
Africa only entered into the agenda of Turkish foreign policy in 2005 which Davutoglu 
declared as the year of Africa. As a result of this new strategy Turkish Prime Minister 
Erdogan visited Ethiopia and South Africa in 2005, which was the first official prime 
ministerial visit to a country below the equator.478 
 
It is interesting to see that both former social democrat foreign minister Ismail Cem and 
Davutoglu have been criticized by the Kemalist establishment and secular media outlets 
for their focus on Sub-Saharan Africa. Their main argument, “What business does he 
have in Sudan?”479, reveals the mindset of the secular establishment in Turkey. 
Principally they oppose developing ties with regions which they perceive as backward 
and only to have business with ‘civilized’ Western countries.  Needless to say, they 
represent an absurd and childish approach in the age of globalization, when all the 
global actors are heavily involved in Sub-Saharan Africa both politically and 
economically.   
 
Despite this criticism the JDP government pursued its opening up to Africa policy 
passionately. Consequently, Turkey increased its efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
obtained an observer status in the African Union in 2005.  In 2008, the AU summit held 
in Addis Ababa declared Turkey as a strategic partner. In the same year the “Turkey-
Africa Cooperation Summit” convened with the participation of 49 African countries in 
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Istanbul which marked the beginning of a new era in the relations. Turkey also decided 
to increase its diplomatic presence in Sub-Saharan Africa by opening 15 new embassies 
and 3 TIKA (Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency) offices.  
Currently Turkey has 15 embassies in Sub-Saharan Africa and 3 TIKA offices in Addis 
Ababa, Khartoum and Dakar.480 As a result of this new activism Turkey’s exports to 
Sub-Saharan African countries increased from 430 million USD in 2002 to 3,635 billion 
USD in 2012.481 
 
One can find other striking examples of Turkey’s new multidimensional foreign policy 
strategy in other regions such as the Balkans, the Middle East, Latin America, Central 
Asia, Russia and etc. For instance following the year of Africa in 2005 the year 2006 
was declared as “The Year of Latin America and the Caribbean” in Turkish foreign 
policy.  Furthermore, Turkey began to implement a strategy to increase visa free 
countries all around the world for Turkish passport holders. Consequently the number of 
countries allowing Turkish citizens to pass their border without a visa increased to 72 in 
2012482. 
However, as mentioned above, it is beyond the scope of this study to cover all these 
areas. Nevertheless one should acknowledge that in the last decade Turkish foreign 
policy acquired a new multidimensional approach and Turkish diplomacy started to 
involve different regions which increased Turkey’s diplomatic presence in its 
neighboring regions in the last decade considerably.  For instance, Turkey has been 
actively involved in the conciliation talks and mediations between Israel and Syria, 
Sunni and Shia groups in Iraq, Bosnia and Serbia, Afghanistan and Pakistan, in the 
political crisis in Lebanon regarding the presidential elections and in the Iran’s nuclear 
crisis with the West. 
In sum, Davutoglu considers “Turkey’s engagements from Chile to Indonesia, from 
Africa to Central Asia, and from EU to OIC... part of a holistic approach to foreign 
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policy.” He claims that “these initiatives will make Turkey a global actor as we 
approach 2023, the one hundredth anniversary of the establishment of the Turkish 
republic.”483 
   
d. Rhythmic Diplomacy:  Presence in International Organizations and Public 
Diplomacy                     
 
                                        
What Davutoglu calls rhythmic diplomacy484 and others hyperactive diplomacy485, 
constitutes the fourth principle of the “strategic depth” doctrine. Davutoglu describes 
the main aim of his concept of rhythmic diplomacy as “to intervene consistently in 
global issues using international platforms, which signifies a transformation for Turkey 
from a central country to a global power.”486 In order to carry out such an ambitious 
policy Davutoglu has shown incredible physical effort by undertaking 100 foreign visits 
in just one year as foreign minister in 2009, which includes 28 to European, 27 to 
Middle Eastern, 18 to Balkan, 9 to Asian countries and 8 to the United States.487 
 
Davutoglu argues that in order to achieve this goal both state and non-state actors have 
to be involved in Turkey’s new rhythmic diplomacy concept.  He acknowledges 
“Turkey’s success is not only the result of state policies, but also the activities of civil 
society, business organizations, and numerous other organizations, all operating under 
the guidance of the new vision. The state’s macro strategy is in conformity with the 
micro strategies of individual people, corporations, and civil society organizations.”488 
 
“Rhythmic diplomacy” means that Turkey should increase its presence in the field of 
international diplomacy by increasing its diplomatic initiatives, playing a mediator role 
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in international disputes, actively involving in various international organizations and 
hosting summits of important international organizations such as NATO and the OIC.489 
In the last decade Turkey was able to host and initiate a considerable amount of 
international summits and conferences such as the NATO Summit in 2004, OIC Summit 
on the Somalia humanitarian crisis in 2011, a series of conferences on Iraq’s 
neighboring countries, a “Friends of Syria” conference on the Syrian crisis in 2012, the 
UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries in 2011 in Istanbul and etc. 
 
Furthermore, in the last decade Turkey has increased its presence in various 
international and regional organizations which include the following; 
 
• Turkey obtained an observer status in the African Union in 2005 and the 
African Union declared Turkey as a strategic partner in 2008. In the same year 
the first “Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit” was convened in Istanbul. 
• In 2009, after an extended campaign with the backing of 151 countries, Turkey 
was elected for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council for two years.   
• Turkey obtained an observer status in the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, the Association of Caribbean States and the Organization of American 
States. 
 
Additionally, Turkey also aims to increase its presence in international organizations by 
appointing Turkish diplomats in key positions in various international organizations.  
There are many examples of this new approach, which includes the following 
appointments of Turkish diplomats to various important posts in international 
organizations:     
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• In May 2005 a Turkish economist Kemal Dervis was elected unanimously by 
the United Nations General Assembly as the Administrator of the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which is the third-highest ranking 
post in the United Nations. He served between 2005 and 2009. 
• In 2005 Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, a Turkish academic was elected as the 
Secretary-General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, a post he holds 
up until today.  
• In May 2008, another Turkish academic Mahmud Erol Kilic was appointed as 
the Secretary-General of the Parliamentary Union of the OIC Member States. 
• In 2010 a Turkish diplomat, Ambassador Hüseyin Diriöz, the Chief Foreign 
Policy Advisor to the Turkish president, was appointed as Deputy Secretary-
General of NATO in charge of Defense Policy and Planning. 
• Between 2010 and 2012, a Turkish politician, Mevlut Cavusoglu was the 
president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
• In 2003 a Turkish politician and former foreign minister, Hikmet Cetin, was 
appointed NATO Secretary General's Senior Civilian Representative in 
Afghanistan. He held the command of the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan until 2006. 
 
In the last decade Turkey also increased its efforts in the area of public diplomacy 
aiming to promote Turkish culture and language abroad. For this purpose Turkey has 
established the Yunus Emre Foundation in 2007 as a state foundation under Law 5653 
passed by the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The purpose of the foundation was 
identified in the law as follows: “To promote Turkey, its cultural heritage, Turkish 
language, culture and arts, develop Turkey’s friendship ties with other countries, 
establish and manage cultural centers abroad to increase cultural exchange”.490 
Davutoglu, who is also the chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Yunus Emre 
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Foundation, points out that “the mission of Yunus Emre Institute is related to Turkish 
Foreign policy’s strategic dimension and popularization of Turkish Language, 
protection of Turkish cultural heritage and the dissemination of Turkish culture to the 
outside world”.491  He argues that this will enable Turkey to place its historical-cultural 
richness into its current foreign policy strategy.  Consequently, the Yunus Emre 
Institute has opened 18 Yunus Emre Turkish Culture centers all around the world, 
including: Brussels, Sarajevo, Tirana, Cairo, Skopje, Astana, London, Damascus, 
Pristine, Prizren, Tokyo, Beirut, Bucharest, Constanta, Tehran,  Amman, Fojnitsa, 
Tbilisi.492   
 
Having realized the importance of development assistance in public diplomacy, the 
Turkish state also established its official technical aid agency TIKA as early as 1992. 
However it was not until the JDP government came to power in 2003 that TIKA became 
an essential part of Turkish foreign policy in the developing world. In this regard Fidan 
and Nurdon point out the fact that “although TIKA was initially established for the 
purpose of helping transition economies in Central Asia, Caucasus and the Balkans, 
from 2003 onwards, TIKA began to reach out to the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) countries and African countries.”493 TIKA cooperates with Turkish NGOs and 
coordinates Turkey’s development assistance towards Turkey’s surrounding regions 
such as the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Africa and the Middle East.494  In 2010 
Turkey’s governmental and non-governmental development assistance amounted to one 
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and a half billion dollars annually495 and the number of TIKA offices abroad reached 22 
in 20 countries in 2007. 496 
 
                             
4.2.5 The Rising Role of Civil Society:  NGOs, Think Tanks and Public Opinion 
 
In the emergence of Kantian culture in Turkish foreign policy one should also analyze 
the impact of the rising role of civil society in the Turkish political system, i.e. NGOs, 
think tanks and public opinion. It is widely accepted that civil society plays a crucial 
role in the consolidation of democracy in a liberal political system. Furthermore it is 
clear that the improvements in the democratic standards of a country force the 
government of this country to take its public opinion, NGOs and think tanks into 
consideration in the formulation of foreign policy issues. In the emergence of a Kantian 
culture, civil society also plays a very substantial role, since it can force governments to 
follow a more restrained foreign policy strategy in order to settle the disputes 
peacefully, which is the basis of a Kantian culture.     
In the literature one can find various definitions of civil society. Yet, one can summarize 
these definitions under two main categories, i.e. the liberal and the critical approach.  
According to the liberal approach civil society can only be defined in a liberal 
democratic political system.  It considers civil society as the counterweight that checks 
and balances the dominant role of the state. In this context Hall argues that civil society 
is “the self-organisation of strong and autonomous groups that balance the state”.497 
Another scholar, Diamond considers civil society to be “the realm of organised social 
life that is voluntary, self generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the 
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state, and bound by a legal order or a set of shared values.”498 In the liberal approach 
Gellners’ definition can be regarded as the most comprehensive definition, in which he 
argues that “Civil society is that set of diverse non-governmental institutions, which is 
strong enough to counterbalance the state, and, whilst not preventing the state fulfilling 
its role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless 
prevent the state from dominating and atomizing the rest of society.”499 
The critical approach argues that the concept of civil society should be separated from 
the liberal democratic context. This approach considers the state and society as the 
products of a common political culture, in which the main struggle may arise within the 
state and civil society rather than between them.  Therefore civil society may develop 
and flourish in nondemocratic political systems without producing liberalization in the 
political system. Consequently one may find civil societies in patriarchal, Islamist, 
communist and fascist political systems. 500 Briefly this approach argues that the 
attitudes of civil societies towards democratization depend on circumstances and 
therefore “different (or the same) civil organisations at different times and under 
different circumstances may support democracy as well as authoritarian and 
totalitarian rules.”501  
Apart from this theoretical debate, this study will be based on the assumptions of the 
liberal approach since the Turkish political system is more compatible with the liberal 
approach. According to this approach large scale citizen participation in civil society 
organizations constitutes one of the most concrete features of a liberal democratic 
system. These organizations check and balance undemocratic tendencies of states and 
play a substantial role in the consolidation of democracy.  
Given the history of the Turkish Republic one cannot claim that Turkey has a strong 
civil society tradition. On the contrary, it can be said that the role of NGOs, think tanks 
and public opinion is relatively a new phenomenon in Turkish political life because of 
Turkey’s strong state tradition.  It is widely accepted that Turkey constitutes “an 
example of a “strong state,” that is, a society in which the state is at the center of public 
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policymaking and the notion of state sovereignty is highly developed and unalloyed. The 
idea of the strong state does not necessarily imply a powerful or capable state in 
practical terms (although, overall, the Turkish state has played this role in some areas) 
but rather a pervasive, doctrinal attachment to the primacy of the state... For almost 80 
years, the Turkish state has had a pervasive role in virtually all aspects of Turkish life... 
Economic policy was shaped from the center on a statist pattern, with high levels of 
government ownership and oversight.”502 
As mentioned above, until the end of the 80s the Turkish state had absolute power over 
Turkish society and strictly controlled any kind of social movement and organization. 
There were 38,354 NGOs in Turkey before the September 12 military coup in 1980, out 
of which almost 20.000 were closed down by the military regime.503 Following the 
coup, the 12 September military regime imposed constitutional and legal restrictions on 
civil society organizations. Article 33 of the 1982 Constitution imposed by the military 
regime prohibited associations “from pursuing political aims, engaging in political 
activities, receiving support from or giving support to political parties, or taking joint 
action with labor unions or public professional organisations or foundations. 
Associations could normally be dissolved by a decision of a judge or suspended by the 
compenent (administrative) authority pending a court decision in cases where delay 
was deemed to endanger the indivisible integrity of the state.... ”504 The law on 
associations of 1983 that regulated the activities of civil society organizations followed 
the same authoritarian logic. This law banned any association that aimed to engage 
activities on the behalf of region, race, social class, religion or sect. Associations were 
not allowed to have relations with international organizations and to use different 
languages other than Turkish in their official writings. As a result of these strict 
restrictions, associations were under maximum state control and constant threat of 
closure. 505   
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The post Cold War world witnessed a spread of “the western model of democracy and 
its associated concepts such as civil society and the notion of non governmental 
organisations (NGOs.)” Turkey was no exception in this new trend, which was referred 
by Huntington as the “third wave”.506 Additionally Turkey’s transition to a liberal 
economic model and its basic democratic reforms paved the way for the toleration of 
NGOs and their activities to a certain extent in the beginning of 90s.507 Furthermore, as 
a result of increasing Turkish-EU relations, EU also started to exert its influence on the 
Turkish political system through conditionality and adaptations. In this regard, EU 
started to focus on the problems of Turkish civil society and considered the absence of a 
strong civil society in Turkey as one of the main reasons for Turkey’s weak democratic 
standards.   
Therefore it is not surprising that the first amendment to the illiberal Article 33 of the 
1982 Constitution came with the customs union agreement between Turkey and EU in 
1995. Turkey had to amend the article in order to overcome opposition by the European 
Parliament. As a result of this amendment associations were allowed to engage in 
political activities and to cooperate with political parties and other organizations. The 
closure of associations by the decisions of administrative authorities had to be approved 
by a court decision.508   
From the 90s onwards, thousands of NGOs have been established in Turkey. For 
instance, the number of NGOs in Turkey has reached around 61.000 in 2004.509 Despite 
this staggering increase in the quantity of NGOs their role in Turkish political life in the 
90s remained very limited because of slow democratization reforms and the strong state 
tradition, which put the political NGOs under immense state pressure. During the 90s 
the civil society organizations that were linked to Kurdish, Islamist and human rights 
groups were under permanent state persecution. For instance, in 1999 it was reported 
that 30 NGOs closed down and 387 of them were harassed by Turkish authorities.510  
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It should be noted that NGOs do not constitute a homogenous group and there are 
various NGOs which have different interests and political views. In the Turkish case 
NGOs are divided along the main political ideologies. Although this fragmentation 
hindered a solid cooperation among the different NGOs, with the help of the prospect of 
an EU membership during the 90s the NGOs started to raise the issues of human rights 
and a more pluralistic democracy, and demanded wide ranging reforms in the Turkish 
political system. “Among other things, civil society organizations have demanded 
reforms that include the reorganization of the dual structure of the judiciary (civil and 
military) and a check of military courts by the higher civilian courts where necessary. 
Civil society organizations also have played an active role in the public administration 
reform discussions. A wide range of civil society organizations, including 
municipalities, employee associations, trade unions, and the like commented on the new 
reform draft and have accentuated their demands about the new law...”511 
For the rights of civil society the real revolution came with the EU reforms packages 
after Turkey was granted candidate status at the EU Helsinki Summit in 1999. The EU 
considered the lack of freedom of association as one of the main issues in the fulfillment 
of the Copenhagen criteria. Between 1999 and 2004 Turkey made the necessary 
political reforms in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria. In this context the Article 33 
of the Turkish Constitution that guaranteed the freedom of association was amended in 
2001.  Furthermore, the law on associations was amended five times under the EU 
reform packages. (March 2002, August 2002, January 2003, July 2003 and July 2004).  
In the last amendment a brand new law on associations was adopted, which lifted all the 
restrictions imposed on associations.512  
These wide ranging EU reforms strengthened Turkish democracy and the freedom of 
associations which in return led to an increase in the role of civil society in Turkish 
political life. As mentioned above, starting from the 90s the NGOs in Turkey began to 
increase their role in the democratic consolidation process with the help of the prospect 
of an EU membership. Toros argues that NGOs “for the first time in Turkish politics, 
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started to articulate and represent the interests of various social segments and managed 
to transmit these demands to political actors and state elites relatively effectively.” 513  
In terms of public visibility and organizational power the earthquake in 1999 may be 
considered as a turning point for NGOs in Turkey. In the first three days after the 
earthquake the Turkish state apparatus had totally failed to organize help efforts and 
attend to the basic needs of the affected people, whereas Turkish NGOs reached the 
disaster affected area faster than state institutions and in a much more organized 
manner. For instance just in the province of Adapazari 55 different NGOs were active in 
providing makeshift camps for survivors.514  This huge tragedy demonstrated to the 
Turkish public the capabilities and utility of the NGOs as a government counterpart in 
Turkey.  
Apart from these positive developments it should be noted that compared to Western 
liberal democracies Turkish civil society still plays a very limited role in Turkish 
political life.  Simsek notes that “some characteristics of Turkish civil society such as 
the multitude of NGOs and the existence of an individualistic culture are adequately 
developed to support democracy. On the other hand, in terms of its autonomy against 
the state and military power, its participation in the decision-making process, its 
fragmented structure and its quality, Turkish civil society is still very far from 
contributing to democratization.”515 
Although civil society does not play a substantial role in Turkish political life as in the 
case of other Western democracies, they still have a considerable amount of influence 
that is rising almost continuously. This rising role of civil society in Turkish political 
life has its impacts on Turkish foreign policy making as well. In this context the role of 
civil society in the formation of Turkish foreign policy will be analyzed mainly under 
three areas, i.e. the role of NGOs, think tanks and public opinion.  
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As already mentioned above, the Turkish state was built on a strong state tradition, 
which did not allow participation of NGOs in the political system until recently. The 
foreign policy making was no exception in this strong state tradition and stayed as a 
privilege of a limited number of bureaucrats. They considered “civil society... as a 
threat and non-governmental organisations were readily associated with foreign 
influence and seen as a tool of external agents.”516 Consequently, until the end of the 
Cold War, there was absolute dominance of Kemalist elites in the making of Turkish 
foreign policy. However, as a result of the transformation that the Turkish state and 
society has been going through in the last two decades, NGOs have flourished in 
Turkey. Furthermore, the EU reforms have strengthened civil society and Turkish 
NGOs have started to acquire a role in the foreign policy making process which was 
regarded as the privilege of state officials until the end of the millennium.   
Today, one can find examples of NGO involvement and cooperation in the formation of 
both low and high policy issues in Turkish foreign policy. Examples for the cooperation 
between Turkish state institutions and NGOs in low politics issues can be found in the 
combating of women trafficking and illegal migration.  In this regard, various Turkish 
state institutions are involved in the cooperation with NGOs such as the Human 
Resources Development Foundation (HRDF) and the International Organization for 
migration and etc.517   
In the last decade the Turkish NGOs have also been increasingly involved in the areas 
of high politics issues too. In 1995 Turkish NGOs lobbied for the adaptation of the 
customs union agreement by the European Parliament. However the real change came 
with the Helsinki Summit decision to grant Turkey candidate status, which paved the 
way of the increasing role of civil society in Turkish political life. For instance, after the 
Helsinki Summit Turkey had to make wide ranging legal reforms in order to meet the 
Copenhagen criteria.  Between 1999 and 2002 Turkey was ruled by a weak coalition 
government that was split in terms of required EU reforms.  In the adaptation of fiercely 
debated EU reform packages in Turkey, Turkish pro-EU civil society groups such as 
TÜSIAD, the Economic Development foundation (IKV) and other ad hoc groups such 
as the Europe Movement (Avrupa Hareketi) and their well led media campaign were 
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influential in the mobilization of MPs that were needed to adopt the EU reforms. Kirisci 
concludes that “Civil society and the media played a crucial role in weakening the hold 
of the national security discourse and priorities over one of the most critical issues 
concerning Turkey´s future: membership of the EU.” 518   
Another example of the involvement of NGOs in high politics issues is the Turkish 
policy change towards Cyprus in 2004. Turkish NGOs were also influential in this 
drastic change of policy. Turkish NGOs such as TUSIAD and TESEV (The Turkish 
Economic and Social Studies Foundation) lobbied for a change of stance in Turkey’s 
status quo oriented Cyprus policy and supported the JDP government in its decision to 
accept the UN’s Annan Plans against military and civil bureaucracy. In sum, Turkish 
NGOs such as TÜSIAD, IKV and TOBB (The Union of Chambers and Commodity 
Exchanges of Turkey) have played a very constructive role in Turkey’s relations with 
the EU.  519 
Apart from this, the Turkish state also realized the soft power of NGOs in the 
international arena and started to consider Turkish NGOs as a means to extend its 
influence and prestige in Turkey’s surrounding regions. Today, a considerable amount 
of Turkish NGOs, mostly charity organizations, are involved in educational and health 
development projects around the globe. In this regard, one should pay extra attention to 
the activities of Fethullah Gülen’s movement. Starting with the end of the Cold War this 
movement has founded hundreds of Turkish schools around the world, which teach 
Turkish language and culture among their official curricula. In 2003 there were “more 
than 300 private high schools and seven universities affiliated with the Gülen 
community, with 26,500 students and over 6000 teachers around the world. In Turkey 
alone there are over 150 private schools, including Istanbul’s Fatih University.”520One 
can suggest that their number has risen considerably from 2003 onwards.  In the last 
two decades Turkish politicians from different ideological backgrounds such as Turgut 
Özal, Süleyman Demirel, Bülent Ecevit, Mesut Yilmaz, Tayip Erdogan have always 
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supported and encouraged the activities of these schools and visited these schools in 
their foreign visits to different countries.  
In addition to Turkish schools, Turkish charity organizations such as the Humanitarian 
Relief Foundation (IHH) (est. 1992), Deniz Feneri Association (Light House (est. 
1996), Kimse Yokmu (Is Anybody There est. 2004) etc. started to engage in 
humanitarian aid and development projects around the globe with the end of the Cold 
War.  With the Gaza flotilla massacre by Israeli navy commandos in May 2010 the IHH 
became the most well-known among these organizations. One may claim that the IHH, 
which started its humanitarian aid activities with the beginning of the Bosnian War in 
1992 and extended its projects to 120 countries in 2010, represents the rising power of 
Turkish NGOs in the international arena in the last two decades.  The Gaza flotilla 
incident brought Turkish charity organizations into the spotlight of world attention and 
forced Turkey to sever its ties with Israel. Apart from this negative incident Turkish 
state officials are well aware of the fact that Turkish charity organizations increase 
Turkey’s prestige and extend its influence in the international arena and therefore 
support and facilitate these NGOs in their activities. In this regard the following 
statement of the architect of JDP’s foreign policy, Davutoglu, is noteworthy: “Turkish 
Civil Society organisations form an integral part of the bigger picture defined as 
foreign policy. All of these elements have become part of Turkey’s new international 
vision.”521 
In the rising role of civil society the influence of public opinion in the making of 
Turkish foreign policy is also substantial.  As mentioned above, until the end of the 
Cold War Turkish foreign policy making remained the privilege of Kemalist elites and 
the demands and opinions of the public were not taken into consideration in the decision 
making process. However, starting from 90s the role of public opinion in the making of 
Turkish foreign policy started to increase.522 In the beginning of the post Cold War era 
the improvements in communication technologies helped the Turkish public to receive 
more information about the situation of Muslim and Turkic communities in the 
Caucasus and Balkans.  This led to increasing public pressure on the Turkish foreign 
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policy towards the conflicts in Bosnia, Azerbaijan, Chechnya and East Turkistan.523 In 
this regard Bulut concludes that “Religious identity, the use of religious themes in 
politics, and a perception of religion as an important force in politics have influenced 
the way Turkey – comprising a variety of state and societal actors – reacted to conflicts 
in South East Europe.” in the post Cold War Era.524 However, despite the growing 
influence of public opinion it cannot be concluded that the decision makers made their 
decisions according to public demands in the 90s. The lack of Turkey’s democratic 
standards was the main reason for the dominant role of the elites.  Hale notes that “state 
actors apparently continued to be the dominant decision makers during the 90ies.” 525 
The turning point came with the EU reforms after Helsinki in 1999.  As discussed 
above, these wide ranging reforms strengthened Turkey’s democracy and decreased the 
dominance of elites in the decision making process. In the past decade, Turkish public 
opinion has played an increasing role in the formation of Turkish foreign policy. The 
democratic reforms forced the governments to take public opinion into consideration in 
vital foreign policy decisions. The increasing role of public opinion can be seen in 
Turkey’s policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For instance, during the 90s, 
because of lack of democratic standards and the strong role of the Turkish Army in the 
decision making process, governments were able to ignore the criticisms of the public in 
their cooperation with Israel.  However with growing democratization, the demands of 
the public were much more reflected in the policies of the Ecevit (1999-2002) and 
Erdogan (2003 - to date) governments, which adopted a much more balanced policy 
towards this conflict.526   
The most staggering example in the role of public opinion on Turkish foreign policy is 
Turkey’s refusal to allow US troops to invade Iraq using Turkish territory. Contrary to 
the expectation of many analysts, the transfer of US soldiers via Turkish territory to 
northern Iraq was rejected by Turkish parliament on 1 March 2003.  This rejection was 
to a certain extent related to the harsh opposition of the Turkish public towards the 
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invasion of Iraq.  In this example the fierce opposition of the Turkish public towards an 
involvement of Turkey in the invasion of Iraq forced Turkey to adopt a more restrained 
policy towards Iraq.  
Think tanks are the most vital institutions of a civil society that can influence foreign 
policy making profoundly. As discussed in the previous chapter one of the main 
features of the Turkish foreign policy culture is its lack of strategic thinking and theory. 
Until the end of the Cold War Turkish foreign policy was mainly controlled by the 
Kemalist elites who did not show any interest in alternative foreign policy strategies.527  
The post Cold War era and Turkey’s EU membership process decreased the role of 
Kemalist elites in foreign policy making and opened the way for the articulation of 
different foreign policy options. In this regard it is clear that think tanks are vital 
institutions for any country to develop strategies and provide expert advice on 
international issues. In the Turkish context think tanks are a new phenomenon starting 
with the end of the Cold War. Since then a considerable number of think tanks aiming 
to develop foreign policy strategies have been established in Turkey:  
• TESEV  (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation) 
• SAM (Center for Strategic Research) Est. by Turkish Foreign Ministry in 1995 
• USAK (International Strategic Research Organization) 
• TASAM (Turkish Asian Center For Strategic Studies) 
•  GASAM (South Asian Strategic Research Center) 
• SETA (Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research) 
• TEPAV (Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey)  
• TURKSAM  (Turkish Center for International Relations Strategic Analysis)  
Despite the increase in their quantity, the influence of think tanks in the foreign policy 
making process is still very modest compared to other Western countries because of the 
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authoritarian character of Turkish politicians and bureaucrats. Özcan notes that 
“although some of these institutions have proved their viability, time is needed for think 
tanks to mature in Turkey.”528 Apart from this negative legacy, one should realize that 
the think tanks are on their way to become important actors in Turkish foreign policy 
making. There are examples of coordination between state officials and various think 
tanks such as TESEV, SETA and etc.  These think tanks provide alternative and 
realistic foreign policy strategies aiming to increase friendly relations with surrounding 
regions. They also balance the one-dimensional orientation of Kemalist elites in Turkish 
foreign policy.  Therefore they also make a vital contribution to the emergence of 
Kantian values in Turkish foreign policy.  
 
4.3 Conclusion: The Emergence of Kantian Culture  
 
 
As discussed in the theoretical chapter Wendt argues that the behavior of consolidated 
liberal democracies in the post Cold War era “seems to go well beyond a Lockean 
culture.” He points out the fact that, contrary to Lockean culture, the North Atlantic 
states and many others have settled their disputes peacefully, and they have acted as a 
team in terms of their security in the post Cold War era. Consequently he claims that an 
emergence of Kantian culture - derived from Immanuel Kant’s “perpetual peace” – can 
be observed among the nations of Western democracies. He argues that in the Kantian 
culture the states consider each other as friends.  Accordingly, the non-violent method 
of dispute settlement and mutual assistance in case of a security threat towards any 
members of the security team are the two rules of the Kantian culture.  
 
As discussed in the previous chapters, starting from the establishment of the Turkish 
Republic its foreign policy had been shaped by the Kemalist identity and its interests. It 
is argued that throughout the history of the Turkish Republic the Lockean values were 
internalized to the third degree and Turkey was under the influence of Lockean culture 
until as late as 1999. Yet, starting from 1980 the dominance of this culture was 
challenged by a number of internal and external developments, which resulted in the 
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emergence of a Kantian culture in Turkish foreign policy in the last decade. In this 
chapter the role of the following factors in the emergence of a Kantian culture in 
Turkish foreign policy have been discussed;   
• Globalization,  
• The end of the Cold War and transformation of the geo-political and geostrategic 
position of Turkey,  
• The EU membership process: Europeanization and democratization,  
• The rise of counter elites and ideologies,  
• Economic liberalization and the rise of economic politics,  
• The rise of the JDP,  
• A new grand strategy for Turkish foreign policy: “strategic depth” 
• The rising role of civil society, i.e. NGOs, think tanks and public opinion. 
 
To begin with, it is argued that the phenomenon of globalism as in its broader sense 
was responsible for the intensification of Turkey’s economic-technological, political 
and cultural relations with the outside world in the post 1980 era. As discussed in the 
theoretical chapter the interaction between states may change the identity and interest 
of the actors which in return may create a new culture of anarchy.  In this regard the 
process of globalization has played a constructivist role by changing the Turkish 
state’s identity and interests. Like many other countries, Turkish state and society has 
been experiencing an unprecedented increase in its relations with the outside world in 
every dimension of contemporary life in the last three decades. This interaction 
transformed the Turkish state’s identity and interests producing a more open and 
liberal culture, which is substantial for the emergence of a Kantian culture in Turkey. 
One can also consider Turkey’s transition to a liberal economic model in 1980 and the 
integration of the Turkish economy into the world and capitalist economy as a direct 
result of the globalization process. 
Along with globalization, the transition to a liberal economy also played a significant 
role in the transformation of foreign policy.  Before 1980 Turkey represented a closed 
society and a statist economy, which was based on import substitution. The 
introduction of a liberal economy, export oriented growth policy and the impact of 
globalization transformed the Turkish state and society in three decades into an “open 
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society.”  The transition to a liberal economic system in Turkey in 1980 contributed to 
the embedment of liberal values in Turkish state and society. Consequently, in the past 
three decades the free market economy and its values settled into Turkish society 
producing an export oriented business elite and a more liberal political atmosphere. 
This had direct results on Turkish foreign policy, which is now tasked with finding the 
necessary foreign direct investment and foreign markets for Turkish exports, which in 
return has forced Turkey to abandon its isolationist foreign policy strategy towards its 
neighboring regions.   
In this regard, the end of the Cold War can be seen as a blessing for Turkey, since it 
has opened a vast area to Turkish economic and cultural influence such as Central 
Asia, Caucasus and Balkans, which were isolated from Turkey since the beginning of 
the Cold War.  Thos meant both opportunities and challenges for Turkish foreign 
policy. Yet the lack of strategic thinking, political instability, and financial crisis in the 
90s prevented Turkey from developing a grand strategy in the post Cold War era. 
In this regard, it was Davutoglu who took the challenge of developing a grand new 
strategy that took the new challenges and opportunities in the post Cold War era into 
consideration. The “strategic depth” doctrine offers a new interpretation of Turkey’s 
geopolitical position in the world. It describes Turkey as a pivotal country with 
multiple identities in the midst of Eurasia, which has to follow a multidimensional 
foreign policy strategy.  Consequently it argues that Turkey has to change its policy 
towards its neighbors, based on rivalry and isolation, to a zero problem and maximum 
cooperation policy based on friendship and interdependence. Davutoglu’s 
multidimensionalism and zero problem policy, which has been successfully 
implemented by the JDP governments in the last decade to a certain extent, symbolizes 
a major break with the Kemalist identities foreign policy strategy based on one-
dimensionalism and rivalry. 
In the post 1980 era, with the influence of democratization, Europeanization and 
liberalization, the dominance of Kemalist elites and Kemalist identity has been 
increasingly challenged by the rise of new counter identities such as Islamism, 
Turkism, neo-Ottomanism and conservatism. In this regard the JDP represents the rise 
of the conservative businessman and masses in Turkish politics, which reject the 
Kemalist isolation of Turkey from its surrounding regions.  It represents a 
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conservative democrat party with light neo-Ottomanist motives in its foreign policy 
strategy, which is mainly shaped by Davutoglu’s “strategic depth” doctrine. The JDP’s 
neo-Ottomanism aims to increase Turkey’s soft power by improving Turkey’s 
economic and cultural relations with countries that emerged out of the Ottoman 
Empire.  
The political reforms for further democratization in Turkey in the last three decades 
also paved the way for the increasing role of civil society in the foreign policy making 
process.  Turkish NGOs and think tanks gradually became more and more influential 
on foreign policy in this era, which was shaped absolutely by military and civil 
Kemalist elites in the past. Furthermore, the democratization reforms also resulted in 
the increasing role of public opinion in foreign policy issues.  Consequently, one can 
argue that the increasing influence of civil society has played substantial role in the 
embedment of Kantian values in Turkish society.  
It is a fact that the EU constitutes the main driving force behind the Europeanization 
and democratization of Turkish foreign policy making, transforming its mindset 
radically. The European Union exerts top-down influence on candidate states’ 
domestic political structures, which is referred to as Europeanization. As discussed 
previously, this process can be considered to be one of the main influential factors in 
the emergence of a Kantian culture in Turkish foreign policy. As discussed in the 
theoretical chapter, conditionality and power asymmetry are the main features of the 
relations between the EU and a candidate country. EU as an international institution 
has also compulsory power on its candidate countries. The EU exerts compulsory 
power because of its normative values and its material advantages stemming from a 
prospective membership. In this context the Helsinki Summit decision to grant Turkey 
candidate status was a turning point. In the post Helsinki era the EU has exerted 
enormous influence on Turkish institutions and decision makers through adaptations 
forced by conditionality and socialization of decision makers. 
The legal changes required by the EU as described in the Copenhagen criteria led to a 
loss of the Turkish Army’s influence in the formulation of foreign and security policy. 
Above all, the wide ranging EU reforms brought Turkey closer to European values and 
its foreign policy closer to a Kantian culture.  In order to become a member of the EU 
Turkey has had to resolve its border problems peacefully, show restraint in its policies 
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and improve its relations with neighboring countries and harmonize Turkish foreign 
policy with the positions of the member states within the framework of the CFSP. It is 
this area, in which the most concrete examples of the Europeanization of Turkish 
foreign policy in Turkey’s deep rooted issues such as Turkish Greek rapprochement 
after 1999, Turkey’s acceptance of Annan Plan for the unification of Cyprus in 2004, 
and the signing of protocols with Armenia can be observed. 
As discussed in the theoretical framework, Wendt argues that imitation and social 
learning constitute the two mechanisms of cultural selection, which play a significant 
role in the identity change of states. Accordingly, the many Third World countries and 
former communist states adopt the institutional and ideological attributes of Western 
states, because they perceive them successful. In the Turkish case, as discussed in the 
third chapter, the imitation of the West and Europe can be regarded the foundation of 
the Turkish Kemalist state’s identity. Thus the majority of Turkish elites have always 
considered Turkey’s membership to the European Union as their ultimate goal.  Not 
only the Kemalist identity but also the other identities such as Turkism, neo- 
Ottomanism, conservatism and to a certain extent also Islamism, has perceived the 
West as so successful that it has to be imitated.  Islamists only disagreed in the nature 
of imitation, which they argued should only include the technological achievements of 
Western civilization. Therefore one can argue that the imitation of European countries 
has been the main driving force behind the emergence of Kantian values in Turkish 
foreign policy.  
Apart from imitation, social learning also plays a substantial role in the transformation 
of Turkish foreign policy. In this regard one should note that Turkey has been a 
member of NATO since 1952, a founding member of the UN, and a candidate of EU 
membership since 1987. The increasing contact between Turkish, UN, NATO and 
above all EU officials in the troika meetings, summit diplomacy and accession 
negotiations contribute to the “socialization of decision makers around the concepts of 
common reflexes and norms of behaviours and thinking”.  This increasing contact does 
not only include the military and the foreign ministry bureaucracy but also affects all 
levels of Turkish bureaucracy, such as the Ministry of the Treasury, Transportation, 
Health and etc.  Furthermore NGOs and interest groups are also involved in this 
process as a result of increasing low politics issues such as organized crime, illegal 
migration and human trafficking. Thus the identities and norms of Turkish bureaucrats 
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from different state institutions as well as Turkish NGOs are increasingly affected by 
their European counterparts. 529  
 
As discussed before, at a macro level the rules of Kantian culture such as the non-
violent method of dispute settlement and the mutual assistance result in pluralistic 
security communities and collective security systems.  Wendt argues that the main aim 
of a pluralistic security community is to settle the disputes among its member states, 
whereas the main aim of a collective security system is to resolve the disputes between 
the community and non-member states. Wendt argues that a collective security system 
does not have to be universal and states may establish collective security systems 
“within relatively autonomous regional subsystems or security complexes”. 
Consequently, in this context one may describe the NATO as a security community, 
whose main logic is “one for all, all for one”. In the Turkish case one should note that 
Turkey became a member of NATO as early as 1952.  However it is clear that Turkey’s 
membership to NATO did not stem from its acceptance of Kantian values at that time, 
which was obvious in Turkey’s consistent suspicion of Western countries and its 
policies based on rivalry until as late as 1999. Yet, as mentioned above one may claim 
that Turkey’s membership to NATO has played an important role in the socialization of 
its decision makers, which paved the way in the emergence of a Kantian culture in the 
post Helsinki era.  
 
As mentioned before, there are three influential factors in the adaptation of cultural 
norms by actors: force, price and legitimacy, which are a reflection of the “three 
different degrees to which a norm can be internalized and thus as generating three 
different pathways by which the same structure can be produced.530  Consequently it is 
argued that a culture can be internalized in three different degrees. In Turkey’s 
transition from the Lockean values to Kantian norms, one can argue that force has been 
the main factor along with the imitation of the West and social learning through 
interaction between Turkish decision makers and NATO and EU officials.  In order to 
be accepted into the European Union, Turkey has had to accept the Kantian values that 
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are based on the mutual friendship and cooperation. Furthermore, the new rising 
conservative elites in Turkey, represented by the JDP, have perceived the accession to 
the European Union as the stabilizer of Turkish democracy, with which they cut the 
mighty Turkish Army’s influence in Turkish politics. Furthermore, the new geopolitical 
realities in the post Cold War era and the needs for fresh markets for Turkish exports 
also forced Turkey to abandon its old isolationist foreign policy strategy towards its 
surrounding regions, which was shaped by the Lockean perception of rivalry. Finally 
the “strategic depth” doctrine with its principals of multidimensionalism, 
interdependence and friendly relations with neighboring countries provided the much 
needed grand strategy for Turkish foreign policy in the post Cold War era. All in all, 
one can argue that in the last decade Turkey has been internalizing Kantian values to the 
first degree, which is an ongoing process along Turkey’s accession negotiations with the 
EU.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
Today the very foundation of Turkish foreign policy seems to be transformed radically 
which shows substantial differences compared to its features and characteristics just one 
decade ago. This study aimed to analyze the deep running processes and the factors 
behind this rapid transition which occurred in such a short time. It is argued that this 
transformation started with the transition to a liberal economy in the 80s, then 
accelerated with the effects of the end of the Cold War in the 90s, and finally came to a 
turning point with the JDP’s rule and the Europeanization in Turkey in the last decade.  
Consequently, the Turkish state’s identity and interests have been transformed, which 
resulted in the emergence of a Kantian culture in Turkish foreign policy. In order to 
achieve a clear understanding of this transition, the evolution of the Turkish state’s 
identity (i.e. the Kemalist identity) and its interests were analyzed in the third chapter. 
Then in the fourth chapter the factors behind the transition from a Lockean culture to 
Kantian culture were examined. In order to provide the readers with an overall picture 
of this transition, the results and findings of this research will be summarized in this 
chapter.    
In order to explain the transformation of Turkish foreign policy, this study applied 
holistic constructivism, which combines the internal and external factors in foreign 
policy analysis. In general terms, constructivism argues that international relations are 
socially constructed and the states’ identities and interests are indigenous to the 
interstate interaction, which means they are not given and subject to change in the 
course of interaction. Furthermore, this theory argues that the identities constitute the 
 212 
 
basis of the interests of the states.  Finally, it argues that agents and structures are 
mutually constructed.   In the analysis of Turkish foreign policy the arguments of 
conventional constructivism has been taken into consideration, since they offer various 
practical theories for the analysis of international relations. In this regard the arguments 
of systemic-level, unit-level and holistic-level constructivism were discussed in the 
theoretical framework.   Special attention was paid to the culture of anarchies theory of 
Alexander Wendt, who argues that anarchy does not always lead to self-help systems, 
and three different sorts of anarchy cultures based on enmity, rivalry and friendship 
have developed during the course of history.  
 
The third chapter analyzed the evolution of the Turkish state’s identity and interests 
after the establishment of the Turkish Republic.  As part of the holistic constructivist 
approach, the external and internal factors in the making of the Turkish state’s identity 
and interests have been included in this chapter. In this chapter it is argued that, with the 
establishment of Turkish Republic in 1923 Turkey totally abandoned the Hobbesian 
culture of the Ottoman Empire and accepted the existential rights of other states and the 
norms of a Lockean culture to the first degree. In this regard the factor of “force”, as 
explained by Wendt, has been influential in Turkey’s rejection of the Ottoman Empire’s 
conquest oriented policy, since Turkey could no longer afford this materially given the 
post world war power relations and Turkey’s ruined economy and population as a result 
of subsequent wars from 1912 to 1923.  
 
Furthermore, it is argued that after the internalization of the Lockean culture to first 
degree, Turkey had also reached the second degree of internalization in a very short 
time, in which actors adopt the norms because they believe it is in their self-interest, 
which makes their behavior towards the norms instrumental. It is argued that the 
transition from the first degree to the second degree occurred in a quite short time, 
because starting from the 18th century the Ottoman Empire was forced by European 
powers to comply with the Lockean values. This became obvious in the 19th century, 
when preserving the status quo became one of the pillars of Ottoman foreign policy and 
the Ottoman state was included in the state system of Europe.  Thus this early Ottoman 
experience in the internalization of Lockean values to the first degree helped the new 
Turkish state to internalize the Lockean values to the second degree in a relatively short 
time. The imitation of Western countries was also an important factor in Turkey’s 
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internalization of Lockean values to the second degree, since it constituted the 
foundation of Kemalist ideology in Turkey, which aimed for the total Westernization of 
Turkish society and its culture. The Kemalists, and above all the founder of the modern 
Turkish State, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, was convinced that it was Turkey’s self-interest 
to adopt all Western values and to integrate Turkey into Western civilization absolutely. 
Ataturk’s practice of foreign policy and his commitment to the Westernization of 
Turkey shaped the principals of the new Turkish state’s foreign policy, which confirmed 
Turkey’s adherence to Lockean values. Finally, as put forward by Wendt, in the third 
degree of internalization the states comply with the norms because they perceive them 
legitimate. Subsequently, the states adopt status quo policies both at the level of 
behavior and interests.  In the Turkish context it was argued that it had moved from the 
second degree to the third degree in the post Second World War era, which was 
symbolized by Turkey’s membership to the UN and NATO. 
 
As mentioned above, the constructivists argue that the identities and interests of the 
states are constructed in the process of interaction between states.  According to Wendt, 
there are two mechanisms of cultural change at the micro level: natural selection and 
cultural selection. He argues that in the transition to the Lockean culture the process of 
cultural selection plays the main role via two mechanisms, i.e. imitation and social 
learning. It is argued that in the internalization of Lockean culture in Turkish foreign 
policy, imitation and social learning have been also influential. Firstly, the Kemalist 
ideology’s main aim was the imitation of Western culture and norms. Secondly, this 
resulted in Turkey’s gradual integration into the Western alliance and institutions such 
as NATO, OECD and etc during the course of the Republic’s history, through which 
Turkish decision makers acquired new norms and identity preferences. Considering the 
history of Turkish foreign policy one can clearly argue that Turkey rejected the 
revisionist or irredentist foreign policy aims and accepted the right of existence of other 
states, which mainly places Turkey into a Lockean culture.  
 
It is argued that the Kemalist identity has been the main driving force behind the 
Turkish foreign policy interests during the much of the Republic’s history.  Furthermore 
it is also argued that, although the Kemalist identity rejected the Ottoman legacy, it has 
inherited the following elements from the Ottoman Empire:   
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• Its bureaucratic elites, its institutions and its political culture, 
• Playing one great power against another for survival and the preservation of the 
status quo,  
• Sevres Phobia and deep skepticisms and cautiousness against other states’ 
intentions and the conviction that the external world is conspiring to weaken and 
divide Turkey, 
• Troubled relations with post Ottoman  national states surrounding Turkey, 
• Perception of a Russian threat, 
•  The responsibility of the religious and ethnic minority groups in the former 
Ottoman regions in Turkey’s neighboring countries, 
• The Turkish Army’s extraordinary role in Turkish political life  
 
It is discussed that the Turkish Army has played an extraordinary role in the making of 
Turkish politics at the expense of Turkish governments and civil society. Furthermore, 
the military and civilian Kemalist bureaucracy has exerted an absolute control in the 
making of Turkish foreign policy in the first seven decades of the Turkish Republic. As 
argued before, Turkey represents a torn country between East and West. During the 
Republic’s history, the Kemalist establishment isolated itself from the conservative 
masses of Turkish society. The result of the Kemalist monopoly in foreign policy 
making was the lack of strategic thinking and theory in Turkish foreign policy. 
Moreover, due to the Sevres Phobia, the Kemalist elites were extremely suspicious 
about the intentions of other states, which they considered rivals who planned to divide 
Turkey. Thus, during the much of its history Turkish foreign policy makers have 
adopted a reaction oriented defensive and conservative policy, which almost constantly 
avoided taking any initiative. In this regard it is argued that the Turkish state’s identity 
and its foreign and security policy making culture have mainly been shaped by a 
Realpolitik view of international relations. The Kemalist elites considered the 
international environment as anarchical, which required being militarily strong and 
ready to deploy hard power military force for win-lose outcomes. 
 
To summarize, one may argue that during the Republic’s history Turkey internalized the 
Lockean culture to the third degree, which was based on the concept of rivalry rather 
than cooperation. As a result of the Lockean logic of rivalry and Kemalist foreign 
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policies preferences, Turkey isolated itself from its neighboring countries and regions 
and followed a one sided foreign policy strategy, which aimed to integrate Turkey into 
the Western civilization and its institutions. Yet, even in their aim to integrate Turkey 
into the Western world, the Kemalists were extremely cautious because of their 
suspicion about the intentions of Western countries due to the Sevres Phobia syndrome.  
 
This study argued that the dominance of a Lockean culture and the Kemalist identity in 
Turkish foreign policy has been challenged by various developments starting from the 
1980s.   Consequently, the main argumentation of this thesis is that Turkish foreign 
policy has been going through a transformation process in the last three decades. Thus, 
applying the holistic constructivist approach the following internal and external factors 
behind the transformation of Turkish foreign policy have been analyzed in the fourth 
chapter: Globalization, the end of the Cold War, The EU membership process, the rise 
of counter elites and ideologies, economic liberalization, the rise of the JDP, the 
“strategic depth” doctrine and the rising role of civil society. 
 
To begin with, it is argued that as a result of globalization in the post 1980 era, Turkey 
has witnessed an unprecedented intensification of its economic-technological, political 
and cultural relations with the outside world, which has played a substantial role in the 
emergence of liberal values in Turkish society.  Turkey’s adoption of a liberal economic 
model in 1980 and the integration of the Turkish economy into the world and capitalist 
economy was a direct consequence of globalization.  In a very short time Turkey was 
transformed from an import substitution based statist economic model to export and 
growth oriented liberal economic model, which transformed the Turkish state and 
society in three decades into an “open society.” The liberal economic model, it is 
argued, contributed to the embedment of liberal values into Turkish state and society 
and produced an export oriented business elite and a more liberal political atmosphere.  
Another direct result of liberalization and globalization on Turkish foreign policy was 
the renouncement of the Kemalist isolationist policy towards Turkey’s neighboring 
regions because Turkey had to find the necessary foreign direct investment, and foreign 
markets for Turkish exports.  In this context, one should also consider the consequences 
of the end of the Cold War. It is argued that it marked an unprecedented opportunity, 
since an immense geography from Central Asia to the Balkans that had been isolated 
from Turkey since the beginning of the Cold War was opened to Turkish economic and 
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cultural influence for the first time in the Republic’s history.  However, Turkey was 
caught unprepared for this major systemic change in the international arena and was 
unable to take the maximum advantage of it because of the lack of strategic thinking, 
political instability, and financial crises in the 90s.  
In this regard, it was Davutoglu’s “strategic depth” doctrine that has provided Turkish 
foreign policy with a new grand strategy that reinterpreted Turkish geopolitical position 
in the world with regard to post Cold War power relations. Rejecting the Kemalist 
isolationist and one dimensional foreign policy strategy, Davutoglu described Turkey as 
a pivotal country with multiple identities which has to adopt a multidimensional foreign 
policy strategy. Furthermore, he criticized Kemalist foreign policy strategy based on 
rivalry and isolation towards Turkey’s neighbors and argued that in the post Cold War 
era Turkey needed to adopt a zero problem and maximum cooperation policy based on 
friendship and interdependence towards its neighbors.  The “strategic depth” doctrine 
that has been implemented by the JDP administration since its takeover of power in 
Turkey was marked with a break with the Kemalist identity’s foreign policy 
preferences.  
Apart from these developments, starting from the 1980s the Kemalist identity has been 
increasingly challenged by the rise of alternative identities such as Islamism, Turkism, 
neo-Ottomanism and conservatism in Turkish politics, and by the increasing influence 
of democratization, Europeanization and liberalization in Turkish society and state. 
Consequently, the Kemalist establishment began to lose its grip on Turkish state and 
society in the 90s. One should also consider the rise of the JDP in Turkish politics 
within this context, which symbolizes the increasing influence of the conservative 
identity, businessman and masses in Turkish politics. This identity rejects the Kemalist 
isolation of Turkey from its surrounding regions. It is argued that the JDP can be 
described as a conservative democrat party with light neo-Ottomanism motives in its 
foreign policy strategy that is built around the “strategic depth” doctrine. In this regard 
one should also note that rather than building a new Ottoman empire, this neo-
Ottomanism envisages an increase of Turkey’s soft power by creating economic and 
cultural interdependence in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood.  Thus it is argued that 
by focusing on cultural and economic interdependence this strategy was based on the 
friendly relations with other states, which also along other factors was influential in the 
emergence of Kantian values in the Turkish society and state.  
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Another factor in the emergence of Kantian values in Turkish foreign policy has been 
the increasing role of civil society in the foreign policy making process, an area that had 
been exclusively controlled by the Kemalist establishment in the past. The triggers of 
the increasing role of the civil society have been the democratization process and the 
European Union reforms in the last three decades, which have played a substantial role 
in the embedment of Kantian values in Turkish society.  
Finally, it is argued that Europeanization has been the main driving force behind the 
emergence of Kantian values in Turkish foreign policy in the last decade.  In this regard, 
it is argued that the EU Helsinki Summit decision in 1999 to grant Turkey candidate 
status for membership can be seen as a turning point. Candidate states’ political 
structures are exposed to the top down pressure, which is labeled as Europeanization. 
Two main features of this top down relationship are conditionality and power 
asymmetry.  Candidate countries are subject to the compulsory power of the EU as an 
international institution, which stems from its normative values and its material 
advantages from a prospective membership. In this context it is argued that in the post 
Helsinki era the EU has exerted top down pressure with compulsory power on Turkish 
institutions and decision makers through adaptations forced by conditionality and the 
socialization of decision makers. Subsequently, in order to reach the Copenhagen 
criteria the EU reform packages accepted by the Turkish parliament, which resulted in 
the decrease of the Turkish Army’s role in the formulation of foreign and security 
policy. Europeanization was visible in Turkish foreign policy, which dictated Turkey to 
resolve its border problems peacefully, show restraint in its policies and improve its 
relations with neighboring countries. Turkish Greek rapprochement after 1999, 
Turkey’s acceptance of the Annan Plan for the unification of Cyprus in 2004 can be 
seen as the most concrete examples of Europeanization in Turkish foreign policy 
making. Yet one may claim that, above all, the most substantial results of the wide 
ranging EU reforms have been the emergence of European values and a Kantian culture 
in the Turkish state’s identity.  
 
As described in the theoretical framework, in the identity change of states there are two 
mechanisms: imitation and social learning. In this regard it is argued that as was the 
case in the emergence of Lockean values in the post Ottoman era, the imitation of 
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European countries has been the main driving force behind the emergence of Kantian 
values in Turkish foreign policy.  In addition to imitation, social learning also has been 
very influential in the transformation of the Turkish state’s identity and interests. In this 
regard, the increasing contact between all levels of Turkish bureaucracy and Western 
institutions such as the EU, NATO and the OECD contributed to the socialization of 
Turkish decision makers around the values of a Kantian culture.  
Furthermore, as put forward by Wendt, at a macro level the logic of Kantian culture 
produces pluralistic security communities, which aim to settle the disputes among its 
member states, and collective security systems, which seek to resolve the conflicts 
between the community and non-member states. In this regard it is argued that Turkey’s 
membership to NATO since 1952, which constitutes a collective security system, has 
been also substantial in the socialization of Turkish decision makers around the concept 
of Kantian values. Nonetheless, it is argued that Turkey’s NATO membership was not 
due to its adoption of Kantian values at that time, which was obvious in Turkey’s Cold 
War policies based on suspicion and rivalry to Western and other countries.  However, 
one can argue that the six decade relationship between Turkey and NATO has paved the 
way for the emergence of Kantian values through the socialization of Turkish decision 
makers.  
As discussed in the second chapter of this study the cultures of anarchy can be 
internalized in three different degrees, in which three factors, namely force, price and 
legitimacy, constitute the main driving forces behind the actors’ adaptation of the values 
of a certain culture of anarchy. In this context it is argued that Turkey has internalized 
the Kantian values to the first degree, in which the factor of “force” was essential along 
with imitation and the socialization of decision makers. In this regard it is argued that 
Turkey was forced to comply with Kantian values based on mutual friendship and 
cooperation in order to be accepted into the European Union. Moreover, the JDP was 
also forced to follow a pro-EU policy, as it perceived the EU as a counterbalance to the 
Turkish Army’s extraordinary role in Turkish political life. Consequently, with the help 
of EU reforms the JDP was able to reduce the military’s influence, which consolidated 
Turkish democracy in the last decade.  Furthermore, Turkey was also forced to comply 
with Kantian values and abandon its isolationist policies due to its need for new export 
markets and its new geopolitical satiation in the post Cold War world. Thus the rivalry 
based Lockean culture of Turkish foreign policy has been gradually replaced by the 
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friendship and interdependence based Kantian culture. Finally, one should also note the 
role of the “strategic depth” doctrine in this process, which formulated a new grand 
strategy for Turkey around the concept of multidimensionalism, interdependence and 
friendly relations with Turkey’s neighboring countries and regions. In this regard, it is 
argued that above all Davutoglu achieved a paradigm change in Turkish the foreign 
policy making culture with the “strategic depth” doctrine’s principals.  To sum up, it is 
argued that Turkey has been internalizing the Kantian values to the first degree in the 
last decade, which is still an ongoing process.  
 
As put forward by Wendt “the longer a practice has been in existence the deeper it will 
be embedded in the individual and collective consciousness.” Thus one may claim that 
a return to Lockean culture in Turkey seems very unlikely, since it will be embedded in 
Turkish political culture more deeply considering Turkey’s deeply institutionalized 
relations with Western institutions such as the EU, NATO and the OECD. However, 
one may claim that it will heavily depend on Turkish-EU relations and Turkey’s 
admission into the European Union in the immediate future. As a result of this one may 
argue that Turkey’s membership in the EU will be the main asset in the deeper 
internalization of Kantian culture in Turkish foreign policy. 
 
In conclusion, this study has argued that during its first seven decades Turkish foreign 
policy had been shaped by the Kemalist identity’s Lockean understanding of anarchy. 
During the Republic’s history Turkey internalized this culture to the third degree, which 
was based on rivalry and suspicion of other states’ intentions. The Kemalist identity’s 
isolationism and one-dimensionalism were the direct results of its adherence to a 
Lockean culture as well as its Westernization ideology. Yet starting form 1980s this 
culture has been challenged by a number of developments, which in the end resulted in 
the emergence of a Kantian culture in Turkish foreign policy.  Consequently, Turkish 
foreign policy has undergone a radical change, adopting a new outlook with much 
emphasis on multidimensionalism, economic and cultural interdependence, friendly 
relations, self-confidence and soft power. Yet this new policy strategy does not mean 
that Turkey will abandon one of the main pillars of its foreign policy, namely its 
Western orientation.  Therefore, it is argued that rather than symbolizing a creeping 
Islamisation and a breakaway from the West, the JDP’s foreign policy strategy reflects 
the deep running structural and cultural change in Turkish foreign policy foundations. 
 220 
 
Consequently, one may expect that the post-JDP governments, regardless of their 
ideological backgrounds, will pursue a similar multidimensional and self-confident 
foreign policy strategy stemming from the values of a Kantian culture.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 221 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 222 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 223 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. References 
 
 
Books and Pamphlets 
• 136. Bergedorfer Gesprächskreis in Istanbul 23.–25. Februar 2007, Die Türkei 
als Partner europäischer Außenpolitik im Mittleren Osten in URL: 
htp://www.koerber-stiftung.de/bg/recherche/pdf_protokoll/bnd_136_de.pdf 
(21.05.08, 15:25) 
• Abdel Latif, Omayme (2004); Interview mit Ahmet Davutoğlu, Harmonising 
immutable values and ever-changing mechanisms, in Al Ahram Weekley 11 – 17 
November, Issue No. 716 in URL: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/716/focus.htm 
(20.05.08, 12:45) 
• Ahmad, Feroz (2004); The making of modern Turkey, Routledge, London. 
• Ahmad, Feroz (2006); Bir Kimlik Peşinde Türkiye, Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 
İstanbul.   
• Akçura, Yusuf (1991); Üç Tarzı Siyaset,  TTK Basımevi, Ankara. 
• Akdogan, Yalcin (2004); Ak Parti ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi (JDP and 
conservative Democracy) Alfa Yayinlari, Istanbul. 
• Barnett, Michael/ Duvall, Raymond (2005); Power in global governance, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
• Başkaya, Fikret (2002); Paradigmanın İflası: Resmi İdeolojinin Eleştirisine Giriş 
(The end of the Paradigm: Indroduction to the critic of State Ideology), Özgür 
Üniversite, Ankara. 
• Beriker, Nimet/ Kesler, Ayse (2006); Dynamics of Foreign Policy Change in 
Turkey: A Comparative Analysis, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
International Studies Association, Town & Country Resort and Convention Center, 
San Diego, California. 
• Burchill, Scott (Ed) (2009); Theories of International Relations, Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke. 
• Çakır, Rusen (1990); Ayet ve Slogan, Türkiye’de islami Olusumlar (Verses and 
Slogans, Islamic Formations in Turkey), Istanbul, Metis. 
• Çalış, Şaban (2001); Hayalet Bilimi ve Hayali Kimlikler: Neo Osmanlıcılık Özal 
ve Balkanlar, Çizgi Kitabevi, Konya. 
• Cizre, Ümit (eds.); Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the 
Justice and Development Party, Routledge, 2007, London. 
 224 
 
• Cook, Steven A. (2007); Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political 
Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey, The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
• Dağı, İhsan D. (1998); Türk Dış Politikasında Gelenek ve Değişim, Siyasal 
Kitabevi, Ankara. 
• Dağı, Zeynep (Hrsg.) (2006); Ak Partili Yıllar: Doğudan Batıya Dışpolitika, Orion, 
İstanbul. 
• Davutoglu, Ahmet (1994); Civilizational transformation and the muslim world, 
Mahir Publ, Kuala Lumpur. 
• Davutoglu, Ahmet (2000); Globalization and the Crisis of Individual and 
Civilizational Consciousness, In: Globality versus democracy?: the changing nature 
of  international relations in the era of globalization, ed. by Hans Köchler, Jamahir 
Society for Culture and Philosophy, Vienna           
• Davutoglu, Ahmet (2001); Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiyenin uluslararasi Konumu 
(Strategic Depth: Turkey´s Place in the World), Küre, Istanbul 
• Davutoglu, Ahmet (2002); Küresel Bunalım (Global Crisis); Küre, Istanbul. 
• Dunne, Tim/ Kurki, Milja/ Smith, Steve (2010); International Relations Theories: 
Discipline and Diversity, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
• Featherstone, Kevin/ Kazamias, George (Ed.) (2001); Europeanization and 
Southern Periphery, Frank Cass, London. 
• Finnemore, Martha (1996); National interests in international society, Cornell 
University Press, New York. 
• Finnemore, Martha/ Barnett, Michael (2004); Rules for the World: International 
Organizations in Global Politics, Cornell University Press, New York. 
• Fuller, Graham E. (2008); The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in 
the Muslim World, US Institute of Peace Press, Washington. 
• Grigoriadis, Ionnnis, N. (2009); Trials of Europeanization: Turkish Political 
Culture and the European Union, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.   
• Gül, Abdullah (2007); Yeni Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikasının Ufukları, T.C. 
Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Ankara. 
• Gürbey, Gülistan (1997); Türkische Außenpolitik unter Necmettin Erbakan: 
Islamistische Wende? In: Südosteuropa Mitteilungen, 2/1997, S. 125-139 
• Hale, William M. (2000); Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, Frank Cass, London.  
• Hecht, Rudolf   (Hrsg.) (2005); Wissenschaftliches Forum für Internationale 
Sicherheit: Bruchlinien der Sicherheitspolitik: Die Türkei und das Spannungsfeld 
Naher Osten, Landesverteidigungsakademie, Wien. 
• Hopf, Ted (2002); Social Construction of International Politics: Identities & 
Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999, Cornell University Press. 
• İskit, Temel (2007); Diplomasi: Tarihi, Teorisi, Kurumları ve Uygulaması 
(Diplomacy: History, Teory, Institituions and Implemantation) İstanbul Bilgi 
Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul. 
• Ismael, Tareq Y.  (Ed.) (2003); Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: A 
Changing Role in World Politics. Adlershot. 
• Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2010); Introduction to International Relations: 
Theories and Approaches, Oxford University Press, Oxford.. 
• Katzenstein, Peter J. (Ed) (1996); Cultural Norms & National Security: Police and 
Military in Postwar Japan, Cornell University Press, New York. 
• Katzenstein, Peter J. (Ed) (1996); The Culture of National Security: Norms and 
identity in World Politics, Columbia University Press, New York.  
• Keohane, Robert (1984); After hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy, Princeton University Press, Princeton 
 225 
 
• Küçükömer, İdris (2001); Batılaşma: Düzenin Yabancılaşması, Bağlam, İstanbul. 
• Laçiner, Sedat/ Özcan, Mehmet/Bal, Ihsan (2005); European Union with Turkey: 
the possible impact of Turkey's membership on The European Union, Internat. 
Strategic Res. Org. (ISRO) USAK, Ankara. 
• Larrabee, F. Stephen/ Lesser, Ian O. (2003); Turkish foreign policy in an age of 
uncertainty, Rand, Santa Monica Californien.  
• Lewis, Bernard (2002); The Emergence of Modern Turkey, Oxford Univ. Press, 
New York. 
• Makosky, Alan (Ed) (2000); Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish 
Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution.. 
• Mardin, Serif (2003); Religion, society and modernity in Turkey, Syracuse Univ. 
Press, N.Y. 
• Oran, Baskın (Ed.) (2006); Türk Dış Politikası I 1919-1980, Kurtuluş Savaşından 
Bugüne Olgular Belgeler Yorumlar, (Turkish Foreign Policy I, 1919-1980), İletişim 
, İstanbul. 
• Oran, Baskın (Ed.) (2006); Türk Dış Politikası, Band II, 1980-2001, Kurtuluş 
Savaşından Bugüne Olgular Belgeler Yorumlar, (Turkish Foreign Policy II, 1980-
2001),  İletişim , İstanbul. 
• Özcan, Mesut (2008); Harmonizing foreign policy, Turkey, the EU and the Middle 
East, Ashgate, Aldershot. 
• Risse, Thomas/ Ropp, Stephen C./ Sikkink, Kathryn (1999); The power of 
human rights: international norms and domestic change, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge.  
• Robins, Philip (2003); Suits and uniforms: Turkish foreign policy since the Cold 
War, Univ. of Washington Press, Seattle. 
• Sander, Oral (2006); Türkiyenin Dış Politikası (Turkey´s Foreign Policy), İmge, 
İstanbul. 
• Seufert, Günter (2005); Vom Außenposten des Westens zum regionalen Akteur; 
Das neue Selbstbewusstsein der Türkei. In: Das Parlament. 32-33/2005. 
• Smith, Steve/ Hadfield, Amelia/ Dunne, Tim (2008); Foreign Policy: Theories 
Actors Cases, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
• Sönmezoğlu, Faruk (2001); Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi (The Analysis of 
Turkish Foreign Policy), Der Yayınları, İstanbul. 
• Uzgel, İlhan/Duru, Bülent (Ed. )(2009); AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu 
(The book of JDP: An account of a transformation), Phoenix Yayınevi, Ankara.  
• Waltz,  K. N. (1979); Theory of International Politics, McGrav-Hill, Boston. 
• Wendt, Alexander (2009); Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge.  
• Yavuz, M. Hakan (Hrsg.) (2006); The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy 
and the AK Party. Salt Lake City, Utah. 
• Zürcher, Erik Jan (2004); Turkey: A Modern History, Tauris, London. 
• Zengin, Gürkan (2010); Hoca: Türk Dış Politikasında Davutoğlu Etkisi (Teacher: 
The İnfluence of Davutoglu on Turkish Foreign Policy), Inkilap, İstanbul. 
• Walker, Joshua W.; The sources of Turkish Grand Strategy- ‘Strategic Depth’ and 
‘Zero- Problems’ in Context, in Kitchen, Nicholas (Ed.) (2011); Turkey's Global 
Strategy, LSE IDEAS, pp. 6-12. 
 
 
 
 
 226 
 
 
Articles 
• Ahmadov, Ramin (2008); Counter Transformations in the Center and Periphery of 
Turkish Society and the Rise of the Justice and Development Party, Alternatives: 
Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol. 7, No. 2 & 3, Summer & Fall 2008, 
pp. 15-36. 
• Akgün, Birol (2002); Twins or Enemies; Comparing Nationalist and Islamist 
Traditions in Turkish Politics, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, 
No. 1 (March 2002), pp. 17- 35. 
• Akgünay, Rafet (2006): Turkey's Approach to the Black Sea Region, Insight 
Turkey, Volume 8, Number 2/2006. 
• Akil, Hakki (2003); Turkey’s Role in European Security as the Epicenter of 
Regional Energy Routes, Turkish Policy Quarterly Vol. 2, No. 3, Fall 2003. 
• Aksop, Ece (2006); The Iranian Nuclear Program: The NPT, the West, Iran and 
Turkey, Insight Turkey, Volume 8, Number 1/2006. 
• Aktürk, Sener (2006); Turkey's Special Relationship with Germany and Russia, 
Insight Turkey, Volume 8, Number 4/2006. 
• Aktürk, Sener (2006); Turkish-Russian Relations after the Cold War (1992-2002), 
Turkish Studies, Volume 7, Issue 3, September 2006, pp. 337 – 364. 
• Aliriza, Bülent/ Ciftci, Seda (2002); Turkey´s Post-election political landscape, 
Insight Turkey, Volume 4, Number 4/2002, pp.7-11 
• Altinay, Hakan (2008); Turkey’s Soft Power: An Unpolished Gem or an Elusive 
Mirage?, Insight Turkey, Volume 10, Number 2/2008. 
• Altunışık, Meliha Benli (2008); The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey’s Soft 
Power in the Middle East, Insight Turkey, Volume 10, Number 2/2008, pp. 41-54. 
• An interview with Ambassador Ümit Halûk Bayülken: Turkish foreign policy: 
past, present and future, Insight Turkey, Volume 4, Number 4/2002 
• An Interview with Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül: Turkey and the 
Middle East, Insight Turkey, Volume 6, Number 1/2004 
• Aral, Berdal (2009); Turkey in the UN Security Council: Its Election and 
Performance, Insight Turkey, Volume 11, Number 4/2009, pp.151-168. 
• Aral, Bülent (2003); Failure of political Islam in Turkey, Turkish Policy Quarterly 
Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 2003. 
• Aras, Bülent (2002); Academic Perceptions of Turkish Israeli Relations, 
Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol.1, No.1, (Spring 2002), 
pp. 1-17. 
• Aras, Bülent (2005); Turkey and the GCC: An Emerging Relationship, Middle East 
Policy, Vol. XII, No. 4, Winter 2005, pp. 89-97. 
• Aras, Bülent (2009); The Davutoglu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy, Insight Turkey, 
Volume 11, Number 3/2009, pp127-142. 
• Aras, Bülent (2009); Turkey's rise in the Greater Middle East: peace-building in the 
periphery, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Volume 11, Issue 1, March 
2009, pp. 29– 41. 
• Aras, Bülent; Turkey Between Syria and Israel, Turkey`s Rising Soft Power, SETA 
Policy Brief, May 2008, No. 15. 
• Atacan, Fulya (2005); Explaining Religious Politics at the Crossroad: AKP-SP, 
Turkish Studies, Volume 6, Issue 2, June 2005, pp. 187–199. 
 227 
 
• Ataman, Muhittin (2002); Leadership Change Özal Leadership and Restructuring 
in Turkish Foreign Policy, Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, 
Vol.1, No.1, (Spring 2002), pp. 120-153. 
• Ataman, Muhittin (2003); The Impact of Non-State Actors on World Politics: A 
Challenge to Nation-States, Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, 
Vol.2, No.1, Fall 2003, pp. 42-66. 
• Aybet, Gülnur (2006); Turkey's long and winding road to the EU: implications for 
the Balkans, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Volume 8, Issue 1, April 
2006, pp. 65 – 83. 
• Aydin Mustafa/ Acikmese, Sinem A. (2007); Europeanization through EU 
conditionality: understanding the new era in Turkish foreign policy, Journal of 
Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Volume 9, Issue 3, December 2007, pp. 263–274. 
• Aydın, Mustafa (2000); Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing 
Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 36, 
No. 1, January 2000, p. 103-139 
• Aydin, Mustafa (2004); Turkish foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis, SAM 
(Center for Strategic Research) Papers, December 2004, Ankara. 
• Aydin, Senem/ Cakir, Rusen (2007); Political Islam in Turkey, Insight Turkey, 
Volume 9, Number 1/2007. 
• Babacan, Ali; Conservative Democracy: Good Governance for Rapid Convergence, 
Turkish Policy Quarterly Vol. 2, No. 3, Fall 2003. 
• Bac, Meltem Müftüler; Turkey’s Foreign Policy Challenges in the new 
millennium, Turkish Policy Quarterly Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 2002. 
• Bacik, Gökhan (2003); Re-Socializing Religion: Islam and the new social Contract 
in Turkey, Turkish Policy Quarterly Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 2003. 
• Bacik, Gökhan (2007); Turkey – Syria: A Belated Friendship?, Insight Turkey, 
Volume 9, Number 3/2007. 
• Bacik, Gökhan/ Aras Bülent (2004); Turkey’s Inescapable Dilemma: America or 
Europe?, Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol.3, No.1, 
Spring 2004, pp. 56-74 
• Bagdonas, Özlem Demirtas (2008); The Clash of Kemalisms? Reflections on the 
Past and Present Politics of Kemalism in Turkish Political Discourse, Turkish 
Studies, Volume 9, Issue 1, March 2008, pp. 99 – 114. 
• Balkir, Canan (2007); The July 2007 Elections in Turkey: A Test for Democracy, 
Mediterranean Politics, Volume 12, Issue 3, November 2007, pp. 415-422. 
• Baran, Zeyno (2008); Turkey Divided, Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 
1 January 2008, p. 55-69. 
• Beng, Phar Kim (2007); The Strategic Benefits of Turkey’s Admission into the 
East Asia Summit, Insight Turkey, Volume 9, Number 4/2007. 
• Beng, Phar Kim (2008); Turkey’s Potential as a Soft Power: A Call for Conceptual 
Clarity, Insight Turkey, Volume 10, Number 2/2008. 
• Bilgin, Hasret Dikici (2008); Foreign Policy Orientation of Turkey's Pro-Islamist 
Parties: A Comparative Study of the AKP and Refah, Turkish Studies, Volume 9, 
Issue 3, September 2008, pp. 407 – 421. 
• Bilgin, Pinar/ Elis, Berivan (2008); Hard Power, Soft Power: Towards a More 
Realistic Power Analysis, Insight Turkey, Volume 10, Number 2/2008. 
• Bishku, Michael B. (2003); Turkish-Bulgarian Relations: From Conflict and 
Distrust to Cooperation, Mediterranean Quarterly: Spring 2003, 77-94. 
• Bolme, Selin M. (2009); Charting Turkish Diplomacy in the Gaza Conflict, Insight 
Turkey, Vol. 11 / No. 1 / 2009 January – March, pp. 23-31. 
 228 
 
• Bonner Arthur (2004); An Islamic Reformation in Turkey, Middle East Policy, 
Vol. XI, No. 1, Spring 2004, pp. 84-97.   
• Bonner; Arthur (2005); Turkey the European Union and Paradigm Shifts, Middle 
East Policy, Vol. XII, No. 1, Spring 2005, pp. 44-71. 
• Bozdaglioglu, Yücel (2008); Modernity, Identity and Turkey’s Foreign Policy, 
Insight Turkey, Volume 10, Number 1/2008. 
• Buharali, Can (2004); Turkey's Foreign Policy towards EU Membership: A 
Security Perspective, Turkish Policy Quarterly Vol. 3, No. 3, Fall 2004. 
• Bulbul, Kudret (2006); Turkey and the EU: A Survey on Turkish MPs’ EU Vision, 
Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol. 5, No.3, Fall 2006, pp. 
32-60.  
• Bülbül, Kudret/ Berat, Bekir/ Kalin, Ibrahim (2008); Turkish Perceptions of the 
West, Insight Turkey, Volume 10, Number 1/2008. 
• Bulut, Esra (2004); The Role of Religion in Turkish Reactions to Balkan Conflicts,   
Turkish Policy Quarterly Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 2004, pp.1-13. 
• Cagaptay, Soner (2002); The November 2002 Elections and Turkey`s new political 
era, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4 (December 2002), 
pp. 42-48. 
• Cagaptay, Soner (2004); Where Goes the U.S.-Turkish Relationship?  Middle East 
Quarterly, Fall 2004. 
• Cagaptay, Soner/ Yegenoglu, Duden (2006); The Myth of Iranian-Turkish Amity, 
Insight Turkey, Volume 8, Number 3/2006. 
• Calleya, Stephen C. (2006); EU-Turkish Relations: Prospects and Problems, 
Mediterranean Quarterly: Spring 2006, p. 40-47. 
• Candar Cengiz /Fuller, Graham E. (2001); Grand Geopolitics for a New Turkey, 
Mediterranean Quarterly: Winter 2001, pp. 22-38. 
• Carkoglu, Ali (2002); Turkey`s November 2002 Elections: A new Beginning?, 
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4 (December 2002), pp. 
30-41. 
• Celenk, Ayse Aslihan (2007); The Restructuring of Turkey's Policy towards 
Cyprus: The Justice and Development Party's Struggle for Power Turkish Studies, 
Volume 8, Issue 3, September 2007, pp. 349–363. 
• Celenk, Ayse Aslihan (2009); Europeanization and Administrative Reform: The 
Case of Turkey, Mediterranean Politics, Volume 14, Issue 1, March 2009, pp. 41 – 
60. 
• Cem, Ismail (2002); Turkish foreign Policy: Opening new Horizons for Turkey at 
the beginning of a new Millennium, Turkish Policy Quarterly Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 
2002. 
• Cetinsaya, Gökhan (2003); Esential Friends and natural Enemies: The historical 
roots of Turkish Iranian relations, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 
7, No. 3 (September 2003), pp. 116-132.  
• Cetinsaya, Gökhan (2006); Turkey and the New Iraq, Insight Turkey, Volume 8, 
Number 2/2006. 
• Cizre, Umit/ Cinar, Menderes (2003); Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism, and 
Politics in the Light of the February 28 Process, The South Atlantic Quarterly 
Spring/Summer 2003, pp. 309-332. 
• Colak, Yilmaz (2006); Ottomanism vs. Kemalism: Collective memory and cultural 
pluralism in 1990s Turkey. Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 42, No. 4, July 2006, pp. 
587 – 602. 
 229 
 
• Collinsworth, Allen; Bridging the sincerity gap: A case for Turkey`s bid for a non-
permanent seat on the united Nations Security Council, Turkish Policy Quarterly, 
Vol. 6, No.4, pp.41-47. 
• Cooper, Malcolm (2002); The legacy of Atatürk: Turkish political structures and 
policy-making, International Affairs 78, 1 (2002), pp. 115-128. 
• Dagi, Ihsan (2008); Turkey`s AKP in Power, Journal of Democracy Volume 19, 
Number 3 July 2008, p. 25-30. 
• Dagi, Ihsan D. (2005); Transformation of Islamic political identity in Turkey: 
Rethinking the West and westernization Turkish Studies, Volume 6, Issue 1, March 
2005, pp. 21 – 37. 
• Danforth, Nicholas (2008); Ideology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy: 
From Atatürk to the AKP, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 3, Fall 2008, p.83-
95. 
• Davutoglu, Ahmet (1999); Tarih İdraki olusumunda metedolojinin rolü: 
Medeniyetlerarası etkileşim açısından dünya tarihi ve Osmanlı, Divan İlmi 
Araştırmalar, 1999/2, Istanbul. 
• Davutoglu, Ahmet (2000); Bunalımdan Dönüşüme Batı Medeniyeti ve 
Hristiyanlık, Divan Ilmi Araştırmalar, 2000/2, Istanbul. 
• Davutoglu, Ahmet (2003); EU-Türkei: Analyse über eine mehrdimensionale und 
vielschichtige Beziehung, Avrupa Günlügü,  No. 2. 
• Davutoğlu, Ahmet (2008); Turkeys Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 
2007, Insight Turkey, Vol.10, No.1, 2008, pp.77-96. 
• Deva, Nirj; Turkey a Success in Modernization, a Failure in self-Promotion, 
Turkish Policy Quarterly Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 25-31.  
• Dogan, Erhan (2005); The Historical and Discoursive Roots of the Justice and 
Development Party's EU Stance Turkish Studies, Volume 6, Issue 3, September 
2005, pp. 421 – 437. 
• Efegil, Ertan (2004); Why Did the Turkish Parliament Reject the Memorandum of 
March 1?, Insight Turkey, Volume 6, Number 1/2004 
• Efegil, Ertan (2008); Turkey’s New Approaches toward the PKK, Iraqi Kurds and 
the Kurdish Question, Insight Turkey Vol. 10 / No. 3 / 2008 pp. 53-73. 
• Erdogdu, Erkan (2002); Turkey and Europe: Undivided but not united, Middle 
East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 2 (June 2002), pp. 40-51- 
• Fidan, Hakan/ Nurdun, Rahman (2008); Turkey's role in the global development 
assistance community: the case of TIKA (Turkish International Cooperation and 
Development Agency), Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Volume 10, 
Issue 1, April 2008, pp. 93-111. 
• Fuller, Graham E. (1992); Turkey Faces East; New Orientations Toward the 
Middle East and the Old Soviet Union, A rand Paper, Santa Monica 
• Fuller, Graham E. (2004); Turkey’s Strategic Model: Myths and Realities, The 
Washington Quarterly, Summer 2004, pp. 51–64. 
• Ghadry, Farid (2005); Syrian-Turkish Relations: At What Price? ; Turkish Policy 
Quarterly Vol. 4, No. 2, Summer 2005, pp. 65-69. 
• Ghanim, David (2009); Turkish Democracy and Political Islam, Middle East 
Policy, Vol. XVI, No.1, Spring 2009, pp. 75-84.  
• Gogus, Hasan; The Vision for Turkey on the UN Security Council; Turkish Policy 
Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 2,  pp. 39-44. 
• Görgülü, Aybars (2009); Towards a Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement, Insight 
Turkey, Volume 11, Number 2/2009, pp.19-29. 
 230 
 
• Greenwood, David (2005); Turkish Civil-Military Relations and the EU: 
Preparation for Continuing Convergence, Insight Turkey, Volume7, Number 
4/2005. pp.126-131.  
• Grigoriadis, Ioannis N./ Kamaras, Antonis (2008); Foreign Direct Investment in 
Turkey: Historical Constraints and the AKP Success Story, Middle Eastern Studies, 
Vol. 44, No. 1, , January 2008, pp. 53 – 68. 
• Guida, Michelangelo (2008); The Sevres Syndrome and “Komplo” Theories in the 
islamist and secular press, Turkish Studies, Volume 9, Issue 1, March 2008, pp. 37 – 
52. 
• Gül, Abdullah (2003); Turkey’s Vision for the Transatlantic Partnership, Turkish 
Policy Quarterly Vol. 2, No. 2, Summer 2003. 
• Gül, Abdullah (2004); Turkey’s Role in a Changing Middle East Environment, 
Mediterranean Quarterly: Winter 2004, pp. 1-7 
• Gül, Abdullah (2004); Turkey's EU Membership: Seeing the Transatlantic Gains, 
Turkish Policy Quarterly Vol. 3, No. 3, Fall 2004. 
• Gül, Abdullah; Why is a non-permanent seat for Turkey at the United Nations 
Security Council important for herself, her Region and World, Turkish Policy 
Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp.13-16. 
• Gulay, Erol N. (2007); The Gülen Phenomenon: A Neo-Sufi Challenge to Turkey’s 
Rival Elite?; Critical Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1, 37–61, Spring 2007 
• Hakki, Murat Metin (2006); Turkey and the EU: Past Challenges and Important 
Issues Lying Ahead, Turkish Studies, Volume 7, Issue 3, September 2006, pp. 451 – 
471. 
• Hale, William (2005); Christian Democracy and the AKP: Parallels and Contrasts, 
Turkish Studies, Volume 6, Issue 2, June 2005, pp. 293 – 310. 
• Hale, William (2009); Turkey and the Middle East in the New Era, Insight Turkey, 
Volume 11, Number 3/2009, pp. 143-161 
• Hamid, Shadi (2004); From Erbakan to Erdoğan: The Evolution of Turkish 
Foreign Policy, Insight Turkey, Volume 6, Number 1/2004 
• Haqqani, Husain/ Fradkin,  Hillel (2008); Going back to the origins, Journal of 
Democracy Volume 19, Number 3 July 2008, p. 13-18 
• Hazar, Numan; Turkey`s Opening up to Africa, Asam Perspective, August 2008, No 4, 
available at: http://www.asam.org.tr/temp/temp777.pdf (accessed on 06.03.2012; 14:58) 
• Heper, Metin (2003); The Victory of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, 
Mediterranean Politics, Volume 8, Issue 1, Spring 2003, pp. 127 – 134. 
• Heper, Metin (2005); The Justice and Development Party Government and the 
Military in Turkey, Turkish Studies, Volume 6, Issue 2, June 2005, pp. 215–231.  
• Heper, Metin (2003); The Justice and Development Party: Towards a 
Reconciliation of Islam and Democracy in Turkey?, Tel Aviv University The Moshe 
Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies The Annual Georges A. 
Kaller Lecture March 16, 2003.   
• Ibrahim Kalin (2009); Debating Turkey in the Middle East: The Dawn of a New 
Geo-Political Imagination? Insight Turkey, Vol. 11 / No. 1 / 2009 January – March, 
pp. 83-96. 
• Idiz, Semih (2003); The AKP's Foreign Policy: Learning it in the Hard Way,  
Turkish Policy Quarterly Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 2003. 
• Insel, Ahmet (2003); The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey, The South 
Atlantic Quarterly Spring/Summer 2003, pp. 293-308. 
 231 
 
• Interview with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili: An exclusive Insight 
Turkey interview with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, conducted by 
Insight Turkey editor Suat Kiniklioglu, Insight Turkey, Volume 6, Number 2/2004 
• Iskandaryan, Alexander (2009); Armenian- Turkish Rapprochement: Timing 
Matters, Insight Turkey, Volume 11, Number 3/2009, pp.37-45. 
• Jenkins, Gareth (2007); Continuity and change: prospects for civil–military 
relations in Turkey, International Affairs 83: 2 (2007), pp. 339–355. 
• Jung, Dietrich (2005); Turkey and the Arab World: Historical Narratives and New 
Political Realities, Mediterranean Politics, Volume 10, Issue 1, March 2005, pp. 1 – 
17. 
• Kalaycioglu, Ersin (2007); Politics of Conservatism in Turkey, Turkish Studies, 
Volume 8, Issue 2, June 2007, pp. 233 – 252. 
• Kaplan, Sam (2005); “Religious Nationalism”: A Textbook Case from Turkey, 
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, A Duke University 
Press, Vol. 25, No. 3, 2005, p. 665-676. 
• Karabelias, Gerassimos (2008); Dictating the Upper Tide: Civil-Military Relations 
in the Post-Özal Decade: 1993-2003, Turkish Studies, Volume 9, Issue 3, September 
2008 , pp. 457 – 473. 
• Karagiannis, Emmanuel (2004); The Turkish-Georgian partnership and the 
pipeline factor, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Volume 6, Issue 1, 
April 2004, pp. 13–26. 
• Kardas, Şaban (2008); Turkey under the Justice and Development Party: Between 
Transformation of 'Islamism' and Democratic Consolidation?, Critique: Critical 
Middle Eastern Studies, Summer 2008, Vol. 17 Issue 2, pp. 175-187. 
• Kavas, Ahmet/ Tepebas, Ufuk; II. International Turkish- African Congress: Sub- 
Saharan Africa Economic Cooperation, Development Aids and Investment 
Opportunities between Turkey and Sub Saharan Africa- Final Report, TASAM  
Strategic Report No. 17, March 2007. 
• Kavas, Serap (2006); Turkish Modernization: Present Challenges within the 
context of the AK Party and the European Union, Insight Turkey, Volume 8, 
Number 4/2006. 
• Kaya, Ayhan/ Tecmen, Ayse (2011); The role of common cultural heritage in 
external promotion of modern Turkey: Yunus Emre Cultural Centres, Working 
paper No: 4 EU /4/2011, The European Institute of Istanbul Bilgi University 
• Kinacioglu, Müge/ Oktay, Emel (2006); The Domestic Dynamics of Turkey's 
Cyprus Policy: Implications for Turkey's Accession to the European Union, Turkish 
Studies, Volume 7, Issue 2, June 2006, pp. 261 – 273. 
• Kiniklioglu, Suat (2006); The Anatomy of Turkish-Russian Relations, Insight 
Turkey, Volume 8, Number 2/2006. 
• Kirisci, Kemal (2004); Between Europe and the Middle East: The Transformation 
of Turkish Foreign Policy, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 
1 (March, 2004), pp. 39-51. 
• Kirişçi, Kemal (2006): Turkey's foreign policy in turbulent times, Chaillot Paper No 92 
September 2006, Inst. for Security Studies European Union, Paris, available at 
http://aei.pitt.edu/7409/01/chai92.pdf (accessed 19.05.08, 13:30) 
• Kirisci, Kemal (2007); Turkey: A Country of Transition from Emigration to 
Immigration, Mediterranean Politics, Volume 12, Issue 1, March 2007, pp.91-97. 
• Kösebalaban, Hasan (2008); Torn Identities and Foreign Policy: The Case of 
Turkey and Japan, Insight Turkey, Volume 10, Number 1/2008. 
 232 
 
• Krespin, Rachel Sharon (2009); Fethullah Gülen's Grand Ambition: Turkey's 
Islamist Danger, Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2009, pp. 55-66. 
• Kubicek, Paul (2005); The European Union and Grassroots Democratization in 
Turkey, Turkish Studies, Volume 6, Issue 3, September 2005, pp. 361 – 377. 
• Kücükkan, Talip (2004); Turkey´s Identity Options and the Challenges of 
Turkey´s EU Relations, Insight Turkey, Volume 6, Number 3/2004, pp.120-124. 
• Kulahci, Erol (2005); EU political conditionality and parties in government: human 
rights and the quest for Turkish transformation, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern 
Studies, Volume 7, Issue 3, December 2005, pp. 387–402. 
• Kulaklikaya, Musa/ Aybey, Ali (2008); An Emerging Donor in Mediterranean 
Basin: Turkey, Mediterranean Yearbook, 2008,  pp. 263-268. 
• Laciner, Sedat; "Özalism (Neo-Ottomanism): An Alternative in Turkish Foreign 
Policy?", Journal of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 1, No.: 1-2, 2003-2004, pp. 161-
202. 
• Lagoglu, O. Faruk; Turkey with a seat on the UN Security Council: Tough 
Decisions ahead,  Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 23-26. 
• Larrabee, Stephen (2007); Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East, Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 86, No.4, July/August 2007, pp.103-114.  
• Lesser, Ian O.; Turkey`s Regional Role: Harder Choices Ahead, Turkish Policy 
Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 33-37. 
• Lewis, Jonathan Eric (2006); Replace Turkey as a Strategic Partner?, Middle East 
Quarterly, Spring 2006, pp. 45-52. 
• Livanios, Dimitris (2006); The 'sick man' paradox: history, rhetoric and the 
'European character' of Turkey, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 
Volume 8, Issue 3, December 2006, pp. 299–311. 
• Makovsky, Alan (1999); The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy: Turkey's 
Role in the Twenty-First Century, SAIS Review, Volume 19, Number 1, Winter-
Spring 1999, pp. 92-113. 
• Mardin, Serif (2005); Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: 
Continuity, Rupture and Reconstruction in Operational Codes, Turkish Studies, 
Volume 6, Issue 2 June 2005, pp.145 - 165 
• Martin, Lenore G. (2009); Turkey and Gulf Cooperation Council Security, Turkish 
Studies, Volume 10, Issue 1, March 2009, pp. 75-93. 
• Mateescu, Dragos  C. (2006); Kemalism in the Era of Totalitarianism: A 
Conceptual Analysis, Turkish Studies, Volume 7, Issue 2, June 2006, pp. 225 – 241. 
• Meral, Ziya/ Paris, Jonathan (2010); Decoding Turkish Foreign Policy 
Hyperactivity, The Washington Quarterly, 33:4, pp 75-86. 
• Murinson, Alexander (2006); The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign 
Policy, Middle Eastern Studies, November 2006, Vol. 42, No. 6, p. 945 – 964. 
• Nafi, Basheer M. (2009); The Arabs and Modern Turkey: A Century of Changing 
Perceptions, Insight Turkey Vol. 11 / No. 1 / 2009, pp. 63-82. 
• Narbone, Luigi/ Tocci, Nathalie (2007); Running around in circles? The cyclical 
relationship between Turkey and the European Union, Journal of Balkan and Near 
Eastern Studies, Volume 9, Issue 3, December 2007, pp. 233–245. 
• Nasr, Vali (2005); The Rise of Muslim Democracy, Journal of Democracy Volume 
16, Number 2 April 2005, p. 18-27. 
• Nazli, H. Kaan; Turkey and North Africa: Challenge and Opportunity; Turkish 
Policy Quarterly Vol. 4, No. 2, Summer 2005, pp. 169-180. 
• Noureddine, Mohammed (2009); Arab-Turkish Cooperation in the New Era, 
Insight Turkey, Vol. 11 / No. 1 / 2009 January – March, pp. 43-51. 
 233 
 
• Ögütcü, Mehmet (2002); Turkey's New Economic Diplomacy: Balancing 
Commercial Interests with Geopolitical Goals, Turkish Policy Quarterly Vol. 1, No. 
1, Spring 2002. 
• Oguzlu, Tarik (2007); Soft power in Turkish foreign policy, Australian Journal of 
International Affairs,  Volume 61, Number 1, March 2007, pp. 81-97 
• Oguzlu, Tarik (2007); The Future of Turkey's Westernization: A Security 
Perspective, Insight Turkey, Volume 9, Number 3/2007. 
• Oguzlu, Tarik (2008); Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy: Does 
Turkey Dissociate from the West?, Turkish Studies, Volume 9, Issue 1, March 2008, 
pp. 3 – 20. 
• Olson, Robert (2007); Turkey’s Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council from 
2003 to 2007: New Paradigms?, Mediterranean Quarterly: Summer 2008, pp. 68-87. 
• Onar, Nora (2007); Kemalists, Islamists, and Liberals: Shifting Patterns of 
Confrontation and Consensus: 2002-06, Turkish Studies, Volume 8, Issue 2, June 
2007, pp. 273 – 288. 
• Onar, Nora Fisher (2009); Echoes of a Universalism Lost: Rival Representations 
of the Ottomans in Today's Turkey, Middle Eastern Studies, Volume 45, Number 2, 
March 2009, pp. 229-241. 
• Önder, Nilgün (2008); The Turkish project of Globalization and new Regionalism,  
Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol. 7, No. 2 & 3, Summer 
& Fall 2008, pp. 86-110. 
• Önis, Ziya (2009); Conservative Globalism at the Crossroads: The Justice and 
Development Party and the Thorny Path to Democratic Consolidation in Turkey, 
Mediterranean Politics, Volume 14, Issue 1, March 2009, pp. 21–40. 
• Önis, Ziya/ Keyman, E. Fuat (2003); Turkey at the Polls: A new Path Emerges, 
Journal of Democracy Volume 14, Number 2 April 2003,  p. 95-107. 
• Önis, Ziya/ Yilmaz, Suhnaz (2009); Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism: 
Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era, Turkish Studies, Volume 
10, Issue 1, March 2009, pp. 7–24. 
• Özbudun, Ergun (2007); Democratization Reforms in Turkey: 1993-2004, Turkish 
Studies, Volume 8, Issue 2, June 2007, pp. 179 – 196. 
• Özcan, Gencer (2003); Turkish Foreign Policy Under AKP: If Only Luck Stays on 
Their Side,available at: 
http://www.tusiad.us/Content/uploaded/TURKISH%20FOREIGN%20POLICY%20
AND%20AKP%20--%20GENCER%20OZCAN.PDF ( accessed on 21.05.08, 
12:29) 
• Özel, Soli (2002); A brave new world in Turkish Politics, Insight Turkey, Volume 
4, Number 4/2002, pp.3-6. 
• Özel, Soli (2003); Turkey at the Polls: After the Tsunami, Journal of Democracy 
Volume 14, Number 2 April 2003, p. 80-94 
• Özkan, Mehmet; Turkey Discovers Africa: Implications and Prospects, SETA 
Policy Brief, September 2008, No. 22. 
• Podeh, Elie (2007); “The Final Fall of the Ottoman Empire”: Arab Discourse over 
Turkey's Accession to the European Union, Turkish Studies, Volume 8, Issue 3, 
September 2007, pp. 317 – 328. 
• Robins, Philip (2003); Confusion at home confusion abroad: Turkey between 
Copenhagen and Iraq, International Affairs 79, 3 (2003), pp. 547-566. 
• Robins, Philip (2007); Turkish foreign policy since 2002: between a post-Islamist' 
government and a Kemalist state, International Affairs, Volume 83, Issue 2, Date: 
March 2007, Pages: 289-304 
 234 
 
• Rubin, Michael (2005); Green Money, Islamist Politics in Turkey, Middle East 
Quarterly, Winter 2005. 
• Saltiel, Leon (2006); Expecting the Unexpected: Turkey in a Changing 
Environment, Insight Turkey, Volume 8, Number 2/2006. 
• Sarigil, Zeki (2007); Europeanization as Institutional Change: The Case of the 
Turkish Military, Mediterranean Politics, Volume 12, Issue 1, March 2007, pp. 39–
57. 
• Sayari, Sabri; Hasanov, Alim (2008); The 2007 Elections and Parliamentary Elites 
in Turkey: The Emergence of a New Political Class, Turkish Studies, Volume 9, 
Issue 2 June 2008 , pp. 345 – 361 
• Shafiq, Mounir (2009); Turkey’s Justice and Development Party through Arab 
Eyes, Insight Turkey, Vol. 11 / No. 1 / 2009 January – March, pp. 33-41. 
• Shankland, David (2007); Islam and politics in Turkey: The 2007 presidential 
elections and beyond, International Affairs, Volume 83, Issue 2, Date: March 2007, 
Pages: 357-371. 
• Simsek, Sefa (2004); New Social Movements in Turkey Since 1980, Turkish 
Studies, Volume 5, Issue 2, Summer 2004, pp. 111–139. 
• Simsek, Sefa (2004); The transformation of civil society in Turkey: from quantity 
to quality,  Turkish Studies, Volume 5, Issue 3, Autumn 2004, pp. 46 – 74. 
• Stavris George; Global Governance and Turkey:  A two way window for a rising 
power, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 121-129. 
• Stone, Leonard A. (2004); Turkish Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity, Insight 
Turkey, Volume 6, Number 4/2004. 
• Tank, Pinar (2005); Political Islam in Turkey: A state of controlled secularity, 
Turkish Studies, Volume 6, Issue 1 March 2005, pp. 3 – 19. 
• Taskin, Yüksel (2008); AKP's Move to “Conquer” the Center-Right: Its Prospects 
and Possible Impacts on the Democratization Process, Turkish Studies, Volume 9, 
Issue 1, March 2008, pp. 53-72. 
• Tepe, Sultan (2005); Turkey´s AKP: A model “Muslim-Democratic” Party,  
Journal of Democracy Volume 16, Number 3 July 2005, p. 69-82. 
• Tibi, Bassam (1998); Die Postkemalistsiche Türkei, Zwischen EU und 
pantürkischem Islamismus, Internationale Politik, 1/1998. 
• Tibi, Bassam (2008); Why they can`t be democratic, Journal of Democracy 
Volume 19, Number 3 July 2008, p. 43-48. 
• Tibi, Bassam (2009); Islamists Approach Europe Turkey's Islamist Danger, Middle 
East Quarterly Winter 2009, pp. 47-54 
• Tok, Evren; Anatolien Cities and the new spirit of Turkish Capitalism,  Turkish 
Policy Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 81-89. 
• Toprak, Binnaz (2005); Islam and Democracy in Turkey, Turkish Studies, Volume 
6, Issue 2, June 2005, pp. 167–186 
• Toros, Emre (2007); Understanding the Role of Civil Society as an Agent for 
Democratic Consolidation: The Turkish Case, Turkish Studies, Volume 8, Issue 3, 
September 2007, pp. 395 – 415. 
• Tunander, Ola (1995); A New Ottoman Empire?: The Choice for Turkey: Euro-
Asian Centre vs National Fortress, Security Dialogue, 1995; 26, pp. 413-426. 
• Turan, İlter (2007); Unstable stability: Turkish politics at the crossroads?, 
International Affairs, Volume 83, Issue 2, Date: March 2007, Pages: 319-338 
• Türkmen, Füsun (2008); The European Union and Democratization in Turkey The 
Role of the Elites, Human Rights Quarterly 30 (2008), pp. 146–163 
 235 
 
• Tüzmen, Kürsad (2005); Turkey's foreign trade strategy, Insight Turkey, Volume7, 
Number 1/2005. 
• Ulusoy, Kivanc (2008); The Europeanization of Turkey and its impact on the 
Cyprus problem, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Volume 10, Issue 3, 
December 2008, pp. 309–329. 
• Uslu, Emrullah (2008); Ulusalcılık: The Neo-nationalist Resurgence in Turkey, 
Turkish Studies, Volume 9, Issue 1, March 2008, pp. 73 – 97. 
• Vermeiren, Dirk; Turkey`s Potential Lies in its Future, not in its Past, Turkish 
Policy Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 115-119. 
• Verney, Susannah (2007); National identity and political change on Turkey's road 
to EU membership, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Volume 9, Issue 3, 
December 2007, pp. 213–221. 
• Walker, Joshua W. (2007); Learning Strategic Depth: Implications of Turkey's 
New Foreign Policy Doctrine, Insight Turkey, Volume 9, Number 3/2007. 
• Wendt, Alexander (1992); Anarchy is what states make of it: the social 
construction of power politics, International Organization, 46, 2, Spring 1999, pp. 
391-425.  
• Wendt, Alexander (1995); Constructing International Politics, International 
Security, Vol. 20,  No. 1, Summer, 1995, pp. 71-81. 
• Yavuz, M. Hakan (1998): Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise of 
Neo-Ottomanism, Middle East Critique, 7:12, pp.19-41. 
• Yavuz, M. Hakan (1999); Search for a New Social Contract in Turkey: Fethullah 
Gülen, the Virtue Party and the Kurds, SAIS Review, Volume 19, Number 1, 
Winter-Spring 1999, pp. 114-143 
• Yildirim, A. Kadir (2009); Muslim Democratic Parties in Turkey, Egypt and 
Morocco: An Economic Explanation, Insight Turkey, Volume 11, Number 4/2009, 
pp.65-76. 
• Yildirim, Ergün/ Inac, Hüsamettin/ Özler, Hayrettin (2007); A Sociological 
Representation of the Justice and Development Party: Is It a Political Design or a 
Political Becoming?, Turkish Studies, Volume 8, Issue 1, March 2007, pages 5 – 24. 
• Yılmaz, Hakan (2008);  Conservatism in Turkey, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 7, 
No. 1, Fall 2008, pp.57-63. 
• Yilmaz, Kamil (2009); The Emergence and Rise of Conservative Elite in Turkey, 
Insight Turkey, Volume 11, Number 2/2009, pp.113-136. 
• Zalewski, Piotr; Turkish Foreign Policy, Telling Style from Substance, Turkish 
Policy Quarterly Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 53-60. 
• Ziya, Önis (2006); Turkey's encounters with the new Europe: multiple 
transformations, inherent dilemmas and the challenges ahead, Journal of Balkan and 
Near Eastern Studies, Volume 8, Issue 3, December 2006, pp. 279–298. 
• Ziya, Önis (2007); Conservative globalists versus defensive nationalists: political 
parties and paradoxes of Europeanization in Turkey, Journal of Balkan and Near 
Eastern Studies, Volume 9, Issue 3, December 2007, pp. 247-261. 
• Zucconi, Mario (2009); The Impact of the EU Connection on Turkey's Domestic 
and Foreign Policy Turkish Studies, Volume 10, Issue 1, March 2009, pp. 25–36. 
 
Theses  
 
• Bekaroglu Dogan, Yüksel (2005); Der neue Konservatismus in der Türkei 
Wissenssoziologische Analyse eines kulturellen Codes, dargestellt am Beispiel der 
"Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi" (AKP/ "Die Partei für Gerechtigkeit und 
 236 
 
Entwicklung"), Diplomarbeit,  Universität Wien Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät, 
Wien. 
• Çalış, Şaban (1996); The role of identity in the making of modern Turkish foreign 
policy, Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Nottingham. 
• Demiray, Muhittin (2001); Die regionale Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Türkei 
in der Ära Özal (1983-1993): Vor dem Hintergrund der innenpolitischen 
Entwicklungen, Dissertation Universität Hamburg. 
• Dicle, Betül (2008); Factors driving Turkish Foreign Policy, Master Thesis, 
Louisiana State University. 
• Günay, Cengiz (2005); From Islamists to Muslim democrats: the trajectory of 
Islamism in Egypt and Turkey before the background of historical, political and 
economic developments, Univ. Wien, Dissertation. 
• Özdemir, Eyüp (2006); Türk Dis Politikasinda Silahli Kuvvetlerin Rolü:1990-2005 
(The role of armed forces in Turkish foreign policy 1990-2005), Master Thesis, 
Selcuk University, Konya.  
• Turhan, Şuayip (2007); Die politischen Entwicklungen in der Türkei seit 1980 und 
die Partei der Gerechtigkeit und Entwicklung (AKP), Diplomarbeit Universität 
Wien Fakultät für Sozialwissenschaften, Wien. 
• Ulusoy, Hasan (2005); A Constructivist Analysis of Turkey`s Foreign and Security 
Policy in the Post Cold War Era, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Middle East Technical 
University, October 2005,  Ankara. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 237 
 
Curriculum Vitae 
 
Name:                               Mag. Enes  Bayraklı     
Date of Birth:                  25 October 1983 
Nationality :                    Turkish 
Place of Birth:                 Gölcük/ Kocaeli/ Turkey 
 
Education  
• 2007 SS- 2012 SS, PhD, University of Vienna, Political Science   
• 2009 WS 2010 SS, PhD, Erasmus Exchange Program, University of Nottingham 
UK, School of Politics and International Relations. 
• 2001 WS-2006 SS, Diplomstudium, University of Vienna, Political Science  
Master Thesis: Kurdish- Israeli Relatons in Northern Iraq (A Conspiracy Theory or 
Realpolitical Cooperation) (In German) 
• 2001 SS:  German Language Courses  in Vienna 
• 2000 WS: German Language Courses in Istanbul 
• 1999 WS–2000 SS, Beykent University Istanbul, International Relations, English 
Language School 
• 1996-1999 Turkey/Kocaeli/ Gölcük İ.H.L (High School)  
• 1994-1996 Turkey/Kocaeli/ Gölcük Piyalepaşa Ortaokulu (Secondary School) 
• 1989-1994 Turkey/ Kocaeli/ Gölcük Pirireis İlkokulu (Primary School)   
 
Work Experience 
• December 2011- Deputy Director at Yunus Emre Institute London in UK 
• August 2011- December 2011, Director at Yunus Emre Institute Bucharest and 
Constanta in Romania 
• January 2011- August 2011, Expert at Yunus Emre Institute London in UK  
• September 2006- August 2009: Founding Member, Member of Executive Board, 
Sections Secretary of Integration and EU of UETD Austria (Union of European 
Turkish Democrats). 
• 2005- 2011 Member of Editorial Board of Sabah Ülkesi, (Journal for Culture and 
Art (in Turkish), Published Quarterly 
 
Publication 
• Kurdisch israelischen Beziehungen im Nordirak, Verschwörungstheorie oder 
Konzept einer realpolitischen Kooperation, (Kurdish- Israeli Relations in Northern 
Iraq: A Conspiracy Theory or Realpolitical Cooperation), VDM Publishing, 
August, 2009, Saarbrücken. 
 
Languages:          -   German: Advanced 
                             -    English: Advanced 
                             -    Turkish: Mother Tongue 
                             -    Ottoman Turkish:  Intermediate 
